New Jersey Public Safety Officers Law Blog : New Jersey Public Safety Employee Lawyer & Attorney : Pellettieri, Rabstein & Altman Law Firm : Workers Compensation, Discipline Representation for Police & Firefighters : New Jersey

As reported by nj.com, unions representing Jersey City municipal employees have filed an appeal with the state Civil Service Commission, challenging some 100 layoffs the administration has carried out so far this year.

The city changed titles of politically-connected employees to avoid laying them off, kept temporary employees on staff for longer than it is supposed to, and generally made it impossible for state officials to determine whether the city’s layoff plan was the result of good-faith efforts, the appeal alleges. The city has laid off nearly 100 workers this year and is scheduled to lay off an additional 16 workers in the next few weeks.

City officials have “been doing so many egregious things for years,” according to Chuck Carroll, president of the Jersey City Public Employee Inc. Local 246, one of three unions that filed the appeal. “They are like the gang that couldn’t shoot straight,” Carroll said of city officials.

The appeal doesn’t seem likely to save the jobs of any recently laid-off employees, according to a source that did not want to be identified.   The city defended the layoffs. “While difficult, the layoffs were necessary due to loss of revenue and were properly implemented for reasons of economy and efficiency and approved by the Civil Service Commission, pursuant to state statute,” said city spokeswoman Jennifer Morrill.

Morrill said she couldn’t comment further since the matter is now in litigation. But a city official who asked not to be named made it clear what the city thinks of Carroll’s allegations. “They’re false,” the official said. “They’re (unions members) upset, they’re angry, but they’re not pointing to any specific examples because there are none.” Carroll said he has plenty of examples he has submitted with the appeal.

According to Civil Service Commission spokesman Peter Lyden, the appeal will be sent to the Office of Administrative Law, where it will go before an OAL judge. After a hearing, the judge will forward a recommendation to the CSC, which will then make a final decision on the appeal. Since July 2010, 748 appeals similar to Jersey City’s have been filed with the CSC, Lyden said.

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As reported in the Star Ledger on November 10, 2010, hundreds of Newark city police officers, firefighters, and civilian employees, barring a last-minute reprieve, will be laid off on Friday, November 12, 2010 after a judge dismissed a lawsuit aimed at blocking the city’s cost-cutting measures.

Superior Court Judge Patricia Costello told lawyers for the unions filing suit that she did not have the authority to issue a temporary stay to prevent 167 city police officers, 24 firefighters, and several hundred civilian employees from losing their jobs. While the Judge appeared sympathetic to the plaintiff’s claim that layoffs might adversely affect public safety and that the city had not engaged in meaningful negotiations, she said only the state Civil Service Commission can hear such a request.

Judge Costello also voiced frustration that the Commission, which had earlier approved the city’s layoff plan, is now one member short of the minimum needed to hold another hearing. “While the case law is completely clear, it’s hollow if the CSC is not meeting,” she said of the Commission, which is a defendant in the lawsuit along with Newark Mayor Cory Booker. The Appellate Division, however, can rule on the request for a temporary stay, Judge Costello said, and can issue a decision itself or return the case to her with that authority.

Facing an $83 million deficit, the Newark City Council approved the mayor’s budget last month, which includes a total of 866 layoffs and a 16 percent property tax hike. The Commission had earlier approved the city’s layoff plan and deemed an earlier appeal “not ripe” until the layoffs occur.

It is expected the unions will be filing a similar request for a temporary injunction with the Appellate Division. Therefore, please continue to check this blog periodically to ascertain any updates that become available.

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www.state.nj.us/csc/

On July 20, 2010, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Latief Dickerson, Hudson County, Docket No.: A-1323-08T2. In the case, Latief Dickerson appealed from a final decision of the Civil Service Commission (“Commission”) terminating his employment as a corrections officer with the Hudson County Department of Corrections (“Department”).

On May 5, 2006, the Department served a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action on Dickerson charging him with: (1) incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties; (2) insubordination; (3) conduct unbecoming an employee; and (4) neglect of duty. These charges stemmed from Dickerson’s failure to satisfy mandatory training requirements and to obtain permission for his outside employment, as well as his arrest in Tuxedo, New York for various motor vehicle violations and criminal possession of a firearm.

