Promotional Examination Results Remanded in Light of USERRA

Posted on October 12, 2009 by Donald Barbati

 

On October 5, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of John Fasanella, Docket No.: A-4455-07T1. In the case, John Fasanella, a sheriff’s officer in Mercer County, appealed a decision of the Merit System Board (“Board”) upholding adverse administrative determinations regarding a promotional examination for lieutenant.

The promotional examination for lieutenant was announced with a closing date of December 21, 2004. Fasanella was one of the nine individuals who applied for and were admitted to that examination. The examination was conducted in written form on June 9, 2005, however, Fasanella, who was on active military duty from May 12, 2004 to June 25, 2006, was unavailable to take the examination on the date it was given.

The June 9, 2005 examination resulted in a four-name eligibles list, promulgated on September 29, 2005, with an expiration date of September 28, 2008. The first-ranked person on that list, a non-veteran, was appointed effective December 1, 2005.

On July 24, 2006, shortly after Fasanella’s return from active military duty, the Department of Military and Veterans Affairs granted his application for veteran’s status. He made several requests of the Department of Personnel (“DOP”) to schedule his make-up examination for the lieutenant position. His examination occurred in June 2007. A memorandum from DOP, dated September 10, 2007, noted an “employment list change” with Fasanella ranked first on the list with veteran’s status. An October 15, 2007 memorandum from the Sheriff’s Office to Fasanella advised that the ranking had been modified as “for future certifications only.” Fasanella promptly filed his internal appeal from the latter determination.     

Subsequently, DOP notified Fasanella that his veteran’s status designation had been incorrect and that the eligibles list had been corrected to reflect his rank on the then-existing list as “A1 non-veteran.” Fasanella appealed that decision.

In considering the issues raised in the two appeals, the Board rejected Fasanella’s contention that he was entitled to the lieutenant appointment because he was, ultimately, first on the eligibles list and had veteran’s status. The Board determined that Fasanella did not qualify for veteran’s status at the time the list was certified. The Board also decided that the latitude conferred on the appointing authority by operation of the “rule of three” validated the appointment of the person who had been designated, notwithstanding that he was second on the list after Fasanella’s name had been added.  This appeal ensued.

 

On appeal, Fasanella argues that: (1) the eligible list resulting from the initial examination should have been conditional pending his return from the active military service; (2) his name should have been added to the eligibles list as first-ranked following the result of the make-up examination; and (3) he was entitled to veteran’s status in that listing.

The Appellate Division agreed with the Board that Fasanella was not entitled to veteran’s status on the eligibles list since when he qualified for the examination, Fasanella had not yet engaged in his active military service. However, the Court remanded this matter to the Board for a determination of Fasanella’s rights in light of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). On remand, the Board must determine what the promotions result would have been or should have been if the choice had been properly made from the superseding list on which Fasanella’s name appeared as first-ranked, without veteran’s status, subject to the rule of three.
Tags: , , , , , , , ,

Candidate Properly Bypassed Under Rule of Three

Posted on June 18, 2009 by Donald Barbati

 

On June 18, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Andre Ruiz, Firefighter (M2271E), City of Camden, Docket No.: A-2611-07T2. In the case, Andrte Ruiz appealed the Final Administrative Action of the Merit System Board (“Board”) issued on October 11, 2007, concluding that the City of Camden (“City”) properly bypassed Ruiz under the “Rule of Three.” Ruiz also appeals from the Board’s January 22, 2008 Final Administrative Action denying his petition for reconsideration.

On October 3, 2005, the Department of Personnel (“DOP”) issued Certification Number Ol052133 to the City respecting open-competitive lists M2013A and M2271E containing the names of 150 eligible candidates for the position of firefighter. Ruiz was on list M2271E. The City returned the certification in March 2006 proposing the removal of several names, including that of Ruiz, ranked thirty-sixth, on the ground that he failed to meet the City’s residency requirements. On April 3, 2006, the City appointed thirty-five eligible candidates to the position of firefighter while the propriety of the proposed removals was still pending before the DOP.

On January 18, 2007, the Board determined that the City had failed to establish that Ruiz and five other eligible candidates, including Ruiz’s brother who resided at the same address as Ruiz, did not reside in the City. As such, the Board ordered the City to either produce sufficient documentation to support removal of the six eligible candidates based on non-residency, appoint them, or produce adequate justification for bypassing them or removing them on other grounds within sixty (60) days. 

