Officer's Resignation Not Attributed to Duress, Upheld

 

In In the Matter of Thomas F. Fricano, Borough of Freehold, Docket No.: A-2280-07T3, the Appellate Division addressed Appellant Thomas Fricano’s appeal from final decisions of the Merit System Board (“Board”), dated September 27, 2007 and December 7, 2007, upholding his resignation in good standing from the Borough of Freehold Police Department.

By way of background, Fricano received a regular appointment as a police officer in Freehold on April 3, 2006. The appointment was subject to the successful completion of a one-year probationary working test period, commencing after completion of a police training course. On February 2, 2007, Fricano, in a written letter, resigned to pursue other opportunities in law enforcement. The appointing authority accepted the resignation, which was made effective February 22, 2007. 

The circumstances surrounding Fricano’s resignation are in dispute and at the core of the appeal. According to Fricano, on February 2, 2007, after having served ten months of his one-year probationary working term, he was summoned to the office of the Police Chief. Allegedly, the Chief ordered Fricano “to resign or be terminated immediately.” Denied his request for legal representation or to have a PBA representative present, Fricano drafted and submitted a letter of resignation under duress and coercion. Thereafter, on February 16, 2007, Fricano’s counsel wrote to the Chief requesting that he be able to rescind the resignation. The Borough attorney advised Fricano that he would not be reinstated, instead stating that “they could have fired him instead.” Subsequently, on March 13, 2007, Fricano was issued a preliminary notice of disciplinary action, charging him with numerous violations. On March 22, 2007, the appointing authority withdrew the charges and, thereafter, on March 28, 2007, issued Fricano a letter indicating that he did not satisfactorily complete his working test period and that he was being terminated effective April 3, 2007.

The Borough offers a different version. When called to his office, the Chief advised Fricano that his performance during the working test period had not been satisfactory, and, therefore, offered him the option to resign effective February 22 or face termination for failure to satisfactorily complete his working test period. This offer was made so that Fricano could avoid any stigma which might attach to an involuntary termination. Fricano decided to resign and submitted a resignation letter the same day. In the letter, Fricano explain that he resigned to pursue “a different choice in the Law Enforcement Career.” Although he did not work after February 2, he was paid through February 22, and his resignation was recorded effective February 22, 2007. After being subsequently informed of Fricano’s intention to challenge his resignation, the police department issued the preliminary notice of disciplinary action on March 13, 2007. On March 22, 2007, the police department withdrew the charges and, instead, as a cautionary measure, issued a letter to

 

Fricano informing him that he had not successfully completed his working test period. 

Thereafter, Fricano filed an administrative appeal challenging his resignation. In a September 27, 2007 decision, the Board upheld the resignation, finding insufficient evidence that Fricano’s resignation was the product of duress or coercion. This appeal followed.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s finding that Fricano voluntarily resigned his position. The Court determined there was sufficient credible evidence that Fricano was told he would be terminated because he had not satisfactorily performed during his working test period. Moreover, the Court found that Fricano voluntarily chose to accept the offered opportunity to resign to avoid any stigma attached to termination. According to the Court, Fricano’s deliberate choice of available alternatives cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be ascribed to duress.

Promotional Guarantee Can Violate Rule of Three

 In the Matter of Martinez, A-0090-07T2, the Appellate Division held a civil service appointing authority violates the Rule of Three, N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8, in guaranteeing a promotional candidate that he or she will receive the appointment if he or she attains the highest score on the examination. 

 

After taking the civil service examination for promotion to deputy fire chief on March 30, 2006, appellant Kenneth Martinez, a fire captain in Passaic, was ranked first among the eligible nonveterans. A promotional list listing Martinez first was promulgated by the State Department of Personnel on June 22, 2006. However, the City was separately arranging for another candidate, Captain Christopher Szczygiel, to receive the promotion. The City had previously bypassed Szczygiel and appointed lower-ranked individuals to the rank of captain, causing Szczygiel to file an administrative appeal before the Merit System Board, as well as a civil action in the Law Division. 

 

A settlement of Szczygiel’s litigation was attained and on January 31, 2007, the Board issued a final decision approving the proposed settlement terms that the parties had disclosed it. Although it was not disclosed to the Board at the time, the settlement terms would allow Szczygiel to compete for the deputy chief position. In fact, the settlement guaranteed Szczygiel appointment to deputy chief, so long as his exam grade proved to be higher than that of anyone else who sat for the exam. 

 

Following the Board’s approval of the settlement, the Department of Personnel graded Szczygiel’s exam and determined that he had the highest score. It then generated a new promotional list for deputy chief ranking Szczygiel first and Martinez second. Thereafter, the City appointed Szczygiel deputy chief on April 1, 2007. 

 

Martinez filed an administrative appeal, contending that the Board’s ratification of the settlement, and the City’s actions in guaranteeing Szczygiel the appointment, violated the longstanding “Rule of Three” principle of New Jersey Civil Service Law, as well as the merit and fitness clause of the state constitution. On July 27, 2007, the Board rejected Martinez’s challenge and this appeal followed.

 

On appeal, Judge Sabatino opined that the guarantee in the Szczygiel was troublesome because it provided that Szczygiel would receive the promotion to deputy chief so long as he scored first on the promotional exam. The Board was not informed of the guarantee prior to its January 31, 2007 approval, final determination of Martinez’s appeal, nor was the guarantee disclosed to Martinez, who had every right to expect that the normal selection processes under the Rule of Three would be observed.

 

In addition, the Court stated it is doubtful that the Legislature wished to allow municipalities to dispense with the Rule of Three and reach agreements with applicants guaranteeing them a position if they scored high enough on an exam. Such individualized guarantees run contrary to the objectives of the civil service system and also deviate from the Rule of Three’s aim to include “other merit criteria” in the selection process.

 

This decision reinforces the importance for an appointing authority to follow the requisite procedures in granting promotions. The Rule of Three, much like other required procedures, cannot be usurped in favor of settlement agreements which undermine the goals of the Civil Service System, namely a fair and objective selection process based on merit and other criteria.