Following a departmental hearing, Dickerson received a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action on July 19, 2006, finding him guilty of the charges and ordering his removal from office effective immediately. Dickerson contested the decision and requested a hearing before the Office of Administrative Law. That hearing was held on January 2 and March 12, 2008, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).

After the hearings, the ALJ determined that the Department failed to sustain its burden in sustaining the charges against Dickerson with the exception of conduct unbecoming a public employee by driving a motor vehicle while unlicensed. However, given Dickerson’s extensive prior disciplinary history, the ALJ ordered that Dickerson be fined 90 working days’ pay.

The Commission, upon its de novo review of the record, disagreed with the ALJ’s decision and upheld the Department’s decision to terminate Dickerson’s employment. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Dickerson argued that the Commission erred in failing to affirm the decision of the ALJ. Specifically, Dickerson contended that the Commission imposed an improper standard of review when it stated that it did not “agree” with the ALJ’s determination. Rather, Dickerson argued the Commission has the authority to modify or reverse the decision of the ALJ if the decision was not supported by credible evidence in the record or was otherwise arbitrary.

After considering Dickerson’s arguments, the Appellate Division affirmed the Commission’s determination and sustained the removal. The Court found the Commission’s decision comported with the applicable law regarding the review of ALJ decisions and was supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Specifically, the Court found, in rejecting and modifying the ALJ’s findings and conclusions, the Commission stated with particularity the reasons for doing so and made new findings supported by competent and credible evidence in the record.

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On June 3, 2010, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Torres Mayfield, Docket No.: A-2969-08T1. In the case, Torres Mayfield appealed from the final decision of the Civil Service Commission (“Commission”) terminating him as an Atlantic City police officer for misconduct.

Mayfield was charged with violations of Atlantic City Police Department Rules and Regulations relating to a domestic dispute involving J.M., who is deaf. In the early morning hours on April 1, 2006, J.M. sought help from police complaining that she was assaulted by her boyfriend, Mayfield. She was bruised and beaten by Mayfield because he thought she was communicating on the computer with an old boyfriend. Mayfield punched her in the face and threatened to hang himself if she left him. That night J.M. was distraught, upset and scared. She was treated in the hospital and photographed.

J.M. eventually dismissed her municipal court charges against Mayfield. She refused to testify at the administrative hearing because Mayfield is the father of her child and they resided together. She was arrested and forced to appear at the administrative hearing. At the hearing, she was defiant and appeared distraught, upset and scared.

During the investigation, Mayfield said that on the night in question he was with Rodney Jamal Armstrong and Ali Cottrell. Mayfield told the investigating detective that when they arrived at his house, J.M. said she was hit by a boot thrown by Mayfield’s son. Armstrong testified he was at a club with Cottrell, but not Mayfield. Armstrong said Mayfield called him telling him and Cottrell about the boot.

The Administrative Law Judge disbelieved the testimony from J.M. that she was struck by a boot. The injuries were not consistent with being struck by a boot, and it was clear to the ALJ that J.M. did not want to contribute to the case against Mayfield. The ALJ found that Mayfield was untruthful by attempting to create an alibi and blame his son. As such, the ALJ found Mayfield assaulted J.M. and was untruthful in his response to the investigation. The Commission adopted the findings of fact made by the ALJ and found the termination of Mayfield as a police officer was justified. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Mayfield contended the administrative decision was not based on legally competent evidence and that, even if the record supports a finding of guilt, his termination was not in accordance with the principles of progressive discipline.  The Appellate Division rejected his arguments and affirmed his termination. Specifically, the Court found that Mayfield failed to demonstrate that the ALJ’s decision was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Moreover, the Court agreed with the ALJ that Mayfield’s offenses in this case were severe enough to warrant his removal despite lack of a substantial prior disciplinary history.

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On May 18, 2010, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Linda Reid, Riverfront State Prison, Docket No.: A-3145-08T2. In the case, Linda Reid appealed from the final determination of the Civil Service Commission sustaining the charges of: (1) conduct unbecoming a public employee; and (2) filing a false report; and the sanction of removal from her position as a Senior Corrections Officer at Riverfront State Prison.

