New Jersey Public Safety Officers Law Blog : New Jersey Public Safety Employee Lawyer & Attorney : Pellettieri, Rabstein & Altman Law Firm : Workers Compensation, Discipline Representation for Police & Firefighters : New Jersey

As reported in the Trentonian on January 8, 2010, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the State of New Jersey alleging that New Jersey’s widespread use of a written exam to promote police sergeants discriminates against blacks and Hispanics. The lawsuit, filed in federal court in Newark, accuses New Jersey of civil rights violations for using a written exam in which black and Hispanic candidates scored significantly and consistently lower than their white counterparts.

Moreover, according to the complaint, even when minority candidates passed the test, they were not promoted as often as white candidates because their scores were lower and promotions were granted first to those with the highest scores and most seniority. Significantly, the Department of Justice has not taken issue with using seniority as a factor for promotions. As such, the lawsuit seeks to stop New Jersey from continuing to use the exam and asks the court to order it to offer relief to officers “harmed” by the exam by extending them promotions, back pay and retroactive seniority.

Test scores from 2000 to 2008 reviewed by the Justice Department showed that 89 percent of the white candidates who took the exam passed, compared to 77 percent of Hispanics and 73 percent of black candidates. With the exception of the New Jersey State Police, most law enforcement agencies across the state use the exam.

“This complaint should send a clear message to all public employers that employment practices with unlawful discriminatory impact on account of race or national origin will not be tolerated,” said Thomas Perez, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division. “The Justice Department will take all necessary action to ensure that such discriminatory practices are eliminated and that the victims of such practices are made whole.”

In a similar case, a federal judge in July sided with the Justice Department in ruling that New York City had discriminated against minorities in its hiring of firefighters, causing blacks and Hispanics to comprise only 10 percent of the fire department’s work force, even though most city residents are minorities.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

As reported in the Trentonian on September 22, 2009, federal oversight of the New Jersey State Police has come to an end. U.S. District Court Judge Mary L. Cooper has ended federal monitoring of the New Jersey State Police more than 10 years after the shooting of unarmed minority men during a highway traffic stop prompted intervention over racial profiling.

Judge Cooper signed the order dissolving a consent decree, following a joint motion filed in August by the State and U.S. Justice Department. The move followed Governor Jon Corzine’s bill signing in August that established an office within the State Attorney General’s office to oversee the State Police.

State Police agreed to federal oversight after troopers on the New Jersey Turnpike shot at a van containing four minority men during a 1998 traffic stop, wounding three of them. The agency has implemented major changes since then, including training and new supervisory policies to monitor road stops. In addition, trooper vehicles now contain dashboard cameras to videotape traffic stops. 

In a 2007 semiannual report, federal monitor Jim Ginger said that the State Police force is a different organization than when troopers fired on the van. Ginger and a second monitor tracked troopers’ stops of minority motorists for years, issuing reports every six months. The monitors found the State Police consistently in compliance for several years before the judge lifted the order. Corzine confirmed the finding with an independent review.

David Jones, President of the State Police Fraternal Association, commended the troopers but condemned the Attorney General’s office for not having policies and systems in place that would have allowed the State Police to identify and resolve isolated incidents of profiling. Specifically, Jones stated, “Former attorneys general for their own political expediency were willing to throw the state police under the bus…a decade later, we can look back at who the true professionals are and at those people who would sacrifice public safety for their own careers.”

To view the article in its entirety, please click on the following link.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

U.S District Court Judge Frieda L. Wolfson dismissed a lawsuit by a group of New Jersey State Troopers seeking to overturn the ban on allowing them to practice law while being employed by the State Police. The decision was filed on July 9, 2009.

“If the troopers were to prevail on this argument, state agencies would be precluded from holding their public employees, specifically attorneys, to a higher ethical standard than those imposed on private attorneys,” Judge Wolfson wrote in her decision. 

Two trooper unions, and twenty one (21) troopers working as lawyers, had argued the State was preventing troopers from pursuing another profession. The State said representing clients and enforcing the law presents an inherent conflict of interest, prohibited under a 2007 revision of the State’s ethics code.

