New Jersey Public Safety Officers Law Blog : New Jersey Public Safety Employee Lawyer & Attorney : Pellettieri, Rabstein & Altman Law Firm : Workers Compensation, Discipline Representation for Police & Firefighters : New Jersey

In the case of In the Matter of Mark Moncho, Mark Moncho, a Sergeant First Class, appealed a final decision of the Division of State Police finding him in violation of Article VI, Section 2a of the Division’s regulations (performance of duties) and imposing a ten day suspension.

Moncho was assigned to the State Police Construction Inspection Unit. The Construction Unit is a component of the Traffic Bureau and operates as a partnership between the New Jersey State Police and the New Jersey Department of Transportation. In this capacity, Moncho was responsible for overseeing five sergeants who, in turn, supervised subordinate troopers. His responsibilities included: (1) reviewing the patrol charts and weekly reports of the sergeants and the subordinates; (2) time-keeping; and (3) day-to-day supervision of the Construction Unit.

Ultimately, the Division of State Police charged Moncho with violating a series of rules and regulations involving billing and overtime. Moncho pled not guilty to the charges and, on June 28, 2004, the Division transmitted the matter to the Office of Administrative Law. After conducting numerous hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded: (1) Moncho violated none of the specifications underlying disciplinary charges; and (2) nevertheless, Moncho was guilty of the performance of duties disciplinary charge based solely upon the amount of overtime he had earned. On August 2, 2007, the Division of State Police issued a final decision upholding the ALJ’s decision in its entirety. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Moncho argued that when the ALJ found that the Division had not met its burden of proof as to the specifications in the charges, the ALJ dismissed all bases of liability of which Moncho had notice. Moreover, Moncho argued the Division’s decision to discipline him absent a showing that he engaged in fraud, misleading conduct, or the violation of a policy is arbitrary and capricious.

In its decision, the Appellate Division agreed with Moncho’s contentions. The Court concluded that the record did not support the Division’s decision and this was further compelled by the ALJ’s incongruous findings. In effect, the ALJ created a new basis on which to justify disciplinary action after hearing and rejecting the official charges and specifications lodged against Moncho. The Court further noted that at no time was Moncho ever notified that the accrual of overtime, in and of itself, could subject him to disciplinary action. Accordingly, the Court determined the final decision of the Division to be arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and thereby vacated the penalty imposed. 

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On October 2, 2008, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey decided the case of Figueroa v. City of Camden. In the case, plaintiffs, Camden firefighters who were on the eligible list for promotion to captain, alleged employment discrimination on the basis of race on account of defendants’ refusal to promote using the existing list and the announcement of a new test and new requirements. 

The Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against all defendants because plaintiffs failed a file a complaint with the EEOC. Moreover, plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 were dismissed because nothing in the pleadings indicated the unions were acting under color of state law, despite plaintiffs’ contention that the unions conspired with the other defendants to deprive them of their rights. Finally, the §1983 claims against the New Jersey Department of Personnel, its director of selection services, and the Camden chief operating officer were also dismissed because plaintiffs failed to identify any specific acts on their part that violated plaintiffs’ federally protected rights. 

This case illustrates the importance of following the procedural requirements in filing an employment discrimination lawsuit as well as recognizing the elements required to sustain a successful cause of action. Employment discrimination lawsuits against governmental entities contain a myriad of procedural and substantive hurdles. As a result, public safety officers who intend on bringing such a cause of action should seek out competent, experienced legal representation in order to ensure their rights are protected. Without obtaining such representation, it is likely the claims will fail, either procedurally or substantively.      

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The Associated Press recently reported that a state council on Wednesday, October 22, 2008, struck down New Jersey's plan to have rural towns pay for the state police coverage that they receive due to the fact that the town’s do not have their own police force. The New Jersey Council on Local Mandates effectively voided a plan contained in Gov. Jon Corzine's budget that would have charged small towns who don't have their own police force but instead are provided with public safety coverage by the New Jersey State Police. Corzine has stated that this loss of revenue would have to be absorbed by further cuts in municipal aid.

