New Jersey Public Safety Officers Law Blog : New Jersey Public Safety Employee Lawyer & Attorney : Pellettieri, Rabstein & Altman Law Firm : Workers Compensation, Discipline Representation for Police & Firefighters : New Jersey

On October 21, 2009, the Appellate Division decided Township of Irvington v. Irvington P.B.A. Local 29, Docket No.: A-0152-08T1. In the case, the Township of Irvington appealed from Law Division orders of April 13, 2007 and July 25, 2008 that respectively confirmed an arbitration award and supplemental arbitration award rendered in arbitration proceedings resulting from grievances filed by Irvington PBA Local 29 and Irvington Superior Officers Association (hereinafter “unions”).

In December 2003, Township officials notified all salaried Township employees that in the upcoming year, instead of their annual salaries being divided by twenty-six, they would be divided by twenty-seven and be paid in twenty-seven biweekly pay periods. Of course, each paycheck would be smaller than if the twenty-six pay period schedule was followed. After some objections and discussions, the Township changed its position. Employees would be paid in twenty-six pay periods, and their annual salaries would be divided by twenty-six, but some of the mid-year pay dates would be adjusted so the pay periods were longer than fourteen days.

On July 30, 2004, the unions filed a grievance claiming that the Township’s adjustment to the four pay dates violated the terms of their collective bargaining agreements. The unions requested that the Township refrain from adjusting the payroll dates, or else pay all union members the eighty “unpaid” hours at the overtime rate of time and one half. After going through all of the required procedural steps for a grievance, the matter was presented to Arbitrator Gerard Restaino.

In his initial award, Arbitrator Restaino required the Township to pay the employees represented by the unions for an additional two-week pay period in 2004. The trial court affirmed the award, but remanded the matter to Arbitrator Restaino for further consideration of the remedy, namely the manner in which the Township would be required to pay the award, in light of the Township’s claim that payment of the total amount required would cause it a severe adverse financial impact. In a supplemental award, the arbitrator modified the remedy to lessen the fiscal impact on the Township. This appeal ensued.

In its brief, the Township argued: (1) the initial award should not have been confirmed because the arbitrator exceeded his authority by disregarding the clear terms of the parties’ collective bargaining agreements; and (2) the supplemental award should not have been confirmed because the arbitrator did not adequately consider the fiscal impact on the Township, and because the court incorrectly ruled as a matter of law that it lacked authority to determine the public policy impact of the award. The unions disputed the arguments raised by the Township, and further argued that the supplemental award was properly confirmed because the Township’s motion to vacate it was untimely.

At oral argument, the Township withdrew argument (1) described above, and advised the Court that it was limiting its argument to the fiscal impact issue. The Appellate Division, after considering the same, affirmed the determination of the trial court. After a thorough review of the record, the Court was satisfied that the trial court did not err in finding that the arbitrator sufficiently considered and addressed the fiscal impact issue in rendering his supplemental award. As a result, the Court found the award was properly confirmed.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On July 2, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided United Steel v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Company, No. 08-1911. In two consolidated cases, Plaintiffs are unions who were seeking to compel Defendants, employers of the unions’ members, to arbitrate Plaintiffs’ grievances about unilateral changes the Defendants made to employee benefit plans. In both cases, the lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the unions on the grounds that: (1) a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the parties provided for arbitration; and (2) there is no strong and forceful evidence that the parties intended to exclude these disputes from arbitration. 

In appealing the lower courts’ determinations, Defendants contended that the Plaintiff’s grievances are disputes over benefit eligibility and, thus, should be resolved using the dispute resolution provisions of the Summary Plan Description rather than the CBA. Moreover, Defendants argued that ERISA, which governs the employee benefit plans maintained by Defendants, mandates that benefit eligibility disputes of this nature should be resolved by the designated ERISA fiduciary.

In affirming the determination of the lower courts, the Third Circuit noted that the arbitration clauses in the CBAs at issue were broadly worded. Specifically, the New Jersey CBAs provide for arbitration of grievances “relating to the interpretation or to any alleged violation” of those CBAs, while the Delaware CBA provides for arbitration of “[a]ny question as to the interpretation, or any alleged violation, of any provision of” that CBA. There was no express provision in any of the CBAs that excluded Plaintiffs’ grievances. Therefore, a presumption of arbitrability applied and Defendants could only overcome this presumption by showing forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude these claims from arbitration.