On March 14, 2007, the City responded to the Board’s January 18, 2007 decision by submitting additional documentation to the DOP seeking to establish that Ruiz and the five other eligible candidates did not meet the City’s residency requirements. Thereafter, on April 3, 2006, the City notified the DOP that it had used the Rule of Three to appoint thirty-five eligible candidates to the position of firefighter. Despite stating it employed the Rule of Three, the City represented that no eligible candidates had been bypassed and appointments had been made through eligible candidate No. 74. The City sought entry of an order that it had properly disposed of open-competitive lists M2013A and M2271E.

On March 20, 2007, the DOP issued a disposition-deficiency notice to the City, notifying it that the reasons it had submitted for removal of Ruiz and two other eligible candidates, including Ruiz’s brother, based upon non-residency were not acceptable. It permitted the City to bypass two of the three eligible candidates provided the City submitted a short, written positive statement explaining why other lower or equally ranked eligible candidates were appointed. However, it required that the City appoint one of the three eligible candidates.

 

In the meantime, open-competitive list M2271E was scheduled to expire on June 20, 2007, and the DOP Director of Selection Services requested that the expiration date be extended until new employment lists could be issued based on a new examination. The Board extended the expiration date and, pursuant to that extension, the City appointed Ruiz’s brother, the highest ranked of the three remaining candidates as a firefighter. 

Subsequently, on July 26, 2007, Ruiz filed a notice of appeal and petition for enforcement of the January 18, 2007, final agency action. He alleged that thirty-five eligible candidates had been appointed and that the City had failed to comply with the Board’s requirements for either adequate documentation of nonresidency or justification for removal or bypass. He further alleged that the City had appointed thirty-five firefighters, but had failed to appoint him.

On October 11, 2007, the Board issued its Final Administrative Action on Ruiz’s notice of appeal and petition for enforcement. The Board concluded that N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.4(c) and N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b)(4) placed the burden of proof on Ruiz to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the City’s decision to bypass him was improper. The Board found that Ruiz had not even alleged “a specific improper reason underlying the appointing authority’s bypass of his name” and found that the City had fully complied with the Board’s January 18, 2007 decision. Accordingly, the Board found that the current disposition of the certification, including the bypass of Ruiz’s name, was in compliance with its prior decision and the Rule of Three. Thereafter, Ruiz filed a petition for reconsideration, which the Board ultimately found to be without merit. This appeal ensued.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision in determining that Ruiz failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the Board’s actions were arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. First, the Court found that all of the issues raised by Ruiz on appeal were not properly before the Court. Specifically, Ruiz’s time to appeal the January 18, 2007 Final Administrative Action expired ling before his July 26, 2007 notice of appeal and petition for enforcement. Second, the Court explained that any expectation that Ruiz had of mandatory appointment was defeated by the possibility of being bypassed that the Board specifically permitted on January 18, 2007, a final agency action from which Ruiz did not appeal. Further, as the Board observed, there is no evidence that Ruiz was not considered by the City when it selected the most qualified of the three remaining eligible candidates.
Tags: , , , , , , , , , , ,

MSB Promotional Examination Decision Upheld

Posted on May 8, 2009 by Donald Barbati

On May 7, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Steven Howe and Joseph Mufalli, Docket No. A-3512-07T1. In the case, Steven Howe appealed from the final administrative determination of the Merit System Board (“Board”), issued December 21, 2007, and its determination of March 13, 2008, denying his motion for reconsideration of the determination that Howe did not meet the experience requirements necessary to sit for the promotional examination for Chief Operating Engineer 2 of the Juvenile Justice Commission.

On appeal, Howe argued that “the administrative agency acted either arbitrarily or capriciously by finding appellant’s prior supervisory experience to be out of title,” whereas only one of the three applicants, Barry Schneider, who did the same work as appellant, was found to qualify for the exam. Howe further argued that the agency acted “arbitrarily and capriciously in its attempt to correct the ambiguous language in the job specification of operating engineer 1 and should have either negated the examination results or should have allowed all three applicants to sit for the exam.” 