Reid began working as a corrections officer at Riverfront State Prison on July 26, 2002. As a result of an incident occurring on August 6, 2005, she was charged with assaulting an inmate and filing a false report in which she represented she had been the victim. The charges were sustained at a departmental hearing and on April 25, 2007, she was removed from employment. Following an appeal, the contested case was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law, wherein a hearing was conducted on April 30, 2008.

Testimony and evidence were presented by Captain Tommy Stahl regarding the internal affairs investigation, which concluded that Reid had assaulted an inmate and misrepresented that she was the victim; Officers Cherril Davis and Dyshella Kee who were eyewitnesses to the incident and reported that the inmate used profanity towards Reid but did not strike her, and that Reid beat the inmate and falsely claimed he assaulted her; and nurse Evelyn Mamuyac who observed only a slight swelling on Reid’s right cheek and lower lip. Reid testified on her own behalf stating that the inmate used profanities indicating he had to use the restroom after which an argument ensued and the inmate pushed her and hit her in the face, causing swelling to the right side of her face and lip and resulting in a scar under her right eye. She further testified to her exemplary performance assessment review from June 15, 2004 through June 15, 2005.

On November 14, 2008, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued an initial decision, making express credibility assessments and finding Reid engaged in the charged conduct. Based on several inconsistencies in Reid’s testimony, the ALJ discredited her version of the events as self-serving. In determining the appropriate sanction, the ALJ considered Reid’s status as a Senior Corrections Officer, which “subjects her to a higher standard of conduct and responsibility than is required of other public employees.” Consequently, the ALJ found this conduct so egregious as to warrant removal despite the absence of a disciplinary history. On January 16, 2009, the Commission issued a final determination adopting the ALJ’s initial decision as to the charges and the sanction of removal. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Reid challenged the agency’s determination on the charges as not based on sufficient credible evidence in the record. She further contended the penalty of removal is not reflective of progressive discipline and, as such, the sanction should be reduced.

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On December 24, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Eugene I. Otto, Police Department, Township of Irvington, Docket No.: A-1112-08T3. In the case, Eugene Otto appealed from a final decision of the Civil Service Commission finding that his removal as a member of the Irvington Police Department was justified and dismissing his appeal.

On February 1, 2006, Otto was served with fifteen separate disciplinary charges for violating various provisions of the Irvington Police Manual. Various offenses were alleged, including withholding information, failing to perform his duties, insubordination, using derogatory terms, and being untruthful. Following a departmental hearing, all the charges were sustained, and Otto was removed from the force. 

Otto appealed to the Merit System Board, now known as the Civil Service Commission, and a hearing was held before an administrative law judge who sustained the following charges: one count of conduct unbecoming a public employee, two counts of being untruthful, and one count of using derogatory terms. The administrative law judge also concluded that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the remaining charges and they were dismissed. He also concluded that the charge of using derogatory language was not of sufficient import to warrant significant discipline, but the remaining charges constituted “mutinous and disruptive behavior” that, in light of Otto’s disciplinary hearing, warranted his dismissal from the force. The Civil Service Commission agreed.  This appeal followed.

On appeal, Otto contended that the charges against him should have been dismissed as untimely, that certain evidence was insufficient to support the charges against him, and that the punishment of dismissal was arbitrary and capricious. The Appellate Division found: (1) the disciplinary charges were timely filed within 45 days of the prosecutor’s office advising the township that it had determined that Otto’s statements were not truthful; (2) Otto’s actions constituted conduct unbecoming a public employee; (3) Otto’s charges that that department chief had deliberately shirked his responsibilities and acted out of improper racial motivations was not protected speech and therefore was not speech for which he could not be disciplined; and (4) the sanction of removal was not unduly severe give Otto’s disciplinary record and the gravity of the offenses.  As such, the Court affirmed the Civil Service Commission’s decision.

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On December 21, 2009, the Appellate Division decidedIn the Matter of Edwin Garcia, Department of Corrections Hudson County, Docket No.: A-1404-08T3. In the case, Edwin Garcia appeals from the final administrative action of the Civil Service Commission, terminating his employment as a corrections officer with the Hudson County Department of Corrections.

