Corrections Officer Charged In Fake Grenade Incident

 

As reported by the Asbury Park Press on August 24, 2009, Keith Trimmer, 41, a senior corrections officer at Mountainview Youth Correctional Facility, has been charged with bringing an imitation hand grenade into the facility on May 13, 2009, creating a disturbance, according to the Hunterdon County Prosecutor’s Office.

Other correction officers saw the device, prompting a response from the Department of Corrections’ Special Operations Group. The Special Operations Group provides tactical and technical support during a crisis. 

The incident was investigated by the Hunterdon County Prosecutor’s Office, Major Crimes Unit and the Department of Corrections, and the Special Investigations Division of Mountainview Youth Correctional Facility. As a result, Officer Trimmer has been suspended without pay since May 15, 2009.

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Going and Coming Rule Serves as Basis for Denial of Application for Accidental Disability

 

On July 23, 2009, the Appellate Division decided Barbara Cannella v. Board of Trustees, The Public Employees’ Retirement System, Docket No.: A-4389-07T2. In the case, Barbara Cannella appealed the decision of the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees’ Retirement System (“Board”) denying her application for accidental disability retirement benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43.

On December 26, 2002, Cannella, a State employee working for the Division of Youth and Family Services, arrived at the parking lot designated for State employees where she was assigned to park. The parking lot was located a block from the building where she worked. As she exited her vehicle, she slipped and fell on ice, sustaining injuries.

On April 19, 2006, the Board determined that due to the injuries incurred in the fall, Cannella was permanently and totally disabled from performing her regular and assigned duties, but did not qualify for accidental disability benefits within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-43. In order to be entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits, the statute requires that the disabling injury be “as a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a result of the performance of [her] regular or assigned duties.” The Board determined that she did not meet this criterion and denied her application for accidental disability retirement benefits.

Cannella appealed and the case was sent to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for an administrative hearing. Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the ALJ found that because Cannella was a block away from her place of employment when she fell, she had not yet completed her commute and, as a result, the fall had not occurred “during and as a result of the performance of [her] regular or assigned duties.” As such, the ALJ granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the appeal. By letter dated May 27, 2008, the Board adopted the Initial Decision of the ALJ and denied Cannella’s application for accidental disability retirement benefits. This appeal ensued.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s determination and dismissed Cannella’s appeal. The Court indicated that Cannella had not reached her employer’s building, but still had another block to go. Moreover, she was not at the premises where she worked when she fell. At the time of her fall, she had not begun any preliminary efforts in commencement of work, but rather still had to continue her commute on foot to her workplace. According to the Court, to award accidental disability retirement benefits under these circumstances would be to significantly extend the scope of coverage. The statutory language was designed to reassert the going and coming rule present in workers’ compensation law, providing that workers were not entitled to benefits for injuries sustained while traveling to and from work. Thus, the Court held the Board’s application of the accidental disability statute to the facts of the case was consistent with the legislative intent to enforce the going and coming rule.

This case illustrates some of the crucial issues which arise during the course of a public pension appeal. Factors such as where and when an accident took place become vital in determining whether an individual qualifies for accidental disability retirement benefits under the statue. As such, it is important that you retain a highly qualified, experienced attorney should you determine to file for accidental disability retirement benefits in order to maximize your chances for recovery.

Arbitrator's Decision Remanded for Clarification on Timeliness Issue

On May 4, 2009, the Appellate Division decided City of Clifton v. Clifton P.B.A. Local #36, Docket No.: A-4806-07T3. In the case, Defendant, Clifton P.B.A. Local #36, appealed from a trial judge’s decision vacating an arbitrator’s award of thirteen (13) shift differential (SD) days to police detectives. 

The trial judge ruled that, in a case in which the union’s grievance was filed eighteen (18) months after the alleged wrong first occurred, and not within the twenty (20) days provided for in the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator exceeded his powers when stated that he had waived the twenty (20) day contractual time limit. In reaching that conclusion, the judge discussed the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Ed. Of Borough of Alpha v. Alpha Ed. Ass’n, a case in which the Court recognized and applied the continuing violation doctrine to preserve a late-filed grievance by the union resulting from the Board’s cessation of payment of health insurance benefits. Because the trial judge found that the arbitrator exceeded his powers in considering the matter, the judge did not render an opinion on any substantive issue raised by the parties.

On appeal, the union claimed that the award was timely pursuant to the continuing violation doctrine as recognized by the Supreme Court. The City of Clifton argued, like the trial judge, that the arbitrator did not find a continuing violation to have occurred, but rather, determined to waive the contractual twenty (20) day requirement.

The Appellate Division determined the arbitrator’s decision is susceptible to both interpretations. According to the Court, the arbitrator’s decision suggests that he nominally declined to decide the applicability of the continuing violation doctrine, instead couching his decision in terms of waiver. However, the result reached was identical to the one reached in Alpha by application of the continuing violation doctrine. Consequently, the Court remanded the matter to the arbitrator for clarification of the basis for his decision on the timeliness of the action.