After reviewing the entire record, the Appellate Division concluded that it could not disturb the findings of the Board because the Court must defer to the agency’s expertise in implementing civil service law. Although the Court noted the job description for operating engineer 1 is ambiguous regarding supervisory responsibilities and the Board directed that it be amended, the Court determined Howe did not provide evidence that he had supervised while in that position and, therefore, was not qualified to sit for the exam. As such, the Court found the Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in not permitting him to take the examination.

 

Tags: , , , , , , , , ,

Termination of Middlesex County Sheriff's Officer Upheld

Posted on April 28, 2009 by Donald Barbati

On April 28, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Joan Ivan, Docket No.: A-1070-07T2.  Following a hearing conducted on April 15, 2003, appellant, Joan Ivan (“Ivan”), a Middlesex County Sheriff’s Officer, was suspended for thirty days as the result of disciplinary charges stemming from her alleged failure to truthfully report smoking by a fellow officer while in an official vehicle. In contrast, the officer committing the prohibited offense, after pleading guilty, was given a four-day suspension that could be served use of vacation days. Ivan appealed to the Merit System Board on May 16, 2003.

Thereafter, on August 22, 2003, Ivan was terminated when, in nine attempts over three days, she was unable to requalify for use of her service weapon. She appealed on September 12, 2003 and she filed an order to show cause on September 19, 2003, in which she contended that the Sheriff’s Department had violated her right to due process of law as the result of its failure to conduct a hearing prior to termination. The Department reinstated Ivan and served her with a preliminary notice of disciplinary action on September 29, 2003. Following a hearing on September 30, 2003, Ivan was served, on October 14, 2003, with a final notice of disciplinary action removing her from her position.

The two matters were referred to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing, where they were consolidated for that purpose without objection. Following the hearing, at which testimony was given by numerous witnesses, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) recommended dismissal of the charge leading to Ivan’s suspension, but affirmance of the termination decision. No attorney’s fees were awarded. The Merit System Board adopted the ALJ’s decision, and this appeal followed. On appeal, Ivan challenged the Board’s failure to award counsel fees in connection with her appeal from the thirty day suspension, and she challenges the Board’s adoption of the ALJ’s findings with respect to her termination and the ALJ’s legal ruling with respect to the admissibility of expert testimony in connection with her termination.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Merit System Board’s determination in its entirety. Specifically, the Court rejected Ivan’s arguments that: (1) she was given insufficient opportunity to qualify with her weapon; (2) the ALJ should have admitted the testimony of her firearms qualification expert; and (3) she was entitled to counsel fees on her successful appeal from her suspension. After reviewing the decision of the ALJ and the Board in detail, the Court determined the Board’s action was supported by sufficient, credible evidence in the record as well as well-established statutory law and, therefore, was not arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.

 

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Termination of Police Officer Arising from Substance Abuse Upheld

Posted on April 15, 2009 by Donald Barbati

On April 15, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Cornelius Caruso, Docket No.: A-1612-07T1. In the case, Cornelius Caruso appealed his termination as police officer in the City of Orange Police Department.

Caruso became a police officer in 2000. In 2005, he began to experience serious problems related to his use of alcohol. He voluntarily entered a program at the Carrier Clinic in December 2005. When he did so, he failed to follow the Department’s requirement that he notify the communication supervisor and apply for a leave of absence. No charges were filed with respect to that omission.

Caruso left the Carrier Clinic in March 2006. He was found by the Department to be fit for duty and returned to work on April 1, 2006. Caruso was instructed to make periodic reports concerning his recovery, which instruction was confirmed in a letter from the City’s attorney to Caruso’s attorney. No such periodic reports were ever made.

The Department permits fifteen days of sick leave per year. The Department assessed Caruso for use of 2006 sick leave only during the period from January 1 to January 10, 2006. The period from January 11 to March 31, 2006, was charged as a combination of administrative and compensatory leave. After Caruso’s return to duty in April, he went out on sick leave from April 6 to April 18; May 10 to July 7; October 25 to November 4; and December 12 to the end of 2006. Consequently, by December 2006, Caruso had taken significantly more sick leave than was permitted by the Department.

On December 12, 2006, Caruso left work because of an eye infection. However, according to Caruso, his problem with alcohol use returned in December 2006. On December 22, 2006, Caruso left his home and traveled to Hazelden, a rehabilitation clinic located in Minnesota. He again failed to notify the communications supervisor, although others apparently notified one of his superiors who subsequently contacted Caruso and arranged for him to surrender his service weapon. Caruso also failed to complete the required form for a leave of absence.