Frederick J. Gordon, president of the Non-Commissioned Officers Association, said they hoped troopers already practicing law could be exempted. “We’re disappointed in the outcome,” he said. “I don’t know what our next step is.”

The unions argued that troopers’ legal work, such as drafting wills or helping with real estate closings, does not conflict with their criminal justice work. However, the State argued that even basic legal tasks could cause problems.”

“By way of example, if a trooper is retained to draft a will for a client, and happens to come across nefarious, possibly illegal, activity during his review of his client’s confidential personal records, the trooper would find himself in an unenviable position, obligated by his duties as an officer of the law to report the crime while simultaneously constrained by his oath as an attorney to protect his client’s confidences,” Judge Wolfson’s decision explained.

The debate centered on a 2007 change to the State’s ethics code. The previous version prohibited almost all attorneys in the department from practicing law outside their job. The revision extended that prohibition to state troopers.

David Wald, spokesman for Attorney General Anne Milgram, praised Judge Wolfson’s decision. “In rejecting the state troopers’ challenge to that rule, Judge Wolfson recognized the potential for conflicts between a private attorneys’ responsibilities to their clients and the department’s law enforcement responsibilities,” he said. “She concluded that the prohibition on the private practice of law by state troopers was an appropriate means to preserve the public trust.”

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On May 19, 2009, the Appellate Division decided State of New Jersey v. Yusef Gethers, Docket No.: A-5323-06T4. By way of background, on March 24, 2005, a Union County grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant, Yusef Gethers, with second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). On the same date, a Union County grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant with third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count one), and fourth-degree possession of a prohibited device, hollow point bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f). 

Following denial of his motion to suppress evidence, Defendant pled guilty to count one of the indictment, third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon. Pursuant to a plea bargain reached with the State, Defendant was sentence to five (5) years probation, conditioned upon 364 days of house arrest. The trial court dismissed the remaining charges under the indictments as well as an outstanding municipal court warrant. The trial court also imposed the appropriate fees and penalties. Thereafter, this appeal ensued when Defendant appealed the suppression ruling.

In this case, the Appellate Division determined the motion to suppress evidence obtained in a vehicular search, specifically, a gun found in a backpack not in plain view, was improperly denied by the trial judge. The Court found the State did not carry its burden of demonstrating a recognized exception to the warrant requirement where: (1) both occupants were outside the car and did not have access to the backpack; (2) there was no possibility they would leave the area; (3) the officers’ conduct did not indicate a belief the occupants were armed and dangerous; (4) there was no evidence of accomplices who might have come onto the scene or other persons who had access to the car destroying or disposing of the evidence or moving the car; (5) the car was parked in a residential driveway so there was no issue of traffic obstruction; (6) the ratio of officers to suspects was 4-to-2; and (7) the Defendant was in a wheelchair. Consequently, the Court reversed the trial judge’s ruling and remanded the case back to the trial court.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On March 20, 2009, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey decided the case of Wade v. Colaner. In the case, plaintiff, a Tinton Falls police officer, was pulled over by New Jersey State Troopers for speeding. Plaintiff was subsequently charged with careless driving, obstruction of administration of law, and resisting arrest. On account of this incident, he was suspended from his position of employment.

Ultimately, plaintiff brought this action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference. Defendants counterclaimed against Plaintiff for reimbursement of the wages paid to Plaintiff during his suspension and moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s other claims. The Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, but dismissed Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. Moreover, the Court granted the Tinton Falls Defendants’ motion for summary judgment finding that Plaintiff was not entitled to a pre-suspension hearing and also granted the motion for summary judgment for reimbursement of the wages paid to Plaintiff during his suspension.

This case shows that a public safety officer who is suspended from his or her employment and is continuing to receive their wages during the period of suspension potentially may have to reimburse their employer for the wages they have received. As a result, public safety officers should be conscious of this possibility in the event they are suspended from employment.

