SID Union Accuses NJDOC of Preventing, Blocking Prison Investigations

 

As reported in the Star-Ledger on November 26, 2009, according to a lawsuit filed by the union representing prison investigators, senior officials at the Department of Corrections are illegally blocking internal investigations into bribery, cell phone smuggling and gang activity. In short, the lawsuit alleges that Correction officials shut down ongoing probes or prevented investigations from even beginning.

For example, the lawsuit alleges that investigators were told not to examine whether a prison employee was hiding a cell phone, or if an inmate had “put out a hit” on people outside the prison system. Other alleged spike investigations included probes into prison employees who fired service weapons, once during an alleged off-duty bar fight. Allegedly, both files were marked “no action taken” by senior officials.

The union, Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 174, represents about 90 officers within the Department of Corrections’ Special Investigations Division. The union has previously clashed with the Department’s leadership on issues of tactics and resources. 

The Special Investigations Division has been controversial for its dual role in probing gang activity and handling internal affairs. Officials inside and outside of the Division say its dual role creates distrust within the Department.

Spokespeople for the Department of Corrections and the Attorney General declined to comment on the pending lawsuit. Please check this blog periodically to ascertain updates regarding this lawsuit as the same become available.

Freedom of Association Claim Permitted to Go Forward

On February 3, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided the case of LaPosta v. Borough of Roseland. In the case, plaintiff, Joseph LaPosta, a police officer, alleges Defendants, the Borough of Roseland and its Police Chief, retaliated against him after he attempted to join a police organization of which the Police Chief did not approve. Plaintiff’s claims were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and state tort law. 

Plaintiff was employed as a police officer with the Borough of Roseland. After completing his police academy training, Plaintiff was forced to join the Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”) union. When Plaintiff expressed an interest in joining an alternative union, the Policemen’s Benevolent Association (“PBA”), the Police Chief advised Plaintiff that neither he nor any other officers were to have any influence from the PBA. Nevertheless, Plaintiff joined the PBA. Thereafter, the Police Chief allegedly retaliated against Plaintiff, specifically by subjecting Plaintiff to smoke from cigarettes, cigars, and scented candles, charging him with insubordination, denying him an earned stipend, belittling him in front of other officers, filing frivolous internal affairs claims against him, and denying him the opportunity to attend career-advancing classes and seminars.

Plaintiff’s complaint asserted six claims: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Police Chief; (3) hostile work environment; (4) negligence; (5) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage against the Police Chief; and (6) conspiracy. Both the Borough and Police Chief filed motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thereafter, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey entered an opinion and order granting the motions. This appeal followed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further consideration. Specifically, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all but one of Plaintiff’s claims for failing to file a notice of claim under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. However, the Third Circuit determined the District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s §1983 claim. The Third Circuit held the retaliation claim was not barred by the statute of limitations and should be remanded to the District Court to be adequately analyzed as a claim based on freedom of association.

This case illustrates the importance of obtaining an experienced, qualified attorney prior to initiating an action similar to the one recounted above. There are many procedural hurdles one must follow, to include filing certain notices, to perfect the filing of such a claim. Consequently, it is imperative one obtains a qualified, experienced attorney to ensure their rights are protected. Moreover, this case shows that viable retaliation claims can be pursued against public employers. With the right set of facts, many courts are willing to explore such a claim and, potentially, hold the employer liable for infringing on one's right to join a certain collective bargaining unit.

Fiscal Cuts and Cost Saving Measures May Violate Your Contract

On January 31, 2009, the Louisville Courier-Journal reported that approximately 50 Louisville Metro Police officers decided to turn in their patrol cars so they will not have to pay an increased fee for using them after work hours. Police Chief Robert White announced in December, 2008 that officers who take their vehicles home would have to pay a $100 monthly fee to help cut expenses in the department and help address a $20 million projected city budget shortfall. Officers who use their cars for off-duty employment will have to pay $160 per month.

Previous to the announcement, officers were paying a $30 monthly fee or $60 for off-duty employment use. The fees have been an issue of contention between the police administration and the Fraternal Order of Police, the union that represents officers. The union contends that assessing the fee violates their contract because it was not negotiated as a change. However, police department managers say driving cars home is a privilege and is not part of the officers' contract.

The policy that assessed the original fee is the subject of a grievance that is presently outstanding. When the fee was increased, the grievance was amended to include the new proposed charges.

The police department estimates that approximately 1,094 police department vehicles are used as take-home cars. With the policy in place and the increased fees, the police department estimates that a savings for the city in the amount of $110,000.00 will be realized on a monthly basis.