As a result, on January 18, 2007, the City filed formal disciplinary charges against Caruso. The disciplinary charges were as follows: (1) performance of duty; (2) insubordination; (3) obedience to laws and rules; and (4) abuse of sick leave. 

Caruso left Hazelden and returned to New Jersey on January 19, 2007. He started intensive outpatient aftercare on January 23, 2007, which required his attendance at a program for four hours a day, four days per week, as well as attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous sessions.

 

On January 25, 2007, Caruso attended a meeting at the Department, at which time he was served with the notice of discipline and preliminarily suspended. On February 12, 2007, Caruso was terminated pursuant to a final notice of disciplinary action. 

Caruso appealed to the Merit System Board, which referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) in August 2007. The ALJ’s initial decision upheld Caruso’ removal, sustaining three of the four charges in the City’s notice of discipline. The Board adopted the ALJ’s decision and upheld the termination. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Caruso argued the Board’s decision “was not based on credible evidence in the record and was not consistent with case law” and that the termination was an excessive penalty. The Appellate Division disagreed. The Court upheld the Board’s decision in its entirety, including Caruso’s termination. Specifically, the Court noted the City complied with certain requirements delineated in the case law and previous decisions when it permitted Caruso to take the leave of absence for the Carrier Clinic. In addition, the Court noted that there was no basis to overturn the City’s decision that termination was an appropriate penalty. 

The case illustrates the importance of a New Jersey public safety officer being cognizant of the policies and procedures of his/her department in the event a leave of absence is necessitated by substance abuse.  In the event the requisite policies and procedures are not adhered to, missing time from employment could lead to the imposition of disciplinary charges and possible termination from employment.

 
Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Corrections' Officer Suspension for Buying Home With Probationer Upheld

Posted on April 1, 2009 by Frank Crivelli

On March 30, 2009, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division decided the case In the Matter of Richard J. Rivera, Docket No. A-3672-07T2. In the case, Richard J. Rivera, a county corrections officer assigned to the Monmouth County Correctional Institute (“MCCI”), appealed from a final decision of the Merit System Board suspending him for ten (10) days without pay for violating Rule 4.1.28 of the Monmouth County Sheriff’s Department.

The alleged violation was based upon Rivera’s failure to disclose a relationship with a “current offender,” which includes probationers, after he purchased a home with a woman who was on probation. On appeal, Rivera contended the rule was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to him. The Court, in rejecting Rivera’s arguments, noted that a serious conflict of interest could arise if a corrections officer maintained a close relationship with a probationer who violated his/her probation and ultimately became incarcerated. To support this, the Court cited Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, a 1993 Appellate Division case, which held, “[t]he need for proper control over the conduct of inmates in a correctional facility and the part played by proper relationships between those who are required to maintain order and enforce discipline and the inmates cannot be doubted.” Consequently, the Court affirmed the Board’s final decision and upheld the penalty imposed.

This case illustrates that correction officers who become socially and/or intimately associated with persons who are either incarcerated or on parole could be subject to discipline. As a result, all correction officers should consult their respective collective bargaining agreements and/or department policies to determine whether their particular employer places limits on fraternization with certain persons.

 

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Merit System Board Increase of Disciplinary Penalty Upheld

Posted on March 24, 2009 by Frank Crivelli

 On March 20, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Larry Martin, Docket No.: A-3271-07T3. In the case, Larry Martin, a police officer with the City of Jersey City, appealed from a disciplinary penalty imposed upon him by the Merit System Board.

Martin, who had been a member of the Jersey City Police Department for 22 years, failed to attend mandatory weapons qualification training for a new service weapon, a Glock .45 caliber handgun, on May 10, 2005. As a result, he was charged with “disobedience to a lawful order” and “absence without leave” in violation of the Police Department’s rules. After holding a hearing, Jersey City sustained the charges and imposed an eight-day loss of vacation days. Martin appealed to the Board.

The matter was referred to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who conducted a hearing. The ALJ, in his decision, found that Martin had been given a direct order by his superior officer to attend the training session and failed to do so. The ALJ sustained the charges and the disciplinary penalty. Neither party filed exceptions and the matter went to the Merit System Board for a final decision.