A similar type concept was the subject of previous posts to this blog regarding the 180 day bill recently signed into law. As you will recall, the bill, in essence, allows certain law enforcement officers and firefighters to regain pay status when appeals of termination are not resolved within 180 days. Under this bill, if an officer and/or firefighter has been receiving his/her base salary after expiration of the 180 day period and he/she ultimately loses their appeal, the officer and/or firefighter will be required to reimburse the employing agency of department all of the base salary received during the period of appeal. Certain rules of law such as these make it imperative for public safety officers to be informed regarding all the potential consequences in the event they are targeted for suspension and/or removal.   

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

 On February 9, 2009, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey decided the case of Martin v. City of East Orange. In the case, plaintiffs, two police officers, alleged that in failing to promote them in 2003, when officers ranked below them were recommended for promotion, although not promoted, the defendants discriminated against them in favor of officers more politically favored in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983, the federal and state constitutions, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. 

The Court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ federal claims. The Court held the officers had no constitutional right to promotion and they failed to produce any evidence of political favoritism or retaliation for having complained about being improperly bypassed for promotion. Further, the Court declined to assert subject-matter jurisdiction over the state law claim, thereby not addressing those issues. 

This case illustrates the importance of producing credible, substantive evidence in support of a claim alleging that one was improperly bypassed for promotion. It is vital that any public safety officer who seeks to assert such a claim should consult with a qualified attorney who is able to produce such competent evidence or determine whether such evidence exists so as to avoid the pitfalls present in this matter. Without the necessary proofs, such a claim will likely fail, as articulated by the Court in this case.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

This blog entry will focus upon our review of certain statutory proposals currently pending in the New Jersey Legislature concerning the pay status of law enforcement officers when appeals of termination are not resolved within 180 days. These proposals are set forth in Assembly Bill Number 3481. 

Assembly Bill 3481 concerns the suspensions of certain law enforcement officers and firefighters and supplements Title 40A of the New Jersey statutes and specifically amends N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150 and N.J.S.A. 40A:14-22. In essence, the bill allows certain law enforcement officers and firefighters to regain pay status when appeals of termination are not resolved within 180 days.

The first part of the bill provides:

When a law enforcement officer employed by a law enforcement agency…that is subject to the provisions of Title 11A of the New Jersey Statutes is suspended from performing his official duties without pay for a complaint or charges, other than (1) a complaint or charges relating to the subject matter of a pending criminal investigation…whether pre-indictment or post indictment, or (2) when the complaint or charges allege conduct that also would constitute a violation of the criminal laws of this State or any other jurisdiction, and the law enforcement agency employing the officer…seeks to terminate that officer’s…employment for the conduct that was the basis for the officer’s…suspension without pay, a final determination on the officer’s…suspension and termination shall be rendered within 180 calendar days from the date the officer…is suspended without pay.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In Division of State Police v. In the Matter of Detective Sergeant First Class Daniel Flaherty, Docket No. A-0257-07T20257-07T2, the Appellate Division addressed the validity and ultimate imposition of disciplinary charges lodged against a Detective Sergeant of the New Jersey State Police. The appeal arose out of disciplinary charges filed by the New Jersey Division of State Police (“Division”) against Detective Sergeant First Class Daniel Flaherty, charging him with: (1) disseminating Division documents without proper authorization; (2) behaving in an official capacity to the personal discredit of a member of the State Police or to the Division; and (3) willfully disobeying a lawful verbal or written order.

The underlying facts of this case were not substantially in dispute. In 2001, Flaherty filed an age discrimination complaint with the New Jersey State Police Equal Employment Opportunity/Affirmative Action (“EEO/AA”) intake unit. He alleged that since 1995, the State Police had denied him numerous specialist positions because of his age. The EEO/AA assigned Lieutenant Patrick Reilly to investigate his claim. After two years, in which the allegations still had not been resolved, the EEO/AA replaced Reilly with DSFC Kevin Rowe.