The Council, which is an independent body created to review the constitutionality of state laws and regulations, said the requirement to force towns to pay for state police was an illegal unfunded mandate. Under New Jersey's Constitution, the Council's decision is final.

Seventy-six New Jersey towns get full-time state police patrols free, while 13 get free part-time patrols, regardless of size, population, taxes and wealth.

This is an interesting proposition as it could be an integral part of the continued push to consolidate municipal services and benefits. As a tax saving measure the Governor’s office has already started an initiative to consolidate smaller school districts within the state.  Public services will certainly follow.  While a reduction of officers on the road is unlikely, it is not too speculative to state that the suggestion of sharing administrative duties between departments may be viewed as a feasible cost saving measure. As the budget gets tighter, taxes go higher, and there is a continual cry from the public for assistance; we may see novel propositions that can have an effect upon the employment of public safety officers and the administrators of public safety departments. Let’s keep an eye on this one.

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In the case of In the Matter of Carpenito, Sergeant Vincent Capenito appealed a final agency decision dismissing him from the Division of State Police. The Appellate Division sustained Carpenito’s dismissal and rejected his contention that the policy of progressive discipline required a less severe sanction.

On March 24, 2006, Carpenito was charged with five disciplinary infractions of the rules and regulations of the Division of State Police. The case was eventually transferred to the Office of Administrative Law as contested matter. A seven day hearing was conducted by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), who issued an initial decision finding Carpenito guilty of the charges against him and recommending his termination of employment. Thereafter, Colonel Joseph Fuentes, Superintendent of the State Police, adopted the findings of the ALJ and dismissed Carpenito from the Division. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Carpenito argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the findings that he engaged in conduct that warranted discipline; and (2) the sanction of dismissal was inconsistent with the general policy of progressive discipline. The Court, in rejecting Carpenito’s arguments, found that the Superintendent’s determination that Carpenito left his post while on duty and lied to investigators was based on Carpenito’s own admissions and, therefore, Carpenito’s contention that he was denied his right to cross-examine his wife because of her invocation of her Fifth Amendment right was of no consequence. 

Moreover, the Court found the Superintendent was entirely justified in terminating Carpenito’s employment due to the seriousness of the misconduct. The Court held that the Superintendent properly: (1) recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished record and; (2) considered Carpenito’s prior disciplinary history and numerous occasions of alleged domestic disputes. As a result, the Court determined the application of progressive discipline was not appropriate in light of Carpenito’s egregious conduct.

This case illustrates an instance of where a general policy of progressive discipline will not be adhered to by a public employer. Should a disciplinary infraction be very serious in nature, a policy of progressive discipline can and will be abandoned so as to ensure a proper disciplinary response. This outcome should be noted by all public safety officers who intend to rely upon their employer’s policy of progressive discipline when contesting a disciplinary action. The seriousness of the misconduct, along with prior disciplinary history, may be used to circumvent a policy of progressive discipline and, therefore, may impose more serious consequences upon an officer than originally anticipated.  

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In the case of In re Carry Permit of Andros, A-4077-06T4, the Appellate Division held that the State of New Jersey’s authority to revoke a retired police officer’s permit to carry a handgun is not preempted by federal law.

James Andros was an Atlantic City police officer from 1968 to 2003. Prior to his retirement in good standing, Andros applied for and obtained a permit to carry a handgun. This action concerns Andros’ appeal from a judgment granting the State’s application, under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6L(6), to revoke his permit to carry a firearm.

Andros challenged denial of his motion to dismiss the State’s application because of federal preemption under 18 U.S.C.A. § 926C, enacted as part of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Safety Act of 2004, which amended 18 U.S.C.A. § 921, et. seq., relating to firearms. Andros contended: (1) that the revocation was preempted; and (2) the Law Division erred in finding that the State had presented “good cause” for the revocation.

The Law Division Judge denied Andros’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that the State was not preempted from revoking the license under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6L(6). The Judge found that N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6L(6) did not bar a retired New Jersey law enforcement officer, or officers from other states who are qualified in those states, from carrying a concealed weapon as long as he meets New Jersey’s qualification standards. Consequently, the Judge concluded that N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6L remained valid.