At issue were two disciplinary matters. In the first, the County maintained that Garcia failed to include in a report the fact that another officer had lunged at a handcuffed inmate and grabbed the inmate’s shirt. As a result, the County charged Garcia with insubordination, conduct unbecoming a public employee, neglect of duty, and other sufficient cause. In the second disciplinary matter, the County asserted that, while involved in an incident with an inmate, Garcia used excessive force despite being ordered numerous times to cease. For this incident, Garcia was charged with conduct unbecoming a public employee, neglect of duty, and other sufficient cause. The County sought to terminate Garcia’s employment.

The County held a hearing on the disciplinary charges on March 2, and April 4, 2007, wherein the hearing officer sustained the charges. A final notice of disciplinary action terminating Garcia’s employment was issued on June 7, 2007. Garcia appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission and a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge.

The ALJ sustained both charges, finding, with respect to the first incident, that “Garcia submitted a report omitting the use of excessive force on an inmate” and, with respect to the second incident, that “Garcia used excessive force to subdue inmate E.B. by striking him, although ordered to desist by superior officers.” In the Initial Decision, the ALJ concluded that Garcia had committed conduct unbecoming a public employee, neglect of duty, and insubordination. In light of Garcia’s prior record and the nature of these offenses, the ALJ imposed the sanction of removal. The Commission, in its independent evaluation of the record, concluded that the removal was justified. This appeal ensued.

 On appeal, Garcia argued the findings of the Commission were not justified and the sanction of removal was arbitrary and capricious. The Appellate Division affirmed Garcia’s termination. Specifically, the Court found that there was substantial credible evidence supporting the findings of the ALJ and the conclusions reached by the Commission. The Court also determined the sanction of termination for the infractions is not unreasonable or disproportionate in light of the offenses, particularly when viewed in conjunction with Garcia’s prior disciplinary record.     

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On November 4, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Michael Curtin, Battalion Fire Chief (PM3593G), Elizabeth, Docket No.: A-4861-07T2. In the case, Michael Curtin appealed from the decision of the former Merit System Board (“Board”), now the New Jersey Civil Service Commission (“Commission”), denying his appeal of the scoring of his promotional examination as well as the Commission’s decision again denying the appeal following remand for consideration of supplemental information.

Curtin is employed by the Elizabeth Fire Department with the rank of captain. He took the Department of Personnel’s examination for the position of battalion fire chief, and received an overall score of 89.270. He was ranked third on the eligible list. He appealed the scoring of the oral portions of the examination to the Board. In a five-page decision dated October 11, 2007, the Board denied the appeal.

Curtis appealed to the Appellate Division. On April 14, 2009, in response to Curtin’s motion to supplement the record, the Appellate Division remanded the matter temporarily to the Commission, which had replaced the Board as of June 30, 2008, for consideration of the arguments raised in Curtin’s motion. Following its review of Curtin’s additional arguments and documents, the Commission issued its remand decision on August 20, 2009, again denying the appeal. As a result, the Court permitted Curtin to supplement his brief on appeal.

The Appellate Division noted that the burden is on a petitioner, not the Commission, when challenging the administration and scoring of examination. Moreover, when reviewing examinations, the Commission shall decide any appeal on the written record or such other proceeding as the Board deems appropriate. Finally, the Court indicated that courts should defer to an agency’s grading of a civil service examination except in the most exceptional of circumstances that disclose a clear abuse of discretion.

Applying these principles, the Court was satisfied that the Commission’s decision on the remand was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The Commission duly re-evaluated the Board’s original decision in light of Curtin’s additional arguments and explained its reasons for disagreeing with his position. Moreover, the Court noted that it was not its role to second-guess the Commission with respect to the scoring of civil service examination and this case does not present “the most exceptional of circumstances that disclose a clear abuse of discretion” warranting such interference.

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On August 17, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Juan Melendez, Docket No.: A-4617-07T1. In the case, Juan Melendez, a Hudson County Corrections Officer, appealed from a final administrative determination of the Merit System Board (“Board”) imposing a fifteen-day suspension for neglect of duty and other sufficient cause warranting discipline.

