Potential for Reimbursement of Wages Received During Period of Suspension

On March 20, 2009, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey decided the case of Wade v. Colaner. In the case, plaintiff, a Tinton Falls police officer, was pulled over by New Jersey State Troopers for speeding. Plaintiff was subsequently charged with careless driving, obstruction of administration of law, and resisting arrest. On account of this incident, he was suspended from his position of employment.

Ultimately, plaintiff brought this action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference. Defendants counterclaimed against Plaintiff for reimbursement of the wages paid to Plaintiff during his suspension and moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s other claims. The Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, but dismissed Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. Moreover, the Court granted the Tinton Falls Defendants’ motion for summary judgment finding that Plaintiff was not entitled to a pre-suspension hearing and also granted the motion for summary judgment for reimbursement of the wages paid to Plaintiff during his suspension.

This case shows that a public safety officer who is suspended from his or her employment and is continuing to receive their wages during the period of suspension potentially may have to reimburse their employer for the wages they have received. As a result, public safety officers should be conscious of this possibility in the event they are suspended from employment.

A similar type concept was the subject of previous posts to this blog regarding the 180 day bill recently signed into law. As you will recall, the bill, in essence, allows certain law enforcement officers and firefighters to regain pay status when appeals of termination are not resolved within 180 days. Under this bill, if an officer and/or firefighter has been receiving his/her base salary after expiration of the 180 day period and he/she ultimately loses their appeal, the officer and/or firefighter will be required to reimburse the employing agency of department all of the base salary received during the period of appeal. Certain rules of law such as these make it imperative for public safety officers to be informed regarding all the potential consequences in the event they are targeted for suspension and/or removal.   

 

Police Promotion Discrimination Suit Dismissed

 On February 9, 2009, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey decided the case of Martin v. City of East Orange. In the case, plaintiffs, two police officers, alleged that in failing to promote them in 2003, when officers ranked below them were recommended for promotion, although not promoted, the defendants discriminated against them in favor of officers more politically favored in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983, the federal and state constitutions, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination

The Court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ federal claims. The Court held the officers had no constitutional right to promotion and they failed to produce any evidence of political favoritism or retaliation for having complained about being improperly bypassed for promotion. Further, the Court declined to assert subject-matter jurisdiction over the state law claim, thereby not addressing those issues. 

This case illustrates the importance of producing credible, substantive evidence in support of a claim alleging that one was improperly bypassed for promotion. It is vital that any public safety officer who seeks to assert such a claim should consult with a qualified attorney who is able to produce such competent evidence or determine whether such evidence exists so as to avoid the pitfalls present in this matter. Without the necessary proofs, such a claim will likely fail, as articulated by the Court in this case.

 

Discipline Regading Dissemination of Internal Affairs Documents Upheld

 

In Division of State Police v. In the Matter of Detective Sergeant First Class Daniel Flaherty, Docket No. A-0257-07T20257-07T2, the Appellate Division addressed the validity and ultimate imposition of disciplinary charges lodged against a Detective Sergeant of the New Jersey State Police. The appeal arose out of disciplinary charges filed by the New Jersey Division of State Police (“Division”) against Detective Sergeant First Class Daniel Flaherty, charging him with: (1) disseminating Division documents without proper authorization; (2) behaving in an official capacity to the personal discredit of a member of the State Police or to the Division; and (3) willfully disobeying a lawful verbal or written order.

The underlying facts of this case were not substantially in dispute. In 2001, Flaherty filed an age discrimination complaint with the New Jersey State Police Equal Employment Opportunity/Affirmative Action (“EEO/AA”) intake unit. He alleged that since 1995, the State Police had denied him numerous specialist positions because of his age. The EEO/AA assigned Lieutenant Patrick Reilly to investigate his claim. After two years, in which the allegations still had not been resolved, the EEO/AA replaced Reilly with DSFC Kevin Rowe.

On May 5, 2003, Flaherty filed a New Jersey State Police Reportable Incident Form alleging “culpable inefficiency” against Reilly. Pursuant to a Division policy regarding non-disclosure of confidential internal investigations, the Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”) denied his request to access the file regarding his complaint against Reilly.

The following month, the State Police administratively closed Flaherty’s complaint file against Reilly and transferred the matter to the Attorney General’s EEO/AA section. In a letter dated September 24, 2003, a Senior Deputy Attorney General informed Flaherty that his claim against Reilly could not be substantiated. 