On appeal, the Appellate Division, in affirming the revocation, held that the federal Law Enforcement Officers’ Safety Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C.A. §926C, does not pre-empt a state from revoking a retired police officer’s permit to carry a handgun under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-6L. In conceding Andros satisfied the requirements of federal act, the Court indicated a retired officer’s conduct permits the licensing state to revoke the permit, as evidenced by the requirements for qualification and testing every year in U.S.C.A. § 926C(c)(5). In other words, the federal act expressly permits states to set standards for training and qualification consistent with those of “active law enforcement officers.”  

The Court agreed with the Law Division Judge that the federal act merely preempts a state’s ability to preclude, or change the requirements for, carrying the firearm interstate, if the state permits licensing of the retired officer. As a result, New Jersey retains jurisdiction to hear the state’s contention that it can establish good cause justifying the revocation. With these principles in mind, the Court found no congressional intent to preclude the action taken by the State here and no basis for concluding that a state cannot revoke a handgun permit because Congress authorizes a carrier when licensed in one state to possess it in another. 

This case illustrates the State’s ability to limit a retired public safety officer’s ability to carry a firearm. Recently, this topic has become an important issue for retired officers throughout the State of New Jersey. This case is significant in that shows the State of New Jersey is not precluded under federal law from seeking and ultimately obtaining revocation of an officer’s permit to carry a firearm. The evolving case law regarding retired officers and their ability to carry a firearm should be followed closely so as to ensure the officers’ rights are protected.   

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In State v. Thompson, A-2279-07T4, the Appellate Division held that a violation of the Conflicts of Interest Law and a code of conduct adopted pursuant thereto is not a sufficient basis for criminal prosecution for official misconduct.

In the case, the State appealed from an order dismissing 36 counts of a 42 count indictment. Thirty two counts charged six Treasury employees and two employees of OSI Collection Services, Inc., a vendor selected by the State, after competitive bidding, to collect tax deficiencies and delinquencies, with official misconduct. Four counts charged two of the State employees and the OSI employees with engaging in a pattern of official misconduct.

Twenty eight of the counts can be grouped into fourteen pairs. One count in each pair charged the State employee(s) and an OSI employee, as an accomplice, with the receipt of a benefit, including meals, entertainment, spa treatments and golf outings. The other count charged failure to report the receipt of the benefit to the appropriate ethics authority. In large part, the State relied on the Department’s Code of Ethics as the source of the duty allegedly breached.

Four counts also charged official misconduct when State employees failed to recuse themselves from the process involving an allegation of improper billing by OSI, the extension of OSI’s contract, selecting the committee that evaluated the bids, determined the winning bidder, and setting conditions on the bid that presumably gave OSI a competitive advantage in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2a.

The Appellate Division, in affirming the dismissal of the receiving and failure to report counts, held that reliance on a violation of the Conflicts of Interest Law alone does not set forth a basis to impose criminal sanctions under the official misconduct statute as the imposition of criminal sanctions does not follow from a simple conflict of interest. There must be some additional allegation of wrongdoing. 

Considering the case law regarding official misconduct, the Court concluded that the imposition of criminal sanctions does not follow from a simple conflict of interest. Culpability is not based on the receipt of a gift in the absence of some additional allegation of wrongdoing. The Conflicts of Interest Law does not set forth a basis for criminal liability under the official misconduct statute. Although it sets forth the ethical obligations of State employment, its terms are not self-executing and do not proscribe any conduct. 

The Court also noted that the Conflicts of Interest Law and Code of Ethics apply to all employees in the Department, providing general and generic rules. However, official misconduct requires an alleged failure to perform a duty specifically required of the defendant’s office. Moreover, the Conflicts of Interest Law does not provide sufficient notice that the unreasonable appearance of impropriety may lead to a defendant’s conviction of a crime.

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In Communication Workers of America v. State of New Jersey, the appellants challenged an amendment made by the State Health Benefits Commission to the retiree prescription drug card pilot plan. In support, appellants argued that the rule is invalid and unenforceable because it reduces post-retirement health care benefits. 