On May 5, 2003, Flaherty filed a New Jersey State Police Reportable Incident Form alleging “culpable inefficiency” against Reilly. Pursuant to a Division policy regarding non-disclosure of confidential internal investigations, the Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”) denied his request to access the file regarding his complaint against Reilly.

The following month, the State Police administratively closed Flaherty’s complaint file against Reilly and transferred the matter to the Attorney General’s EEO/AA section. In a letter dated September 24, 2003, a Senior Deputy Attorney General informed Flaherty that his claim against Reilly could not be substantiated. 

Thereafter, on May 31, 2003, the Division assigned Flaherty to the OPS, which was then called the State Police Internal Affairs Investigation Bureau. Pursuant to Division of Internal Affairs policies and procedures, “[t]he nature and source of internal allegations, the progress of internal affairs investigations, and the resulting materials are confidential information. The contents of internal investigation case files shall be retained in the internal affairs unit and clearly marked as confidential.” Notwithstanding these provisions, internal investigation files can be released in certain enumerated circumstances.  As such, Flaherty executed a confidentiality agreement which provided the dissemination of all confidential information and/or documents.

In a letter dated February 20, 2004, the Department of Law and Public Safety found that Flaherty’s age discrimination claims could not be substantiated. In his appeal to the Department of Personnel, Flaherty questioned the manner in which the State Police and the Attorney General’s office investigated his

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In Brennan v. Township of Fairfield, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey addressed an important topic for public safety officers, freedom of speech. In this case, Plaintiff, a police officer, alleged he was retaliated against for distributing a memorandum on police letterhead to the Mayor and Township Council. The memorandum contained the officer’s reasons for having issued two motor vehicle summonses to a township administrator.   

Defendants moved for summary judgment of plaintiff’s claim. The Court granted the motion because Plaintiff’s speech was made pursuant to his duties as a police officer. Therefore, his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. In addition to seeking summary judgment, Defendants also moved for sanctions against Plaintiff for the assertion of a claim which Plaintiff later withdrew. The Court denied this motion along with Defendants’ other motions to disqualify counsel and to compel mediation.   

This case, although very brief, illustrates how one’s freedom of speech can be limited based on the context in which the speech is offered. Speech made pursuant to one’s duties as a public safety officer will not be protected by the First Amendment, thereby negating support of a retaliation claim. As a result, it is important for public safety officers to be cognizant of the distinction between speech made pursuant to their employment from all other forms.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In the matter of Gary Stolinski v. State of New Jersey, Division of State Police, A-2412-07T3, the Appellate Division considered whether Gary Stolinski, a New Jersey State Trooper, was entitled to an award of counsel fees pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:1-30, as a result of having to defend against an indictment charging official misconduct, credit card fraud, and identity theft.

On July 15, 2005, Stolinski was indicted and charged with official misconduct, credit card fraud, and identity theft based on the allegation that he used a State Police computer to make online credit card applications through the use of false information and by assuming the identity of others. Subsequent to being indicted, Stolinski was suspended from the force without pay.   

The indictment was ultimately dismissed on December 15, 2005. Thereafter, Stolinski was reinstated and reimbursed for the pay withheld during his suspension. Stolinski then demanded reimbursement for the counsel fees he expended in defending against the indictment. In response, the Attorney General’s office advised that the request for the payment of legal fees incurred in seeking back pay would be honored. However, the Division rejected the remaining aspects of Stolinski’s request and asserted there was no statutory basis for the reimbursement of attorney fees associated with: (1) the defense of criminal charges; (2) responding to the administrative disciplinary charge; or (3) seeking the expungement of his criminal record. This appeal ensued.

The Appellate Division concluded that the Division’s final agency decision was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable because it was based upon a correct understanding of N.J.S.A. 53:1-30 and an accurate application of its terms to the allegations contained in the indictment. N.J.S.A. 53:1-30 provides that a law enforcement officer is entitled to be reimbursed only for those fees incurred “in an action or legal proceeding arising out of or directly related to the lawful exercise of police powers in the furtherance of official duties.”   