The Board adopted the initial determination of an Administrative Law Judge on a remand following his first determination that the suspension should only be for three days following Hudson County’s suspension of thirty days. On appeal, Melendez argues that: (1) the decision of the Board upholding the charges is not supported by credible evidence in the record; (2) the penalty of a fifteen day suspension is at odds with the concept of progressive discipline and appellant’s prior disciplinary history; and (3) he is entitled to attorneys’ fees based on having prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues.

The testimony before the ALJ revealed that Sgt. Kevin Orlik reported, and testified, that Melendez was asleep at his post in a trailer annexed to the jail on March 19, 2006 when Orlik and other officers arrived to conduct a search of the cells. In his testimony, Orlik testified that when he entered the trailer he “saw Officer Melendez reclined back in a chair with a roll of toilet paper as a pillow or cushion behind his neck,” “his eyes were closed,” and he was “motionless” as he was observed “for approximately a minute to two minutes” until other officers entered the trailer and started to make noise. Melendez testified that he wasn’t sleeping and told that to Orlik when he directed Melendez “to write a report on why [he] was sleeping.” Melendez challenged Orlik’s credibility by noting that his written report omitted details embodied in his testimony.

There was also testimony about the practice of standing when a superior officer enters the room. Melendez did not do so on the night in questions, and testified that it wasn’t a “regular routine” and he generally did not do so. Although the failure to stand was not itself a basis for discipline, it was determined to be relevant to the issue of “attentiveness” at the time, as well as to the ALJ’s finding that the inattentive conduct was a “sufficient cause” for the three-day suspension he initially imposed.

On the remand, despite making credibility determinations against Orlik because of the failure to include certain details in his written report, the ALJ found neglect of duty and “other sufficient cause” for the discipline, and found that “the failure to stand and acknowledge Sgt. Orlik’s when he entered the trailer to constitute being inattentive.”

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On July 16, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Michael Brown, Monmouth County, Docket No.: A-5157-07T3. In the case, Michael Brown appealed from a final decision of the Merit System Board (“Board”) upholding the termination of his employment as a Monmouth County Corrections Officer after finding that he tested positive for marijuana.

Brown was employed by Monmouth County as a corrections officer for approximately fifteen to seventeen years. According to Captain Thomas J. Philburn, Personnel Captain at the correctional facility, Brown was “a very low-keyed, soft-spoken individual” who did his job and had no prior disciplinary problems other than some minor “attendance-related issues.”

The County uses National Safety Compliance (“NSC”), a safety services and compliance company certified by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration, to perform random drug tests on its employees in accordance with the County’s substance abuse policy. NSC, in turn, employs Lab One, located in Kansas, to perform the actual laboratory tests on the samples.

On July 13, 2004, Brown was randomly selected for a drug test pursuant to the County’s policy. When the test was reported as positive for marijuana use, the matter was heard internally and Brown was found to have violated the County’s substance abuse policy. After a final notice of disciplinary action was served on Brown on August 24, 2004, the matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”) as a contested case.

A hearing was held before the OAL on December 7, 2005 and two witnesses testified on behalf of the County, Captain Philburn and Ronald Raslowsy, President of NSC. Neither of the witnesses had any personal knowledge of the procedures used for the testing, nor could they establish a chain of custody from the time the sample was taken to the time it was purportedly tested at the laboratory in Kansas.

Radomsky testified that he “believed” that the Attorney General guidelines for testing a law enforcement officer were followed, but had no personal knowledge as to whether they actually were. He did know, however, that the proper interview form was not used. He had no knowledge of who was present when Brown was tested, who witnessed the test, whether the sample was properly labeled, packaged and shipped, or who participated in the shipping of the sample. Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) rendered an initial decision on October 20, 2006 sustaining the charges and ordering Brown’s removal.

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On June 8, 2009, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Tanya Johnson, Docket No.: A-0482-07T2. In the case, Tanya Johnson appealed from a final decision of the Merit System Board (“Board”) terminating her employment as a parole officer recruit.