The Appellate Division affirmed the amendment to N.J.A.C. 17:9-6.10(h) as well as a concurrent resolution. The Court held that the rule allowing adjustment of the cap on out-of-pocket expenditures is consistent with statutory authority governing the prescription drug benefit plan. The Court also noted that the pilot plan, as adopted, is reasonable and necessary to preserve the financial integrity of the plan.

This entry serves as follow up to the one regarding the State Health Benefits Program. As you can see, proposed changes or changes actually made to the State Health Benefits Program have become an increasingly important topic for all public employees. Recently, the State of New Jersey has become especially active in seeking to amend or alter the benefits packages offered to its employees through contract negotiations. Undoubtedly, as more collective bargaining units negotiate their contracts, this topic, which involves the potential for premium sharing by the employees, will come to the forefront.

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In the case Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 06-2591, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a police officer’s testimony in a police corruption case is protected speech and his superiors are not entitled to qualified immunity regarding his retaliation claim. 

Appellee, Robert Reilly, a former Atlantic City police officer, filed suit against Robert Flipping, the Director of Public Safety, and Arthur Snellbaker, the Chief of Police, claiming that they retaliated against him for his participation, including trial testimony, in an investigation into police corruption a decade earlier. The alleged retaliation involved defendants formally recommending Reilly be demoted and suspended for 90 days, despite, after an extensive investigation, an independent hearing officer’s recommendation that Reilly serve a four day suspension for violating police department regulations.

Reilly accepted Flipping’s offer that he retire instead of being disciplined. Thereafter, Reilly filed this action alleging defendants’ actions violated his First Amendment free speech rights and Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. The District Court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the procedural due process claim, thereby declining to grant them qualified immunity. The Court also denied their motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim. This appeal followed.

The Third Circuit indicated that determining whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity involves a two-step analysis. First, the court must decide whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged and, if so, whether the right was clearly established. If the answer to the latter is “yes,” the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.

In analyzing whether Reilly had the claimed First Amendment right, the Third Circuit cited Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), which distinguished between employee speech and citizen speech and held that the First Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employee’s expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities. Defendants argued under Garcetti they are entitled to qualified immunity on Reilly’s First Amendment claim because his testimony was made pursuant to his official duties and, thus, not protected by the First Amendment. 

In rejecting this argument, the Third Circuit noted: (1) every citizen owes the duty of giving testimony to aid in the enforcement of the law; (2) the overwhelming weight of authority concludes that an employee’s truthful testimony is protected by the First Amendment; and (3) there is a need to protect the integrity of the judicial process. Therefore, the Court concluded that the fact that Reilly’s official duties provided the impetus to appear in court is immaterial to his independent obligation as a citizen to testify truthfully. Reilly’s testimony constituted citizen speech and his claim is not foreclosed by the “official duties” doctrine announced in Garcetti and, as a result, defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. 

This case has significance for any public safety officer who is called to testimony in a matter related to his official duties. Public safety officers, as with other citizens, have an obligation to testify truthfully in a court proceeding not only to preserve the integrity of the judicial process, but to ensure just enforcement the law. More importantly, however, this case illustrates that an officer’s superiors who retaliate against him/her will not be entitled to qualified immunity in a subsequent civil suit.      

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In the case entitled, In the Matter of Herrick, etc. 33-2-1258, The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division opined that a police officer serving in the elevated civil service title of captain in order to fill a vacancy created by a temporary leave of absence due to a military obligation has no claim to permanent appointment for the title that was temporarily filled.  However despite this ruling,  in its opinion the court did differentiate between temporarily filling a vacancy due to a disciplinary action versus a military leave of absence.  It appears based on the courts reasoning that had the vacancy been temporarily filled due to the fact that the individual that occupied the permanent title were suspended for disciplinary reasons, the appellants would have had a legitimate claim to the permanent title.  Expanded reasoning in this case would have been helpful to understand the direction of the court. 

It is important to note that should a public safety officer occupy an elevated civil service title for a period of time due to the fact that the permanent title holder is suspended from employment for disciplinary infractions, the court may entertain a cause of action that the individual that is temporarily occupying the position may have a legitimate claim to the title of employment.