While this particular article does not have direct applicability to New Jersey Public Labor Law, it does demonstrate that state, county, and municipal police departments throughout the country are looking to curtail spending and reduce costs due to the economic recession. If cuts have not been made in many departments throughout New Jersey, union leaders can expect to see the implementation of cost savings measures soon. It is vitally important to the rights of organized public safety officers that each one of these “cuts” or cost savings measures be assessed and evaluated to determine if the actions are contractual violations and should therefore be the subject of a group grievance. Keep your eyes and ears open and be sure that the rights of your members are being protected.  Finally, always be sure to fight within the confines of the law to preserve the integrity of your collective bargaining agreement.

Non-Civil Service Municipality's Promotion Decision Overturned

 

On November 17, 2008, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the case of Borough v. Glassboro v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 108,  A-75-07. In this case, the Court addressed the validity of an arbitrator’s award addressing the legality of a police officer promotion made by the Borough of Glassboro, a non-civil service municipality.

In 2004, the Borough of Glassboro Police Department (“Borough”) announced an opening for the position of lieutenant. Three candidates applied, including Sergeants Peter Amico and William Highley. As a non-civil service municipality, the Borough is not subject to the statutory requirements of a comprehensive promotional procedure. Rather, state law only requires that due consideration is given to the officer proposed for promotion and to the length and merit of the officer’s service, with preference being given to seniority in service.

The Borough implemented a three stage promotional procedure. The scores from Phase I and II were aggregated for a total possible score of 100%. Phase I consisted of an interview with the Borough Chief of Police and was worth 20%. Phase II involved an oral and written exam and was worth 80%. Phase IIA, the written portion, was a multiple-choice test designed by the International Association of Police Chiefs. Phase IIB, the oral component, consisted of interviews with a panel of four independent police chiefs. Following Phase I and II, the cumulative final scores were as follows: Sergeant Amico, 93.8, and Sergeant Highley, 92.4.

In Phase III, each applicant was interviewed by the Borough Public Safety Committee, which included Borough Council members, the Borough Administrator, and the Chief of Police. Candidates were advised that they would be asked questions “concerning their department’s SOPs Rules and Regulations, in addition to questions concerning the Boro Personnel Policy & Procedures and Boro Ordinances.” The purpose of Phase III was to test leadership intangibles that are necessary for the position and evade formal testing. After the completion of Phase III, Highley, ranked second in the Phase I and II testing, was awarded the promotion.

Amico learned in subsequent conversations with the Chief of Police and the Borough Administrator that his move out of the Borough had a possible negative effect on the promotional decision. The Fraternal Order of Police, Local 108 (“FOP”) filed a grievance on Amico’s behalf, thereby claiming: (1) that the use of Phase III as more than a “confirmatory interview” altered the terms and conditions of employment in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the Borough and FOP; and (2) the Borough violated N.J.S.A. 40A:14-122.6 by making residency a factor in its promotional decision.

 

The matter was ultimately submitted to arbitration after the grievance was unable to be resolved. The arbitrator concluded that Amico was improperly deprived of the promotion contrary to statute and that he should be promoted with full back pay. In making his ruling, the arbitrator noted that Amico, whose education and seniority were greater than Highley’s, was 1.4 points ahead of Highley after Phases I and II, but then fell behind following the Phase III interview. The arbitrator also pointed out that there was nothing in the record to positively determine what elements in that interview caused Amico to fall behind Highley. The arbitrator further surmised from the testimony that Amico had recently moved away from the Borough and that a non-civil service municipality can only use residency in a tiebreaker on the promotional test, which was not the case here.

Thereafter, the Borough filed a complaint in the Superior Court, wherein the arbitrator’s award was stayed pending the outcome of the case. In the complaint, the Borough alleged: (1) that it had placed substantial evidence in the record noting what occurred during the Phase III interview; and (2) the arbitrator disregarded the testimony of the Borough Administrator, the Police Chief, and all the Phase III documentation referenced during the arbitration. Attached to the complaint were two pages of questions asked of each candidate in Phase III, as well as the Chief’s corresponding notes concerning each candidate’s answers.

The trial judge denied the Borough’s motion to vacate the arbitrator’s award or to hold a plenary hearing. In so holding, the judge noted that so long as the arbitrator’s determination is reasonably debatable it should not be disturbed. Accordingly, the judge affirmed the arbitrator’s award, but granted the Borough’s motion for a stay pending appeal. 

