New Jersey Public Safety Employee Lawyer & Attorney : Arpaia & Crivelli Law Firm : Police, Firefighters, Workers Compensation, Discipline Representation : New Jersey

In Frohner v. City of Wildwood, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey addressed a very unusual and interesting factual scenario. The lawsuit asserted numerous claims arising out of the arrest and handcuffing of plaintiff, an undercover FBI agent, by defendants, local police officers. Defendants suspected plaintiff was a motorcyclist impersonating an FBI agent.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on a variety of plaintiff’s claims. First, the Court denied defendants’ motions as to the false-arrest claims because defendants failed to show as a matter of law that they had probable cause or arguable probable cause to believe plaintiff was impersonating an FBI agent. Next, the Court denied defendants’ motion as to the claim that defendants’ conducted an unlawful search and seizure of plaintiff’s car. The Court indicated that it could not be concluded that the search was incident to a lawful arrest.

The Court also denied defendants’ motion as to plaintiff’s excessive-force and punitive damages claims. The Court held that such a claim will lie for the use of excessively tight handcuffs and that expert testimony is not required. With regard to plaintiff’s punitive damages claim, the Court noted that the issue as to whether any defendant was recklessly indifferent to plaintiff’s rights was a jury question. 

Although the vast majority of plaintiff’s claims were upheld, the Court did grant defendants summary judgment on one of the claims. The Court determined that since plaintiff has not shown a pattern of constitutional violations indicating defendants were deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that constitutional violations such as those alleged in this case would occur, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on that claim.

This case shows that arrests of undercover agents by local police departments, much like arrests of everyday citizens, can give rise to various claims being brought against the departments. Even with the unusual nature of the facts of this case, this case also illustrates that Courts are typically reluctant to dismiss certain claims as long as some evidence in support thereof has been offered.    

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In the matter of Paul Weber v. Borough of Glen Rock, A-1079-07T3, Plaintiff, Paul Weber, appealed from two trial court orders: (1) an order dated May 3, 2006 dismissing some of his claims; and (2) an order dated September 5, 2007 granting summary judgment to defendants on the balance of the claims. After reviewing the contentions raised on appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s determinations. 

Weber is a member of the Glen Rock Police Department. After joining the Department as a patrolman in 1978, he was promoted to the rank of sergeant in 1985. Since 1985, there have been four occasions when there was an opening within the Department for a member to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant. Weber applied for this promotion on each occasion and was unsuccessful. 

In 2004, the successful applicant was Garret Merselis, who was promoted from sergeant to lieutenant. In 2005, a vacancy developed for the position of captain. Thereafter, Merselis, the only lieutenant on the Glen Rock force at that time, was promoted to the rank of captain. The promotion of Merselis to captain created a vacancy for the position of lieutenant. Plaintiff applied, as did three other members of the Department. On this occasion, Frederick Stahman was selected for promotion to the rank of lieutenant.

Plaintiff, who had more seniority than did either Merselis or Stahman at the time of their respective promotions, filed suit contending that the promotional process was flawed. Specifically, he sought to reopen the process relating to the most recent promotional opening. In support, Weber contended: (1) the Borough was required to administer examinations to those applying for promotion and not rely exclusively on interviews; and (2) the Borough, in passing him over for promotion, did not comply with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-129. 

The Court rejected both of Weber’s assertions. The Borough is not a civil service municipality and followed its own two-step promotional process, a written test followed by interviews, until 1992 when, under the new police chief, only interviews were used to select a candidate for promotion to lieutenant. The Court found that where all members of the committee participated in the interviews of all the candidates, the process employed by Glen Rock does not suffer from the same deficiencies criticized in Rox v. Dep’t of Civil Service, 141 N.J. Super. 463, 467 (App. Div. 1976). In Rox, different panels interviewed the various candidates and used different criteria in making promotional decisions. This was not the situation in this case.

Moreover, the Court held that seniority, in and of itself, is not determinative of promotion. The Court indicated seniority is merely an additional factor to be considered on the merits of the evaluation of individuals for promotion and not a mechanical rule which guarantees promotion to a senior employee. In this case, it was established Weber’s seniority was considered. That is all he was entitled to; he was not entitled to have it treated as controlling.          

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In the case of In the Matter of Carpenito, Sergeant Vincent Capenito appealed a final agency decision dismissing him from the Division of State Police. The Appellate Division sustained Carpenito’s dismissal and rejected his contention that the policy of progressive discipline required a less severe sanction.