After conducting its independent review of the record, the Merit System Board agreed the charges had been proven. However, the Board increased the penalty to a 120 day suspension based on Martin’s previous major disciplinary history. In reaching this conclusion, the Board considered the seriousness of the underlying incident, the concept of progressive discipline, and Martin’s prior record. This appeal ensued. 

On appeal, Martin contended that the Board’s decision to increase the penalty was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and unsupported by the record. The Appellate Division disagreed and affirmed the Board’s determination. The Court found no basis to overturn the decision and noted that Martin had defied a direct order of his superior officer, on a very important issue, namely firearms training. The Court further noted that Martin had a prior history of four substantial disciplinary sanctions. Based on the nature of the underlying infraction, Martin’s past history of disciplinary sanctions, and the Board’s policy of progressive discipline, the Court did not find the increase in the penalty to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 

The case illustrates the principle that an agency can increase the penalty imposed upon a public safety officer in appealing a disciplinary determination. Many times, the increase will be upheld if the agency, such as the Civil Service Commission, adequately considered an officer’s disciplinary history, the nature of the underlying matter, and the policy of progressive discipline.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Officer's Resignation Not Attributed to Duress, Upheld

Posted on January 21, 2009 by Frank Crivelli

 

In In the Matter of Thomas F. Fricano, Borough of Freehold, Docket No.: A-2280-07T3, the Appellate Division addressed Appellant Thomas Fricano’s appeal from final decisions of the Merit System Board (“Board”), dated September 27, 2007 and December 7, 2007, upholding his resignation in good standing from the Borough of Freehold Police Department.

By way of background, Fricano received a regular appointment as a police officer in Freehold on April 3, 2006. The appointment was subject to the successful completion of a one-year probationary working test period, commencing after completion of a police training course. On February 2, 2007, Fricano, in a written letter, resigned to pursue other opportunities in law enforcement. The appointing authority accepted the resignation, which was made effective February 22, 2007. 

The circumstances surrounding Fricano’s resignation are in dispute and at the core of the appeal. According to Fricano, on February 2, 2007, after having served ten months of his one-year probationary working term, he was summoned to the office of the Police Chief. Allegedly, the Chief ordered Fricano “to resign or be terminated immediately.” Denied his request for legal representation or to have a PBA representative present, Fricano drafted and submitted a letter of resignation under duress and coercion. Thereafter, on February 16, 2007, Fricano’s counsel wrote to the Chief requesting that he be able to rescind the resignation. The Borough attorney advised Fricano that he would not be reinstated, instead stating that “they could have fired him instead.” Subsequently, on March 13, 2007, Fricano was issued a preliminary notice of disciplinary action, charging him with numerous violations. On March 22, 2007, the appointing authority withdrew the charges and, thereafter, on March 28, 2007, issued Fricano a letter indicating that he did not satisfactorily complete his working test period and that he was being terminated effective April 3, 2007.

The Borough offers a different version. When called to his office, the Chief advised Fricano that his performance during the working test period had not been satisfactory, and, therefore, offered him the option to resign effective February 22 or face termination for failure to satisfactorily complete his working test period. This offer was made so that Fricano could avoid any stigma which might attach to an involuntary termination. Fricano decided to resign and submitted a resignation letter the same day. In the letter, Fricano explain that he resigned to pursue “a different choice in the Law Enforcement Career.” Although he did not work after February 2, he was paid through February 22, and his resignation was recorded effective February 22, 2007. After being subsequently informed of Fricano’s intention to challenge his resignation, the police department issued the preliminary notice of disciplinary action on March 13, 2007. On March 22, 2007, the police department withdrew the charges and, instead, as a cautionary measure, issued a letter to

 

Fricano informing him that he had not successfully completed his working test period. 

Thereafter, Fricano filed an administrative appeal challenging his resignation. In a September 27, 2007 decision, the Board upheld the resignation, finding insufficient evidence that Fricano’s resignation was the product of duress or coercion. This appeal followed.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s finding that Fricano voluntarily resigned his position. The Court determined there was sufficient credible evidence that Fricano was told he would be terminated because he had not satisfactorily performed during his working test period. Moreover, the Court found that Fricano voluntarily chose to accept the offered opportunity to resign to avoid any stigma attached to termination. According to the Court, Fricano’s deliberate choice of available alternatives cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be ascribed to duress.
Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,