Court Knocks Down Sign Ordinance that Banned Giant Rat Balloon at Labor Rally

On February 5, 2008, in State v. DeAngelo, Docket No. A-73-07, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a municipality violated free speech rights by banning temporary signs on public streets, including a 10-foot high inflatable rat at a labor protest. This case was the subject of a previous blog entry wherein our office analyzed the oral argument which took place in September 2008.

The Court unanimously called a Lawrence Township ordinance, which prohibited “banners, pennants, streamers…portable signs, balloons or other inflated signs (except grand opening signs,” unduly restrictive of free speech and expression. Specifically, Justice John Wallace, Jr. wrote that the ordinance “is content-based, does not fairly advance any governmental interest, and is not narrowly tailored to prevent no more than the exact source of that evil that is seeks to remedy.” 

By way of background, in 2005, Wayne DeAngelo, a senior official with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 269, was fined $100 and assessed $33 in costs for using the inflatable rat to protest a Gold’s Gym being built in the township without union labor. A trial judge and the Appellate Division panel rejected constitutional challenges by DeAngelo and the union, but a dissenting appeals judge, Jack Sabatino, agreed the ordinance was constitutionally deficient.

In the Supreme Court’s ruling, Justice Wallace said DeAngelo’s protest was protected by the state and federal constitutions, as to both content and location. To support same, he cited U.S. Supreme Court precedents holding that public streets, parks, and sidewalks are traditionally public forums that occupy a “special position in terms of First Amendment protection” and that government cannot restrict expressive activity in such venues without a “compelling reason.”

The Court also rejected the rationale advanced by the township that the ordinance was designed to promote aesthetics and maintain public safety. Specifically, the Court stated, “although they are salutary goals, they do not justify a content-based restriction on free speech” and that an ordinance that prohibits a union from displaying a rat balloon, while authorizing a similar display as part of a grand opening, is content-based.

This ruling is expected to have statewide implications since municipalities across New Jersey have similar ordinances. Therefore, many municipalities will have to rework their own ordinances in order to conform to the ruling. Moreover, according to Andrew Watson, DeAngelo’s attorney, the ruling is a landmark victory for labor activists. Specifically, Watson stated, “this vindicates their [labor union’s] rights to an orderly, non-threatening means of protest.” As such, this case represents another important judicial decision regarding labor protesting and its collision with free speech.

BOROUGH'S PROMOTIONAL PROCESS UPHELD

 

In the matter of Paul Weber v. Borough of Glen Rock, A-1079-07T3, Plaintiff, Paul Weber, appealed from two trial court orders: (1) an order dated May 3, 2006 dismissing some of his claims; and (2) an order dated September 5, 2007 granting summary judgment to defendants on the balance of the claims. After reviewing the contentions raised on appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s determinations. 

Weber is a member of the Glen Rock Police Department. After joining the Department as a patrolman in 1978, he was promoted to the rank of sergeant in 1985. Since 1985, there have been four occasions when there was an opening within the Department for a member to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant. Weber applied for this promotion on each occasion and was unsuccessful. 

In 2004, the successful applicant was Garret Merselis, who was promoted from sergeant to lieutenant. In 2005, a vacancy developed for the position of captain. Thereafter, Merselis, the only lieutenant on the Glen Rock force at that time, was promoted to the rank of captain. The promotion of Merselis to captain created a vacancy for the position of lieutenant. Plaintiff applied, as did three other members of the Department. On this occasion, Frederick Stahman was selected for promotion to the rank of lieutenant.

Plaintiff, who had more seniority than did either Merselis or Stahman at the time of their respective promotions, filed suit contending that the promotional process was flawed. Specifically, he sought to reopen the process relating to the most recent promotional opening. In support, Weber contended: (1) the Borough was required to administer examinations to those applying for promotion and not rely exclusively on interviews; and (2) the Borough, in passing him over for promotion, did not comply with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-129. 

The Court rejected both of Weber’s assertions. The Borough is not a civil service municipality and followed its own two-step promotional process, a written test followed by interviews, until 1992 when, under the new police chief, only interviews were used to select a candidate for promotion to lieutenant. The Court found that where all members of the committee participated in the interviews of all the candidates, the process employed by Glen Rock does not suffer from the same deficiencies criticized in Rox v. Dep’t of Civil Service, 141 N.J. Super. 463, 467 (App. Div. 1976). In Rox, different panels interviewed the various candidates and used different criteria in making promotional decisions. This was not the situation in this case.

Moreover, the Court held that seniority, in and of itself, is not determinative of promotion. The Court indicated seniority is merely an additional factor to be considered on the merits of the evaluation of individuals for promotion and not a mechanical rule which guarantees promotion to a senior employee. In this case, it was established Weber’s seniority was considered. That is all he was entitled to; he was not entitled to have it treated as controlling.