The Court determined that there was no forceful evidence that the parties did not intend to submit these disputes to arbitration. In rejecting Defendants’ argument which characterized the grievances as disputes about “benefit eligibility”, the Court found the disputed issue is not whether any particular employee was eligible under the terms of the plan, but rather whether Defendants violated the CBAs by unilaterally modifying its terms. Moreover, the Court noted that were it to accept Defendants’ characterization of the grievances, this would eliminate any opportunity for a meaningful challenge to Defendants’ unilateral plan amendments and thereby thwarting the CBAs’ arbitration clauses. As such, the Court affirmed the determination of the lower courts.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On June 23, 2009, the Appellate Division decided New Jersey Transit Corporation v. P.B.A. Local 304, Docket No.: A-3341-07T3. In the case, PBA Local 304 (“PBA”) appealed from an order of the Chancery Division, General Equity Part, overturning an arbitration award that declared that New Jersey Transit (“NJT”) police officers who are transferred involuntarily by the Chief of Police are entitled to additional pay for travel time. The court held that the arbitrator’s decision violated public policy because it restricted the chief’s authority to reassign officers, thereby limiting his ability to enhance operational awareness and public safety.

This matter concerned the arbitrator’s interpretation of Article XXIII, Section 6 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The article provides in relevant part:

(a) A temporary position may, at the discretion of the Chief of Police, be assigned to an officer for a period not to exceed 30 calendar days.

(b) After a 30 calendar day period or less, the assigned officer will then be reassigned to his original position, and a second officer may then be assigned, then the third, etc.

On March 1, 2005, the NJT Chief of Police issued orders temporarily assigning two police officers to each other’s regular assignments for a period of twenty-eight calendar days. Specifically, Officer Trumble was transferred from his position in Hoboken, and assigned to Officer Sepe’s position in Newark, while Officer Sepe was assigned to Officer Trumble’s Hoboken position. The assignment orders were effective from March 5, 2005 until April 1, 2005.

On March 22, 2005, the PBA filed a grievance, alleging that the assignments constituted an “involuntary tour swap,” because the affected orders were required to change their bid work location (regular assignment) and to work each other’s bid position. On May 9, 2006, the matter was submitted to arbitration. The parties framed the issue thusly: “Was the effectuation of personnel orders P 05-047 and/or P 05-048 in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement?”

At arbitration, the PBA argued that the assignments are limited under the Article to positions that are open or vacant, and not to those positions that are already filled by officers who had been awarded those positions. NJT argued that, except for certain time limitations, the Article does not limit the Chief’s discretionary authority to assign temporary positions.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On May 28, 2009, the Honorable Peter A. Buchsbaum, J.S.C. decided Mark Petersen v. Township of Raritan, Docket No. HNT-L-446-08. The complaint alleged contractual violations of the 1997-1999 collective bargaining agreement between the Township of Raritan and the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff was police officer who retired in 1999. The 1997-99 collective bargaining agreement included retiree health benefits at Article XXII. As of July 1, 2008, current employees and retirees would no longer be able to enroll in the Traditional Plan. Those who were already enrolled in that plan, such as Plaintiff, could switch to the POS plan without any cost to them. They could, however, choose to remain in the Traditional Plan, provided they agreed to pay the excess premium between these two plans from that point in time.

Count one of the complaint alleges a violation of Section 5 of the insurance clause of the collective bargaining agreement because, as of July 1, 2008, Plaintiff is paying a premium differential for the Traditional Plan in which he is enrolled, that is, the difference in premium costs between the Traditional Plan and the POS plan offered by the Township. Count two of the complaint alleges a violation of Section 5 of the insurance clause of the collective bargaining agreement because, as of July 1, 2008, Plaintiff’s co-pays for certain prescription drugs have increased. In response to the complaint, Defendant moved for summary judgment.

The trial court found the language of the collective bargaining agreement sufficiently complex to warrant further examination. Specifically, the court found ambiguity in the insurance clause as to whether the language “shall continue to receive all health and medical benefits provided by the employer for the remainder of his life” would reasonably lead Plaintiff to believe that he would receive health coverage equivalent to the Traditional Plan for the remainder of his life. Therefore, the court determined Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was premature and, thus, factual exploration of the issues in this matter is necessary.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On May 4, 2009, the Appellate Division decided City of Clifton v. Clifton P.B.A. Local #36, Docket No.: A-4806-07T3. In the case, Defendant, Clifton P.B.A. Local #36, appealed from a trial judge’s decision vacating an arbitrator’s award of thirteen (13) shift differential (SD) days to police detectives. 

The trial judge ruled that, in a case in which the union’s grievance was filed eighteen (18) months after the alleged wrong first occurred, and not within the twenty (20) days provided for in the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator exceeded his powers when stated that he had waived the twenty (20) day contractual time limit. In reaching that conclusion, the judge discussed the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Ed. Of Borough of Alpha v. Alpha Ed. Ass’n, a case in which the Court recognized and applied the continuing violation doctrine to preserve a late-filed grievance by the union resulting from the Board’s cessation of payment of health insurance benefits. Because the trial judge found that the arbitrator exceeded his powers in considering the matter, the judge did not render an opinion on any substantive issue raised by the parties.