The Court determined N.J.S.A. 53:1-30 did not provide support for Stolinski’s claim because the allegations of the indictment were not directly related to his lawful exercise of police powers in the furtherance of official duties. In this case, Stolinski was alleged to have used a State Police computer to make false credit card application. Regardless of whether the allegations could or could not be substantiated, it is clear Stolinski was not charged with conduct that was in furtherance of his official duties on that occasion. As a result, the Court affirmed the Division’s determination.       

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In the case of In the Matter of Mark Moncho, Mark Moncho, a Sergeant First Class, appealed a final decision of the Division of State Police finding him in violation of Article VI, Section 2a of the Division’s regulations (performance of duties) and imposing a ten day suspension.

Moncho was assigned to the State Police Construction Inspection Unit. The Construction Unit is a component of the Traffic Bureau and operates as a partnership between the New Jersey State Police and the New Jersey Department of Transportation. In this capacity, Moncho was responsible for overseeing five sergeants who, in turn, supervised subordinate troopers. His responsibilities included: (1) reviewing the patrol charts and weekly reports of the sergeants and the subordinates; (2) time-keeping; and (3) day-to-day supervision of the Construction Unit.

Ultimately, the Division of State Police charged Moncho with violating a series of rules and regulations involving billing and overtime. Moncho pled not guilty to the charges and, on June 28, 2004, the Division transmitted the matter to the Office of Administrative Law. After conducting numerous hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded: (1) Moncho violated none of the specifications underlying disciplinary charges; and (2) nevertheless, Moncho was guilty of the performance of duties disciplinary charge based solely upon the amount of overtime he had earned. On August 2, 2007, the Division of State Police issued a final decision upholding the ALJ’s decision in its entirety. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Moncho argued that when the ALJ found that the Division had not met its burden of proof as to the specifications in the charges, the ALJ dismissed all bases of liability of which Moncho had notice. Moreover, Moncho argued the Division’s decision to discipline him absent a showing that he engaged in fraud, misleading conduct, or the violation of a policy is arbitrary and capricious.

In its decision, the Appellate Division agreed with Moncho’s contentions. The Court concluded that the record did not support the Division’s decision and this was further compelled by the ALJ’s incongruous findings. In effect, the ALJ created a new basis on which to justify disciplinary action after hearing and rejecting the official charges and specifications lodged against Moncho. The Court further noted that at no time was Moncho ever notified that the accrual of overtime, in and of itself, could subject him to disciplinary action. Accordingly, the Court determined the final decision of the Division to be arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and thereby vacated the penalty imposed. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Associated Press recently reported that a state council on Wednesday, October 22, 2008, struck down New Jersey's plan to have rural towns pay for the state police coverage that they receive due to the fact that the town’s do not have their own police force. The New Jersey Council on Local Mandates effectively voided a plan contained in Gov. Jon Corzine's budget that would have charged small towns who don't have their own police force but instead are provided with public safety coverage by the New Jersey State Police. Corzine has stated that this loss of revenue would have to be absorbed by further cuts in municipal aid.

The Council, which is an independent body created to review the constitutionality of state laws and regulations, said the requirement to force towns to pay for state police was an illegal unfunded mandate. Under New Jersey's Constitution, the Council's decision is final.

Seventy-six New Jersey towns get full-time state police patrols free, while 13 get free part-time patrols, regardless of size, population, taxes and wealth.

This is an interesting proposition as it could be an integral part of the continued push to consolidate municipal services and benefits. As a tax saving measure the Governor’s office has already started an initiative to consolidate smaller school districts within the state.  Public services will certainly follow.  While a reduction of officers on the road is unlikely, it is not too speculative to state that the suggestion of sharing administrative duties between departments may be viewed as a feasible cost saving measure. As the budget gets tighter, taxes go higher, and there is a continual cry from the public for assistance; we may see novel propositions that can have an effect upon the employment of public safety officers and the administrators of public safety departments. Let’s keep an eye on this one.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link