On March 24, 2006, Carpenito was charged with five disciplinary infractions of the rules and regulations of the Division of State Police. The case was eventually transferred to the Office of Administrative Law as contested matter. A seven day hearing was conducted by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), who issued an initial decision finding Carpenito guilty of the charges against him and recommending his termination of employment. Thereafter, Colonel Joseph Fuentes, Superintendent of the State Police, adopted the findings of the ALJ and dismissed Carpenito from the Division. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Carpenito argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the findings that he engaged in conduct that warranted discipline; and (2) the sanction of dismissal was inconsistent with the general policy of progressive discipline. The Court, in rejecting Carpenito’s arguments, found that the Superintendent’s determination that Carpenito left his post while on duty and lied to investigators was based on Carpenito’s own admissions and, therefore, Carpenito’s contention that he was denied his right to cross-examine his wife because of her invocation of her Fifth Amendment right was of no consequence. 

Moreover, the Court found the Superintendent was entirely justified in terminating Carpenito’s employment due to the seriousness of the misconduct. The Court held that the Superintendent properly: (1) recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished record and; (2) considered Carpenito’s prior disciplinary history and numerous occasions of alleged domestic disputes. As a result, the Court determined the application of progressive discipline was not appropriate in light of Carpenito’s egregious conduct.

This case illustrates an instance of where a general policy of progressive discipline will not be adhered to by a public employer. Should a disciplinary infraction be very serious in nature, a policy of progressive discipline can and will be abandoned so as to ensure a proper disciplinary response. This outcome should be noted by all public safety officers who intend to rely upon their employer’s policy of progressive discipline when contesting a disciplinary action. The seriousness of the misconduct, along with prior disciplinary history, may be used to circumvent a policy of progressive discipline and, therefore, may impose more serious consequences upon an officer than originally anticipated.  

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In the case entitled, In the Matter of Herrick, etc. 33-2-1258, The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division opined that a police officer serving in the elevated civil service title of captain in order to fill a vacancy created by a temporary leave of absence due to a military obligation has no claim to permanent appointment for the title that was temporarily filled.  However despite this ruling,  in its opinion the court did differentiate between temporarily filling a vacancy due to a disciplinary action versus a military leave of absence.  It appears based on the courts reasoning that had the vacancy been temporarily filled due to the fact that the individual that occupied the permanent title were suspended for disciplinary reasons, the appellants would have had a legitimate claim to the permanent title.  Expanded reasoning in this case would have been helpful to understand the direction of the court. 

It is important to note that should a public safety officer occupy an elevated civil service title for a period of time due to the fact that the permanent title holder is suspended from employment for disciplinary infractions, the court may entertain a cause of action that the individual that is temporarily occupying the position may have a legitimate claim to the title of employment.

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 After much concern regarding the new Treasury Regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and their potential impact on members of government pension plans, the IRS and the Treasury intend to extend the date by which a governmental plan must comply with final regulations on distributions from a pension plan upon attainment of normal retirement age. Under the extension, the new Treasury Regulations will be effective for a governmental plan for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2011.     

As described in two previous blog entries, the IRS modified Treasury Regulation §1.401(a)-1 to provide an exception to the rule that pension benefits be paid only after retirement by permitting a pension plan to commence payment of retirement benefits to a participant after the participant has attained normal retirement age even if the participant has not yet had a severance from employment with the employer maintaining the plan. 

The new regulations also require a pension plan’s normal retirement age to be an age that is not earlier than the earliest age that is reasonably representative of the typical retirement age for the industry in which the covered workforce is employed.  In the case of a retirement plan where substantially all of the participants are qualified public safety officers, a normal retirement age of age 50 or later is deemed not be earlier than the earliest age that is reasonably representative of the typical retirement age for the industry in which the covered workforce is employed. 

Notice 2007-69, which provided temporary relief for certain plans that may have to change their definitions of normal retirement age to satisfy the new regulations, indicated that the new regulations do not contain a safe harbor or other guidance with respect to a normal retirement age conditioned on the completion of a stated number of years of service.  The notice requested comments on whether and how a pension plan with a normal retirement age conditioned on the completion of a stated number of years of service satisfies the requirement in §1.401(a)-1 that a pension plan be maintained primarily to provide for the payment of definitely determinable benefits after retirement or attainment of normal retirement age and how such a plan satisfies the pre-ERISA vesting rules. 

Based upon this, in Notice 2008-98, the IRS indicated its intention to amend the new regulations to change the effective date for governmental plan to plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2011.  Moreover, the notice provided that government plan sponsors may rely on this notice with respect to extension until such time as the new regulations are so amended. 

Although the implementation of the new regulations has been delayed, it is critical to keep apprised of the comments regarding whether a pension plan with a normal retirement age conditioned on the completion of a stated number of years of service satisfies the new regulations. Clearly, the resolution of this issue could drastically impact many public safety officers not only in New Jersey, but across the country. Periodic updates to this website regarding these regulations will be posted as more information becomes available.    

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