Thereafter, on May 31, 2003, the Division assigned Flaherty to the OPS, which was then called the State Police Internal Affairs Investigation Bureau. Pursuant to Division of Internal Affairs policies and procedures, “[t]he nature and source of internal allegations, the progress of internal affairs investigations, and the resulting materials are confidential information. The contents of internal investigation case files shall be retained in the internal affairs unit and clearly marked as confidential.” Notwithstanding these provisions, internal investigation files can be released in certain enumerated circumstances.  As such, Flaherty executed a confidentiality agreement which provided the dissemination of all confidential information and/or documents.

In a letter dated February 20, 2004, the Department of Law and Public Safety found that Flaherty’s age discrimination claims could not be substantiated. In his appeal to the Department of Personnel, Flaherty questioned the manner in which the State Police and the Attorney General’s office investigated his

 

discrimination claims and his complaint against Reilly. Attached to the appeal were several documents from OPS internal investigation files relating to Reilly and several documents from the internal investigation file regarding his culpable inefficiency claim against Reilly. He also claimed that two other State troopers had filed reportable incident forms against Reilly, specifically citing to one of the internal investigation files.

The Department of Personnel acknowledged receipt of Flaherty’s appeal and forwarded a copy of same to the Attorney General’s office. In responding to the appeal, it became apparent Flaherty might have breached confidentiality by attaching Division documents from internal investigation files. Consequently, an investigation was commenced regarding Flaherty’s acquisition and dissemination of several of the documents referenced in and attached to his appeal. After the investigation, on August 25, 2005, the Division filed the above referenced disciplinary charges against Flaherty. 

The case was ultimately transferred to the Office of Administrative Law. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) assigned to the case granted a summary decision in favor of the State on charges one and three, dismissed charge two, and ordered Flaherty suspended from duty for five days without pay. After the State filed exceptions seeking to increase the penalty and Flaherty challenged the grant of summary decision as well as the penalty, the Superintendent of the State Police issued a final decision on August 1, 2007, upholding the summary decision on charges one and three, but increasing the suspension to ten days. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Flaherty asserted: (1) genuine issues of material fact precluded summary decision; (2) the ALJ failed to consider relevant evidence; (3) the ALJ applied the incorrect burden of proof; (4) the Superintendent erred by adopting the Department of Personnel’s finding that his discrimination claims were “unsubstantiated”; (5) the Superintendent erred in asserting that he has “absolute discretion” to promulgate rules and regulations; (6) he was unfairly charged with two violations based on the same facts; and (7) the ten day suspension is disproportionately harsh.

The Appellate Division rejected all of Flaherty’s arguments and affirmed the Superintendant’s decision. According to the Court, the record sustained the ALJ’s grant of summary decision imposing disciplinary action on Flaherty for attaching the records from the Internal Affairs Unit of the State Police. The Court determined Flaherty knew the records he attached to and referenced in his appeal were confidential. Moreover, the Court noted Flaherty even executed a confidentiality agreement which specifically prohibited such dissemination. As such, the Court held the ten day suspension was not disproportionately harsh and sustained the findings of the ALJ and Superintendent.

STATE TROOPER'S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES DENIED

 

In the matter of Gary Stolinski v. State of New Jersey, Division of State Police, A-2412-07T3, the Appellate Division considered whether Gary Stolinski, a New Jersey State Trooper, was entitled to an award of counsel fees pursuant to N.J.S.A. 53:1-30, as a result of having to defend against an indictment charging official misconduct, credit card fraud, and identity theft.

On July 15, 2005, Stolinski was indicted and charged with official misconduct, credit card fraud, and identity theft based on the allegation that he used a State Police computer to make online credit card applications through the use of false information and by assuming the identity of others. Subsequent to being indicted, Stolinski was suspended from the force without pay.   

The indictment was ultimately dismissed on December 15, 2005. Thereafter, Stolinski was reinstated and reimbursed for the pay withheld during his suspension. Stolinski then demanded reimbursement for the counsel fees he expended in defending against the indictment. In response, the Attorney General’s office advised that the request for the payment of legal fees incurred in seeking back pay would be honored. However, the Division rejected the remaining aspects of Stolinski’s request and asserted there was no statutory basis for the reimbursement of attorney fees associated with: (1) the defense of criminal charges; (2) responding to the administrative disciplinary charge; or (3) seeking the expungement of his criminal record. This appeal ensued.

