Distinction Between Public and Private Speech

 

In Brennan v. Township of Fairfield, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey addressed an important topic for public safety officers, freedom of speech. In this case, Plaintiff, a police officer, alleged he was retaliated against for distributing a memorandum on police letterhead to the Mayor and Township Council. The memorandum contained the officer’s reasons for having issued two motor vehicle summonses to a township administrator.   

Defendants moved for summary judgment of plaintiff’s claim. The Court granted the motion because Plaintiff’s speech was made pursuant to his duties as a police officer. Therefore, his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. In addition to seeking summary judgment, Defendants also moved for sanctions against Plaintiff for the assertion of a claim which Plaintiff later withdrew. The Court denied this motion along with Defendants’ other motions to disqualify counsel and to compel mediation.   

This case, although very brief, illustrates how one’s freedom of speech can be limited based on the context in which the speech is offered. Speech made pursuant to one’s duties as a public safety officer will not be protected by the First Amendment, thereby negating support of a retaliation claim. As a result, it is important for public safety officers to be cognizant of the distinction between speech made pursuant to their employment from all other forms.

Arrest of Undercover Agent Gives Rise to Various Claims

 

In Frohner v. City of Wildwood, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey addressed a very unusual and interesting factual scenario. The lawsuit asserted numerous claims arising out of the arrest and handcuffing of plaintiff, an undercover FBI agent, by defendants, local police officers. Defendants suspected plaintiff was a motorcyclist impersonating an FBI agent.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on a variety of plaintiff’s claims. First, the Court denied defendants’ motions as to the false-arrest claims because defendants failed to show as a matter of law that they had probable cause or arguable probable cause to believe plaintiff was impersonating an FBI agent. Next, the Court denied defendants’ motion as to the claim that defendants’ conducted an unlawful search and seizure of plaintiff’s car. The Court indicated that it could not be concluded that the search was incident to a lawful arrest.

The Court also denied defendants’ motion as to plaintiff’s excessive-force and punitive damages claims. The Court held that such a claim will lie for the use of excessively tight handcuffs and that expert testimony is not required. With regard to plaintiff’s punitive damages claim, the Court noted that the issue as to whether any defendant was recklessly indifferent to plaintiff’s rights was a jury question. 

Although the vast majority of plaintiff’s claims were upheld, the Court did grant defendants summary judgment on one of the claims. The Court determined that since plaintiff has not shown a pattern of constitutional violations indicating defendants were deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that constitutional violations such as those alleged in this case would occur, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on that claim.

This case shows that arrests of undercover agents by local police departments, much like arrests of everyday citizens, can give rise to various claims being brought against the departments. Even with the unusual nature of the facts of this case, this case also illustrates that Courts are typically reluctant to dismiss certain claims as long as some evidence in support thereof has been offered.    

Non-Civil Service Municipality's Promotion Decision Overturned

 

On November 17, 2008, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the case of Borough v. Glassboro v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 108,  A-75-07. In this case, the Court addressed the validity of an arbitrator’s award addressing the legality of a police officer promotion made by the Borough of Glassboro, a non-civil service municipality.

In 2004, the Borough of Glassboro Police Department (“Borough”) announced an opening for the position of lieutenant. Three candidates applied, including Sergeants Peter Amico and William Highley. As a non-civil service municipality, the Borough is not subject to the statutory requirements of a comprehensive promotional procedure. Rather, state law only requires that due consideration is given to the officer proposed for promotion and to the length and merit of the officer’s service, with preference being given to seniority in service.

The Borough implemented a three stage promotional procedure. The scores from Phase I and II were aggregated for a total possible score of 100%. Phase I consisted of an interview with the Borough Chief of Police and was worth 20%. Phase II involved an oral and written exam and was worth 80%. Phase IIA, the written portion, was a multiple-choice test designed by the International Association of Police Chiefs. Phase IIB, the oral component, consisted of interviews with a panel of four independent police chiefs. Following Phase I and II, the cumulative final scores were as follows: Sergeant Amico, 93.8, and Sergeant Highley, 92.4.

In Phase III, each applicant was interviewed by the Borough Public Safety Committee, which included Borough Council members, the Borough Administrator, and the Chief of Police. Candidates were advised that they would be asked questions “concerning their department’s SOPs Rules and Regulations, in addition to questions concerning the Boro Personnel Policy & Procedures and Boro Ordinances.” The purpose of Phase III was to test leadership intangibles that are necessary for the position and evade formal testing. After the completion of Phase III, Highley, ranked second in the Phase I and II testing, was awarded the promotion.