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 After much concern regarding the new Treasury Regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and their potential impact on members of government pension plans, the IRS and the Treasury intend to extend the date by which a governmental plan must comply with final regulations on distributions from a pension plan upon attainment of normal retirement age. Under the extension, the new Treasury Regulations will be effective for a governmental plan for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2011.     

As described in two previous blog entries, the IRS modified Treasury Regulation §1.401(a)-1 to provide an exception to the rule that pension benefits be paid only after retirement by permitting a pension plan to commence payment of retirement benefits to a participant after the participant has attained normal retirement age even if the participant has not yet had a severance from employment with the employer maintaining the plan. 

The new regulations also require a pension plan’s normal retirement age to be an age that is not earlier than the earliest age that is reasonably representative of the typical retirement age for the industry in which the covered workforce is employed.  In the case of a retirement plan where substantially all of the participants are qualified public safety officers, a normal retirement age of age 50 or later is deemed not be earlier than the earliest age that is reasonably representative of the typical retirement age for the industry in which the covered workforce is employed. 

Notice 2007-69, which provided temporary relief for certain plans that may have to change their definitions of normal retirement age to satisfy the new regulations, indicated that the new regulations do not contain a safe harbor or other guidance with respect to a normal retirement age conditioned on the completion of a stated number of years of service.  The notice requested comments on whether and how a pension plan with a normal retirement age conditioned on the completion of a stated number of years of service satisfies the requirement in §1.401(a)-1 that a pension plan be maintained primarily to provide for the payment of definitely determinable benefits after retirement or attainment of normal retirement age and how such a plan satisfies the pre-ERISA vesting rules. 

Based upon this, in Notice 2008-98, the IRS indicated its intention to amend the new regulations to change the effective date for governmental plan to plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2011.  Moreover, the notice provided that government plan sponsors may rely on this notice with respect to extension until such time as the new regulations are so amended. 

Although the implementation of the new regulations has been delayed, it is critical to keep apprised of the comments regarding whether a pension plan with a normal retirement age conditioned on the completion of a stated number of years of service satisfies the new regulations. Clearly, the resolution of this issue could drastically impact many public safety officers not only in New Jersey, but across the country. Periodic updates to this website regarding these regulations will be posted as more information becomes available.    

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              Recently, there has been much concern over new Department of Treasury regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and their effect upon State legislated pension systems for public employees. This entry summarizes the new regulations and their potential impact on the members of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (“PFRS”). After conducting research and for the reasons set forth in detail below, it our belief the new Treasury Regulations will not alter the ability of a PFRS member to retire under any existing PFRS law, including the special retirement provision allowing retirement prior to attaining the age of 50. 

By way of background, the New Jersey State PBA reported that the IRS adopted regulations that would prohibit any public safety officer in a state legislated pension system from retiring before the age of 50. As most public safety officers are aware, there is currently no minimum retirement age for a member of PFRS to qualify for a pension. In fact, all that is needed to qualify for a PFRS pension is twenty-five (25) years of service and retirement credits paid into the system. Specifically, N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.1, entitled “Special Retirement; resignation with 25 years of creditable service; allowance; death benefit”, provides in pertinent part:

Should a member resign after having established 25 years of creditable service, he may elect “special retirement,” provided, that such election is communicated by such member to the retirement system by filing a written application, duly attested, stating at what time subsequent

to the execution and filing thereof he desires to be retired…

[N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.1(a).]   

Treasury Regulation §1.401(a)-1 was recently modified. The modifications require qualified pension plans to revise the definition of normal retirement age to an age that is not earlier than the earliest age that is reasonably representative of the typical retirement age for the industry in which the covered workforce is employed. In addition, the regulations provide that a normal retirement age of at least 62 is deemed to be not earlier than the typical retirement age for the industry in which the covered workforce is employed. Thus, a plan satisfies this provision if its normal retirement age is age 62, or if its normal retirement age is the later than age 62 or another specified date, such as the later of age 62 or the fifth anniversary of plan participation. This is known as the “safe harbor” provision. 