In her position as a recruit, Johnson was required to complete a Police Training Commission (“PTC”) course. She began the basic course on January 9, 2006. On March 24, 2006, she failed a test for unarmed defensive tactics. She was given remediation training, but on March 29, Johnson failed the test again and was dismissed from the PTC course.

On the same date, March 29, 2006, Johnson was served with a notice of dismissal from her position as a parole officer recruit. On March 31, 2006, she was served with a preliminary notice of disciplinary action for failure to comply with N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(11), which required her to successfully complete all of the instructional areas of the training cycle. She was removed effective April 4, 2006, and a departmental hearing was held on July 19, 2006. The charge was sustained.

Johnson appealed to the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Training Academy on April 20, 2006. The Training Academy, however, was not the proper venue for the appeal and Johnson’s counsel was advised that the appeal had been filed with the wrong party and had to be filed with the PTC. The appeal was not sent to the proper venue until almost a year after her dismissal, however.

Ultimately, the matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”) and, thereafter, the appointing authority moved to dismiss on the grounds that the appeal was not timely filed with the PTC. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) granted the motion and the matter was dismissed with prejudice. Johnson appealed to the Board and the Board affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal of the appeal. However, the Board dismissed the appeal without prejudice. This appeal ensued.

Since the dismissal of the appeal was without prejudice, the Appellate Division held the matter was not ripe for appeal because it did not know whether Johnson was ultimately successful in having the PTC accept her untimely appeal. Although Johnson argued that the Court should order a preliminary hearing on the merits, the Court determined it could not do so since Johnson has not complied with the procedural requirements for an administrative hearing. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice because is interlocutory.     

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On April 28, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Joan Ivan, Docket No.: A-1070-07T2.  Following a hearing conducted on April 15, 2003, appellant, Joan Ivan (“Ivan”), a Middlesex County Sheriff’s Officer, was suspended for thirty days as the result of disciplinary charges stemming from her alleged failure to truthfully report smoking by a fellow officer while in an official vehicle. In contrast, the officer committing the prohibited offense, after pleading guilty, was given a four-day suspension that could be served use of vacation days. Ivan appealed to the Merit System Board on May 16, 2003.

Thereafter, on August 22, 2003, Ivan was terminated when, in nine attempts over three days, she was unable to requalify for use of her service weapon. She appealed on September 12, 2003 and she filed an order to show cause on September 19, 2003, in which she contended that the Sheriff’s Department had violated her right to due process of law as the result of its failure to conduct a hearing prior to termination. The Department reinstated Ivan and served her with a preliminary notice of disciplinary action on September 29, 2003. Following a hearing on September 30, 2003, Ivan was served, on October 14, 2003, with a final notice of disciplinary action removing her from her position.

The two matters were referred to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing, where they were consolidated for that purpose without objection. Following the hearing, at which testimony was given by numerous witnesses, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) recommended dismissal of the charge leading to Ivan’s suspension, but affirmance of the termination decision. No attorney’s fees were awarded. The Merit System Board adopted the ALJ’s decision, and this appeal followed. On appeal, Ivan challenged the Board’s failure to award counsel fees in connection with her appeal from the thirty day suspension, and she challenges the Board’s adoption of the ALJ’s findings with respect to her termination and the ALJ’s legal ruling with respect to the admissibility of expert testimony in connection with her termination.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Merit System Board’s determination in its entirety. Specifically, the Court rejected Ivan’s arguments that: (1) she was given insufficient opportunity to qualify with her weapon; (2) the ALJ should have admitted the testimony of her firearms qualification expert; and (3) she was entitled to counsel fees on her successful appeal from her suspension. After reviewing the decision of the ALJ and the Board in detail, the Court determined the Board’s action was supported by sufficient, credible evidence in the record as well as well-established statutory law and, therefore, was not arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.

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On March 30, 2009, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division decided the case In the Matter of Richard J. Rivera, Docket No. A-3672-07T2. In the case, Richard J. Rivera, a county corrections officer assigned to the Monmouth County Correctional Institute (“MCCI”), appealed from a final decision of the Merit System Board suspending him for ten (10) days without pay for violating Rule 4.1.28 of the Monmouth County Sheriff’s Department.