Amico learned in subsequent conversations with the Chief of Police and the Borough Administrator that his move out of the Borough had a possible negative effect on the promotional decision. The Fraternal Order of Police, Local 108 (“FOP”) filed a grievance on Amico’s behalf, thereby claiming: (1) that the use of Phase III as more than a “confirmatory interview” altered the terms and conditions of employment in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the Borough and FOP; and (2) the Borough violated N.J.S.A. 40A:14-122.6 by making residency a factor in its promotional decision.

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BOROUGH'S PROMOTIONAL PROCESS UPHELD

 

In the matter of Paul Weber v. Borough of Glen Rock, A-1079-07T3, Plaintiff, Paul Weber, appealed from two trial court orders: (1) an order dated May 3, 2006 dismissing some of his claims; and (2) an order dated September 5, 2007 granting summary judgment to defendants on the balance of the claims. After reviewing the contentions raised on appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s determinations. 

Weber is a member of the Glen Rock Police Department. After joining the Department as a patrolman in 1978, he was promoted to the rank of sergeant in 1985. Since 1985, there have been four occasions when there was an opening within the Department for a member to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant. Weber applied for this promotion on each occasion and was unsuccessful. 

In 2004, the successful applicant was Garret Merselis, who was promoted from sergeant to lieutenant. In 2005, a vacancy developed for the position of captain. Thereafter, Merselis, the only lieutenant on the Glen Rock force at that time, was promoted to the rank of captain. The promotion of Merselis to captain created a vacancy for the position of lieutenant. Plaintiff applied, as did three other members of the Department. On this occasion, Frederick Stahman was selected for promotion to the rank of lieutenant.

Plaintiff, who had more seniority than did either Merselis or Stahman at the time of their respective promotions, filed suit contending that the promotional process was flawed. Specifically, he sought to reopen the process relating to the most recent promotional opening. In support, Weber contended: (1) the Borough was required to administer examinations to those applying for promotion and not rely exclusively on interviews; and (2) the Borough, in passing him over for promotion, did not comply with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-129. 

The Court rejected both of Weber’s assertions. The Borough is not a civil service municipality and followed its own two-step promotional process, a written test followed by interviews, until 1992 when, under the new police chief, only interviews were used to select a candidate for promotion to lieutenant. The Court found that where all members of the committee participated in the interviews of all the candidates, the process employed by Glen Rock does not suffer from the same deficiencies criticized in Rox v. Dep’t of Civil Service, 141 N.J. Super. 463, 467 (App. Div. 1976). In Rox, different panels interviewed the various candidates and used different criteria in making promotional decisions. This was not the situation in this case.

Moreover, the Court held that seniority, in and of itself, is not determinative of promotion. The Court indicated seniority is merely an additional factor to be considered on the merits of the evaluation of individuals for promotion and not a mechanical rule which guarantees promotion to a senior employee. In this case, it was established Weber’s seniority was considered. That is all he was entitled to; he was not entitled to have it treated as controlling.          

         

Firefighters' Discrimination Suit Dismissed

 

On October 2, 2008, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey decided the case of Figueroa v. City of Camden. In the case, plaintiffs, Camden firefighters who were on the eligible list for promotion to captain, alleged employment discrimination on the basis of race on account of defendants’ refusal to promote using the existing list and the announcement of a new test and new requirements. 

The Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against all defendants because plaintiffs failed a file a complaint with the EEOC. Moreover, plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 were dismissed because nothing in the pleadings indicated the unions were acting under color of state law, despite plaintiffs’ contention that the unions conspired with the other defendants to deprive them of their rights. Finally, the §1983 claims against the New Jersey Department of Personnel, its director of selection services, and the Camden chief operating officer were also dismissed because plaintiffs failed to identify any specific acts on their part that violated plaintiffs’ federally protected rights. 

This case illustrates the importance of following the procedural requirements in filing an employment discrimination lawsuit as well as recognizing the elements required to sustain a successful cause of action. Employment discrimination lawsuits against governmental entities contain a myriad of procedural and substantive hurdles. As a result, public safety officers who intend on bringing such a cause of action should seek out competent, experienced legal representation in order to ensure their rights are protected. Without obtaining such representation, it is likely the claims will fail, either procedurally or substantively.      

 

         

Municipalities Will Not Pay For State Police Patrols

The Associated Press recently reported that a state council on Wednesday, October 22, 2008, struck down New Jersey's plan to have rural towns pay for the state police coverage that they receive due to the fact that the town’s do not have their own police force. The New Jersey Council on Local Mandates effectively voided a plan contained in Gov. Jon Corzine's budget that would have charged small towns who don't have their own police force but instead are provided with public safety coverage by the New Jersey State Police. Corzine has stated that this loss of revenue would have to be absorbed by further cuts in municipal aid.