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Most recently New Jersey GovernorJon S. Corzine signed the Public Employee Pension and Benefits Reform Act of 2008. While this bill does not affect the members of the Police and Firemen’s retirement System (PFRS), it does affect members of the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) and the Teachers Pension and Annuity Fund (TPAF). Certain Public Safety Officers in the State of New Jersey hold membership in PERS. The legislation, S-1962/A-2818, is touted to save New Jersey tax payers $150 million dollars by 2022 through new changes to the pension systems to include instituting a higher retirement age and new income eligibility requirements for enrollment in the major pension systems.

The significant changes signed into law today include:

•  Increasing the annual salary required for new workers to qualify for the state pension system to $7,500. Previously, workers required an annual compensation of only $500 to qualify for the Teachers Pension and Annuity Fund, and a minimum salary of $1,500 a year for the Public Employees Retirement System.

• Raising the retirement age from 60 to 62 for new employees to qualify for a pension without a reduction.

• The number of paid holidays for state employees is reduced to 12. It eliminates the Lincoln's Birthday holiday and combines it with Washington's Birthday, to be observed as President's Day.

The new law also makes reforms to the State Health Benefits Program (SHBP), allowing the state to offer an incentive to employees to opt out of the program and accept health coverage from other sources such as a spouse's plan. The state has the power and authority to determine whether to offer the incentive and the amount, which could not exceed half of the amount saved because of the employee's waiver of coverage.

The bill was sponsored in the Senate by Senators Barbara Buono (D-Middlesex), Stephen Sweeney (D-Salem, Cumberland, Gloucester), Nicholas Scutari (D-Middlesex, Cumberland, Union), and Tom Kean (R-Essex, Morris, Somerset, Union), and in the Assembly by Speaker Joseph Roberts (D-Camden).

While the members of PFRS have been spared by this legislation, close watch must be kept on our elected officials as it appears they are prepared to enact any cost savings measures available due to the poor financial position of the state.

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 On its website, www.njspba.com, The New Jersey State PBA has reported that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has adopted regulations that would prohibit any public safety officer in a state legislated pension system from retiring before the age of 50. The regulation in its current form is slated to go into effect on January 1, 2009.

As all public safety officers throughout the State of New Jersey are aware, there is currently no minimum retirement age for a member of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System to qualify for a pension. All that is needed to qualify for a PFRS pension is twenty five (25) years of service and retirement credits paid into the system. Based on the new regulations the State of New Jersey would be required to amend its pension laws or face the potential of being non compliant with the Federal tax code and regulations. The State PBA reports that this particular regulation has caught New Jersey politicians and the New Jersey Division of Pensions off guard and the State is not prepared to address the IRS regulations should they be enacted in 2009.

The New Jersey State PBA appears to have engaged in an extensive lobbying effort and has requested that the regulation be delayed indefinitely in order to seek a change in language impacting public safety employees. A formal request to delay the rule has already been made but the IRS has not yet acted upon it. 

The PBA goes on to further state that if the IRS rejects its request to delay the enactment of the regulation they will be seeking either federal legislation to overrule the IRS Regulation or a legal remedy challenging the regulations as a violation of PFRS member’s constitutional rights.

The Publishers of the New Jersey Public Safety Officers Law Blog are currently looking into this regulation and the legalities of the same. We will report more on this topic in the immediate future.

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 In the Matter of Martinez, A-0090-07T2, the Appellate Division held a civil service appointing authority violates the Rule of Three, N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8, in guaranteeing a promotional candidate that he or she will receive the appointment if he or she attains the highest score on the examination. 

After taking the civil service examination for promotion to deputy fire chief on March 30, 2006, appellant Kenneth Martinez, a fire captain in Passaic, was ranked first among the eligible nonveterans. A promotional list listing Martinez first was promulgated by the State Department of Personnel on June 22, 2006. However, the City was separately arranging for another candidate, Captain Christopher Szczygiel, to receive the promotion. The City had previously bypassed Szczygiel and appointed lower-ranked individuals to the rank of captain, causing Szczygiel to file an administrative appeal before the Merit System Board, as well as a civil action in the Law Division. 