The Appellate Division concluded that the Division’s final agency decision was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable because it was based upon a correct understanding of N.J.S.A. 53:1-30 and an accurate application of its terms to the allegations contained in the indictment. N.J.S.A. 53:1-30 provides that a law enforcement officer is entitled to be reimbursed only for those fees incurred “in an action or legal proceeding arising out of or directly related to the lawful exercise of police powers in the furtherance of official duties.”   

The Court determined N.J.S.A. 53:1-30 did not provide support for Stolinski’s claim because the allegations of the indictment were not directly related to his lawful exercise of police powers in the furtherance of official duties. In this case, Stolinski was alleged to have used a State Police computer to make false credit card application. Regardless of whether the allegations could or could not be substantiated, it is clear Stolinski was not charged with conduct that was in furtherance of his official duties on that occasion. As a result, the Court affirmed the Division’s determination.       

         

State Trooper Discipline Overturned

 

In the case of In the Matter of Mark Moncho, Mark Moncho, a Sergeant First Class, appealed a final decision of the Division of State Police finding him in violation of Article VI, Section 2a of the Division’s regulations (performance of duties) and imposing a ten day suspension.

Moncho was assigned to the State Police Construction Inspection Unit. The Construction Unit is a component of the Traffic Bureau and operates as a partnership between the New Jersey State Police and the New Jersey Department of Transportation. In this capacity, Moncho was responsible for overseeing five sergeants who, in turn, supervised subordinate troopers. His responsibilities included: (1) reviewing the patrol charts and weekly reports of the sergeants and the subordinates; (2) time-keeping; and (3) day-to-day supervision of the Construction Unit.

Ultimately, the Division of State Police charged Moncho with violating a series of rules and regulations involving billing and overtime. Moncho pled not guilty to the charges and, on June 28, 2004, the Division transmitted the matter to the Office of Administrative Law. After conducting numerous hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded: (1) Moncho violated none of the specifications underlying disciplinary charges; and (2) nevertheless, Moncho was guilty of the performance of duties disciplinary charge based solely upon the amount of overtime he had earned. On August 2, 2007, the Division of State Police issued a final decision upholding the ALJ’s decision in its entirety. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Moncho argued that when the ALJ found that the Division had not met its burden of proof as to the specifications in the charges, the ALJ dismissed all bases of liability of which Moncho had notice. Moreover, Moncho argued the Division’s decision to discipline him absent a showing that he engaged in fraud, misleading conduct, or the violation of a policy is arbitrary and capricious.

 

In its decision, the Appellate Division agreed with Moncho’s contentions. The Court concluded that the record did not support the Division’s decision and this was further compelled by the ALJ’s incongruous findings. In effect, the ALJ created a new basis on which to justify disciplinary action after hearing and rejecting the official charges and specifications lodged against Moncho. The Court further noted that at no time was Moncho ever notified that the accrual of overtime, in and of itself, could subject him to disciplinary action. Accordingly, the Court determined the final decision of the Division to be arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and thereby vacated the penalty imposed. 

         

Municipalities Will Not Pay For State Police Patrols

The Associated Press recently reported that a state council on Wednesday, October 22, 2008, struck down New Jersey's plan to have rural towns pay for the state police coverage that they receive due to the fact that the town’s do not have their own police force. The New Jersey Council on Local Mandates effectively voided a plan contained in Gov. Jon Corzine's budget that would have charged small towns who don't have their own police force but instead are provided with public safety coverage by the New Jersey State Police. Corzine has stated that this loss of revenue would have to be absorbed by further cuts in municipal aid.

The Council, which is an independent body created to review the constitutionality of state laws and regulations, said the requirement to force towns to pay for state police was an illegal unfunded mandate. Under New Jersey's Constitution, the Council's decision is final.

Seventy-six New Jersey towns get full-time state police patrols free, while 13 get free part-time patrols, regardless of size, population, taxes and wealth.

This is an interesting proposition as it could be an integral part of the continued push to consolidate municipal services and benefits. As a tax saving measure the Governor’s office has already started an initiative to consolidate smaller school districts within the state.  Public services will certainly follow.  While a reduction of officers on the road is unlikely, it is not too speculative to state that the suggestion of sharing administrative duties between departments may be viewed as a feasible cost saving measure. As the budget gets tighter, taxes go higher, and there is a continual cry from the public for assistance; we may see novel propositions that can have an effect upon the employment of public safety officers and the administrators of public safety departments. Let’s keep an eye on this one.