The Council, which is an independent body created to review the constitutionality of state laws and regulations, said the requirement to force towns to pay for state police was an illegal unfunded mandate. Under New Jersey's Constitution, the Council's decision is final.

Seventy-six New Jersey towns get full-time state police patrols free, while 13 get free part-time patrols, regardless of size, population, taxes and wealth.

This is an interesting proposition as it could be an integral part of the continued push to consolidate municipal services and benefits. As a tax saving measure the Governor’s office has already started an initiative to consolidate smaller school districts within the state.  Public services will certainly follow.  While a reduction of officers on the road is unlikely, it is not too speculative to state that the suggestion of sharing administrative duties between departments may be viewed as a feasible cost saving measure. As the budget gets tighter, taxes go higher, and there is a continual cry from the public for assistance; we may see novel propositions that can have an effect upon the employment of public safety officers and the administrators of public safety departments. Let’s keep an eye on this one.

Free Speech and Labor Protesting Collide

On September 23, 2008, the New Jersey Supreme Court entertained oral argument in the case of State v. DeAngelo, A-73-07, wherein the issues of labor protesting and free speech collide. The case involves a union official who was fined for displaying a 10-foot tall, inflatable rat at a Lawrence Township labor rally, thereby claiming the municipality violated his constitutional and statutory rights.

Wayne DeAngelo, a senior official with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 269, was fined $100 and assessed $33 in court costs for using the balloon to protest a gym being built without union labor. DeAngelo asked the Court to declare the ordinance in question, which prohibits “banners, pennants streamers, pinwheels, or similar devices; vehicle signs, portable signs, balloon signs or other inflated signs (except grand opening signs)”, unconstitutional and violative of the National Labor Relations Act. The trial court and the Appellate Division have rejected the challenge, finding the ordinance a valid time, place, and manner restriction on commercial speech.

At the hearing, DeAngelo asserted the ordinance was “overbroad” because it prohibits all forms of signs used in protests, while allowing a variety of other signs, such as political and industrial signs and those at grand openings and real estate sales. In response, the Township asserted the ordinance and its enforcement were both within constitutional bounds, namely because DeAngelo’s use of the rat balloon amounted to commercial speech, which can be regulated.

Despite its listed exceptions, Justice Roberto Rivera-Soto said the ordinance appeared strictly worded and content-neutral. Conversely, Justice Barry Albin seemed troubled by the ordinance because it gave the gym owner permission to use an inflatable sign to announce his grand opening, but barred labor protesters from using inflatable signs at the same location. It will be interesting to see how the Court ultimately rules and addresses the intersection of these important issues. Undoubtedly, the case will be followed closely by labor organizations, who want to ensure their rights are adequately protected. 

         

New Jersey Public Employment Labor Law 101

Many public safety officers in the state of New Jersey understand that the terms and conditions of their employment to include the wages they are paid and the benefits they receive are derived from a collective bargaining agreement reached between the public employer and their collective bargaining unit.  However many public safety officers are not aware of the inner-workings of public employment labor law in the state of New Jersey.  This post is being written to provide public safety officers with a brief oversight of the statutes and agencies that govern public employment labor law in the state of New Jersey.  It will be the first post in a series that discusses public employee labor law and the effect it has on New Jersey Public Safety Officers.

In 1968, the New Jersey State Legislature passed the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). This Act granted to all public employees the right to join or refrain from joining employee organizations (labor unions), and the right to conduct collective negotiations with public employers through majority representatives. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3. The avowed purpose of the Act was to foster the prevention and prompt settlement of labor disputes in the public employment sector of the state. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-2. To that end, the Act authorized majority representatives to negotiate agreements with public employers on behalf of the employees in the relevant bargaining unit. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3. It further required that the majority representative “be responsible for representing the interest of all such employees without discrimination and without regard to employee organization membership.” Ibid. 

The Act also established PERC, the Public Employment Relations CommissionN.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.2. This administrative body was granted exclusive jurisdiction over reviewing and adjudicating unfair labor practices, grievance arbitrations, and compulsory interest arbitration for public safety officers in the state of New Jersey. PERC was also authorized to make policy and establish rules and regulations governing employer-employee relations in public employment. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.2, -5.4.  Almost all labor disputes and aspects of public employment labor law is under the oversight of PERC, its administrative rules and regulations, and the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act.  An association acting as the majority representative must be sure that it has leadership that is familiar with the inner workings of PERC but even more importantly, has counsel to call on that is familiar with public employment labor law.