A settlement of Szczygiel’s litigation was attained and on January 31, 2007, the Board issued a final decision approving the proposed settlement terms that the parties had disclosed it. Although it was not disclosed to the Board at the time, the settlement terms would allow Szczygiel to compete for the deputy chief position. In fact, the settlement guaranteed Szczygiel appointment to deputy chief, so long as his exam grade proved to be higher than that of anyone else who sat for the exam. 

Following the Board’s approval of the settlement, the Department of Personnel graded Szczygiel’s exam and determined that he had the highest score. It then generated a new promotional list for deputy chief ranking Szczygiel first and Martinez second. Thereafter, the City appointed Szczygiel deputy chief on April 1, 2007. 

Martinez filed an administrative appeal, contending that the Board’s ratification of the settlement, and the City’s actions in guaranteeing Szczygiel the appointment, violated the longstanding “Rule of Three” principle of New Jersey Civil Service Law, as well as the merit and fitness clause of the state constitution. On July 27, 2007, the Board rejected Martinez’s challenge and this appeal followed.

On appeal, Judge Sabatino opined that the guarantee in the Szczygiel was troublesome because it provided that Szczygiel would receive the promotion to deputy chief so long as he scored first on the promotional exam. The Board was not informed of the guarantee prior to its January 31, 2007 approval, final determination of Martinez’s appeal, nor was the guarantee disclosed to Martinez, who had every right to expect that the normal selection processes under the Rule of Three would be observed.

In addition, the Court stated it is doubtful that the Legislature wished to allow municipalities to dispense with the Rule of Three and reach agreements with applicants guaranteeing them a position if they scored high enough on an exam. Such individualized guarantees run contrary to the objectives of the civil service system and also deviate from the Rule of Three’s aim to include “other merit criteria” in the selection process.

This decision reinforces the importance for an appointing authority to follow the requisite procedures in granting promotions. The Rule of Three, much like other required procedures, cannot be usurped in favor of settlement agreements which undermine the goals of the Civil Service System, namely a fair and objective selection process based on merit and other criteria. 

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On October 1, 2008, Governor Jon Corzine signed into law five bills aimed at fixing New Jersey’s Workers’ Compensation System. Significantly, the bills should reduce the long delays in making injured workers whole. The legislation, the State’s first workers’ compensation overhaul in thirty years, was the product of public hearings that followed a series of articles in the The Star-Ledger of Newark that were critical of systemic delays. The articles also described a bureaucracy that was easily manipulated by employers and their attorneys. 

The bills give workers’ comp judges more authority to enforce their orders, penalize employers who fail to provide workers’ comp insurance coverage for their workers, and ensure that employees injured on the job are given prompt and adequate treatment as well as short term disability benefits. In pertinent part, the bills provide:

• S-1913: Permits workers’ comp judges to hold a separate hearing on any issue of contempt, and if contempt is found, the successful party can file a motion in Superior Court for enforcement. A judge may also impose costs and simple interest on money due and, in the event of an unreasonable delay, may award legal fees of up to 20 percent of the award.

• S-1914: Strengthens enforcement actions against employers for failure to provide workers’ comp coverage. Those employers that knowingly fail to provide coverage can be charged with a second, third, or fourth degree crime and can be fined up to $5,000.

• S-1915: Requires all employers to submit proof of workers’ comp coverage as part of its annual report. If a statement of proof is not included, the annual report will not be considered as properly filed.

• S-1916: Requires that when a doctor states an injured worker is in need of emergent medical care that employer has not authorized, the worker can file a request for treatment with the Division of Workers’ Compensation. The division and the employer must answer the request within five calendar days.

•  S-1917: Revises the membership of the Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau, presently made up primarily of insurance industry representatives. Instead, the bill requires the Department of Banking and Insurance to include members who do not represent the industry, but rather representatives of employers, labor, and licensed insurance producers. 

It will be interesting to see how these new measures alter the landscape of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation System. Hopefully, these laws will prove to be adequate in aiding injured workers and ensuring unscrupulous employers and persons will not be able to “work” the system.       

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