On appeal, the union claimed that the award was timely pursuant to the continuing violation doctrine as recognized by the Supreme Court. The City of Clifton argued, like the trial judge, that the arbitrator did not find a continuing violation to have occurred, but rather, determined to waive the contractual twenty (20) day requirement.

The Appellate Division determined the arbitrator’s decision is susceptible to both interpretations. According to the Court, the arbitrator’s decision suggests that he nominally declined to decide the applicability of the continuing violation doctrine, instead couching his decision in terms of waiver. However, the result reached was identical to the one reached in Alpha by application of the continuing violation doctrine. Consequently, the Court remanded the matter to the arbitrator for clarification of the basis for his decision on the timeliness of the action.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In the case of Grasso v. Fraternal Order of Police, Glassboro Lodge No. 108, 33-2-1617, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held that under the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et.seq, the Defendants owed no duty to the Plaintiff to represent him in a dispute with the Borough of Glassboro due to his status of not being an "employee" as defined under the act.

Grasso initially filed suit against the Borough of Glassboro for their failure to reimburse him for Medicare Part B. premiums pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.  Some time during the suit Grasso called on the FOP for representation as the matter dealt with an issue related to the collective bargaining agreement.  The FOP declined representation of Grasso, and following his success in the underlying action against the Borough, Grasso then moved against the FOP for their failure to represent him.

The Appellate Panel affirmed the Trial Court's decision to grant Summary Judgment in favor of the FOP due to the fact that Grasso can not be considered an employee under the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et.seq. 

This case is important to both collective bargaining units and retired Public Safety Officers alike as it clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of each party under the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et.seq

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On September 11, 2008, the New Jersey Law Enforcement Supervisors Association (“NJLESA”) and New Jersey Law Enforcement Commanding Officers Association (“NJLECOA”), jointly filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County against the State of New Jersey challenging the viability of N.J.S.A. 11A:6-10 and N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.13, the provisions of New Jersey law providing convention leave for State employees.

It is alleged that on or around July 15, 2008, NJLESA, the exclusive representative of those employees in the primary level supervisory law enforcement unit, and NJLECOA, the exclusive representative of superior officers and other command law enforcement personnel holding the rank of Captain or its equivalency in classified career service, requested a leave of absence with pay for certain union officials and duly authorized delegates within their organizations to attend a state convention jointly hosted by NJLESA and NJLECOA. In response, the New Jersey State Office of Employee Relations denied the request and took the position that it was not permitted to grant plaintiffs’ request because neither NJLESA nor NJLECOA were affiliated with any of the organizations delineated in N.J.S.A. 11A:6-10 and N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.13 which are entitled to convention leave.

The complaint asserts N.J.S.A. 11A:6-10 and N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.13 are arbitrarily exclusive in conferring the benefit of convention leave on certain fraternal organizations while excluding others, thereby violating certain provisions of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. Consequently, NJLESA and NJLECOA seek a declaration that N.J.S.A. 11A:6-10 and N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.13 are unconstitutional or, alternatively, for an order directing the State of New Jersey to award convention leave to members of their organization. It will be interesting to see how this suit develops and how the state of New Jersey reacts to preserving this piece of legislation.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic Vicinage, (DeLuccia, J.S.C.) recently interpreted a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) pertaining to discipline in the case of Whitaker v. Passaic County Sheriff's Department, 33-3-139.  In this case the Plaintiff appealed her right to challenge minor disciplinary charges which were previously dismissed for alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the CBA. 

Instead of proceeding with the grievance procedure as outlined under the CBA, Whittaker opted to challenge the minor discipline at a disciplinary hearing.  After the disciplinary hearing was decided, Whittaker next attempted to appeal the decision through the grievance procedure as outlined in the CBA.  Whittaker was denied the right to grieve the charges by her employer stating that she was precluded from doing so due to the fact that she had chosen to challenge the charges at a hearing and is thus not entitled to pursue the case by way of grievance. 

The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, took the liberty to interpret the CBA and held that a reasonable interpretation of the agreement would permit an employee charged with a minor disciplinary infraction to proceed first to an administrative hearing to challenge the charges and then, if adverse action is taken by the employer, to demand arbitration of the dispute under the CBA. 

This is an interesting case in that it appears to give a Public Safety Officer "two bites at the apple" when challenging minor disciplinary charges.  Furthermore, we normally do not see Superior Court Judges stepping into disputes between public employers and employees especially when it comes to the interpretation of a CBA.  Interpretation of agreements is traditionally left to the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) and the Appellate Division.  I think what we should take away from this case is that there is always more than one reasonable interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, and Public Safety Officers should not be afraid or hesitate in certain circumstances to challenge their employers in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link