The Appellate Division affirmed on appeal, essentially because it agreed with the arbitrator and the trial judge that the record was bare regarding the Borough’s reasoning for elevating Highley over Amico, thereby rendering the promotion of Highley arbitrary and capricious. The Borough appealed and the Supreme Court granted certification.

The Supreme Court held the arbitrator properly determined that the record did not adequately support the elevation of Highley over Amico. However, the Court did indicate it was beyond the arbitrator’s power to fashion a remedy that promoted Amico. Therefore, the judgment of Appellate Division was affirmed and reversed in part and the case was remanded for proceedings consistent with its holding.

In support, the Court noted that an arbitrator must uphold a non-civil service municipality’s promotion decision unless the decision was clearly arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, since judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision is limited and the decision should not be set aside easily. The New Jersey Arbitration Act permits courts to vacate an arbitration award in only limited defined circumstances. In addition, a court may vacate an arbitration award that is contrary to existing law or public policy as embodied in legislative enactments, administrative regulations, or legal precedents.

After reviewing the record in this case, the Court agreed with the arbitrator’s decision. The Court noted that the arbitrator’s conclusion that the record shows no reasoning by the Borough for elevating Highley is unassailable. The Court further noted this case stands for the unremarkable proposition that, should a grievant make the type of showing that Amico made here, and should the municipality not provide even the simplest explanation on the record for some kind of rational reason for its decision, the decision cannot stand. 

The Court also indicated that the Legislature, through statue, clearly established residence as a tie-breaker in non-civil service municipalities. However, in this case, there was no tie after the first two phases, simply out, Amico was ahead of Highley. Moreover, the Court also noted that if the record was inadequate regarding how Highley passed Amico during Phase III, it was equally deficient in respect of Amico’s leadership skills and how, upon testing, he lost his lead. Therefore, it was beyond the arbitrator’s power to fashion a remedy that promoted Amico and, thus, the matter must be remanded to the Borough to conduct a new Phase III proceeding.

Retirees Not Entitled to Collective Bargaining Unit Representation Under The New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et.seq

In the case of Grasso v. Fraternal Order of Police, Glassboro Lodge No. 108, 33-2-1617, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held that under the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et.seq, the Defendants owed no duty to the Plaintiff to represent him in a dispute with the Borough of Glassboro due to his status of not being an "employee" as defined under the act.

Grasso initially filed suit against the Borough of Glassboro for their failure to reimburse him for Medicare Part B. premiums pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.  Some time during the suit Grasso called on the FOP for representation as the matter dealt with an issue related to the collective bargaining agreement.  The FOP declined representation of Grasso, and following his success in the underlying action against the Borough, Grasso then moved against the FOP for their failure to represent him.

The Appellate Panel affirmed the Trial Court's decision to grant Summary Judgment in favor of the FOP due to the fact that Grasso can not be considered an employee under the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et.seq

This case is important to both collective bargaining units and retired Public Safety Officers alike as it clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of each party under the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et.seq

Constitutionality of Paid Convention Leave Statutes Challenged

On September 11, 2008, the New Jersey Law Enforcement Supervisors Association (“NJLESA”) and New Jersey Law Enforcement Commanding Officers Association (“NJLECOA”), jointly filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County against the State of New Jersey challenging the viability of N.J.S.A. 11A:6-10 and N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.13, the provisions of New Jersey law providing convention leave for State employees.

It is alleged that on or around July 15, 2008, NJLESA, the exclusive representative of those employees in the primary level supervisory law enforcement unit, and NJLECOA, the exclusive representative of superior officers and other command law enforcement personnel holding the rank of Captain or its equivalency in classified career service, requested a leave of absence with pay for certain union officials and duly authorized delegates within their organizations to attend a state convention jointly hosted by NJLESA and NJLECOA. In response, the New Jersey State Office of Employee Relations denied the request and took the position that it was not permitted to grant plaintiffs’ request because neither NJLESA nor NJLECOA were affiliated with any of the organizations delineated in N.J.S.A. 11A:6-10 and N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.13 which are entitled to convention leave.

The complaint asserts N.J.S.A. 11A:6-10 and N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.13 are arbitrarily exclusive in conferring the benefit of convention leave on certain fraternal organizations while excluding others, thereby violating certain provisions of the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. Consequently, NJLESA and NJLECOA seek a declaration that N.J.S.A. 11A:6-10 and N.J.A.C. 4A:6-1.13 are unconstitutional or, alternatively, for an order directing the State of New Jersey to award convention leave to members of their organization. It will be interesting to see how this suit develops and how the state of New Jersey reacts to preserving this piece of legislation.