The alleged violation was based upon Rivera’s failure to disclose a relationship with a “current offender,” which includes probationers, after he purchased a home with a woman who was on probation. On appeal, Rivera contended the rule was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to him. The Court, in rejecting Rivera’s arguments, noted that a serious conflict of interest could arise if a corrections officer maintained a close relationship with a probationer who violated his/her probation and ultimately became incarcerated. To support this, the Court cited Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, a 1993 Appellate Division case, which held, “[t]he need for proper control over the conduct of inmates in a correctional facility and the part played by proper relationships between those who are required to maintain order and enforce discipline and the inmates cannot be doubted.” Consequently, the Court affirmed the Board’s final decision and upheld the penalty imposed.

This case illustrates that correction officers who become socially and/or intimately associated with persons who are either incarcerated or on parole could be subject to discipline. As a result, all correction officers should consult their respective collective bargaining agreements and/or department policies to determine whether their particular employer places limits on fraternization with certain persons.

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 On March 20, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Larry Martin, Docket No.: A-3271-07T3. In the case, Larry Martin, a police officer with the City of Jersey City, appealed from a disciplinary penalty imposed upon him by the Merit System Board.

Martin, who had been a member of the Jersey City Police Department for 22 years, failed to attend mandatory weapons qualification training for a new service weapon, a Glock .45 caliber handgun, on May 10, 2005. As a result, he was charged with “disobedience to a lawful order” and “absence without leave” in violation of the Police Department’s rules. After holding a hearing, Jersey City sustained the charges and imposed an eight-day loss of vacation days. Martin appealed to the Board.

The matter was referred to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who conducted a hearing. The ALJ, in his decision, found that Martin had been given a direct order by his superior officer to attend the training session and failed to do so. The ALJ sustained the charges and the disciplinary penalty. Neither party filed exceptions and the matter went to the Merit System Board for a final decision.

After conducting its independent review of the record, the Merit System Board agreed the charges had been proven. However, the Board increased the penalty to a 120 day suspension based on Martin’s previous major disciplinary history. In reaching this conclusion, the Board considered the seriousness of the underlying incident, the concept of progressive discipline, and Martin’s prior record. This appeal ensued. 

On appeal, Martin contended that the Board’s decision to increase the penalty was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and unsupported by the record. The Appellate Division disagreed and affirmed the Board’s determination. The Court found no basis to overturn the decision and noted that Martin had defied a direct order of his superior officer, on a very important issue, namely firearms training. The Court further noted that Martin had a prior history of four substantial disciplinary sanctions. Based on the nature of the underlying infraction, Martin’s past history of disciplinary sanctions, and the Board’s policy of progressive discipline, the Court did not find the increase in the penalty to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 

The case illustrates the principle that an agency can increase the penalty imposed upon a public safety officer in appealing a disciplinary determination. Many times, the increase will be upheld if the agency, such as the Civil Service Commission, adequately considered an officer’s disciplinary history, the nature of the underlying matter, and the policy of progressive discipline.

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This blog entry will focus upon our review of certain statutory proposals currently pending in the New Jersey Legislature concerning the pay status of law enforcement officers when appeals of termination are not resolved within 180 days. These proposals are set forth in Assembly Bill Number 3481. 

Assembly Bill 3481 concerns the suspensions of certain law enforcement officers and firefighters and supplements Title 40A of the New Jersey statutes and specifically amends N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150 and N.J.S.A. 40A:14-22. In essence, the bill allows certain law enforcement officers and firefighters to regain pay status when appeals of termination are not resolved within 180 days.

The first part of the bill provides:

When a law enforcement officer employed by a law enforcement agency…that is subject to the provisions of Title 11A of the New Jersey Statutes is suspended from performing his official duties without pay for a complaint or charges, other than (1) a complaint or charges relating to the subject matter of a pending criminal investigation…whether pre-indictment or post indictment, or (2) when the complaint or charges allege conduct that also would constitute a violation of the criminal laws of this State or any other jurisdiction, and the law enforcement agency employing the officer…seeks to terminate that officer’s…employment for the conduct that was the basis for the officer’s…suspension without pay, a final determination on the officer’s…suspension and termination shall be rendered within 180 calendar days from the date the officer…is suspended without pay.

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