MSB Promotional Examination Decision Upheld

On May 7, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Steven Howe and Joseph Mufalli, Docket No. A-3512-07T1. In the case, Steven Howe appealed from the final administrative determination of the Merit System Board (“Board”), issued December 21, 2007, and its determination of March 13, 2008, denying his motion for reconsideration of the determination that Howe did not meet the experience requirements necessary to sit for the promotional examination for Chief Operating Engineer 2 of the Juvenile Justice Commission.

On appeal, Howe argued that “the administrative agency acted either arbitrarily or capriciously by finding appellant’s prior supervisory experience to be out of title,” whereas only one of the three applicants, Barry Schneider, who did the same work as appellant, was found to qualify for the exam. Howe further argued that the agency acted “arbitrarily and capriciously in its attempt to correct the ambiguous language in the job specification of operating engineer 1 and should have either negated the examination results or should have allowed all three applicants to sit for the exam.” 

After reviewing the entire record, the Appellate Division concluded that it could not disturb the findings of the Board because the Court must defer to the agency’s expertise in implementing civil service law. Although the Court noted the job description for operating engineer 1 is ambiguous regarding supervisory responsibilities and the Board directed that it be amended, the Court determined Howe did not provide evidence that he had supervised while in that position and, therefore, was not qualified to sit for the exam. As such, the Court found the Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in not permitting him to take the examination.

 

Termination of Middlesex County Sheriff's Officer Upheld

On April 28, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Joan Ivan, Docket No.: A-1070-07T2.  Following a hearing conducted on April 15, 2003, appellant, Joan Ivan (“Ivan”), a Middlesex County Sheriff’s Officer, was suspended for thirty days as the result of disciplinary charges stemming from her alleged failure to truthfully report smoking by a fellow officer while in an official vehicle. In contrast, the officer committing the prohibited offense, after pleading guilty, was given a four-day suspension that could be served use of vacation days. Ivan appealed to the Merit System Board on May 16, 2003.

Thereafter, on August 22, 2003, Ivan was terminated when, in nine attempts over three days, she was unable to requalify for use of her service weapon. She appealed on September 12, 2003 and she filed an order to show cause on September 19, 2003, in which she contended that the Sheriff’s Department had violated her right to due process of law as the result of its failure to conduct a hearing prior to termination. The Department reinstated Ivan and served her with a preliminary notice of disciplinary action on September 29, 2003. Following a hearing on September 30, 2003, Ivan was served, on October 14, 2003, with a final notice of disciplinary action removing her from her position.

The two matters were referred to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing, where they were consolidated for that purpose without objection. Following the hearing, at which testimony was given by numerous witnesses, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) recommended dismissal of the charge leading to Ivan’s suspension, but affirmance of the termination decision. No attorney’s fees were awarded. The Merit System Board adopted the ALJ’s decision, and this appeal followed. On appeal, Ivan challenged the Board’s failure to award counsel fees in connection with her appeal from the thirty day suspension, and she challenges the Board’s adoption of the ALJ’s findings with respect to her termination and the ALJ’s legal ruling with respect to the admissibility of expert testimony in connection with her termination.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Merit System Board’s determination in its entirety. Specifically, the Court rejected Ivan’s arguments that: (1) she was given insufficient opportunity to qualify with her weapon; (2) the ALJ should have admitted the testimony of her firearms qualification expert; and (3) she was entitled to counsel fees on her successful appeal from her suspension. After reviewing the decision of the ALJ and the Board in detail, the Court determined the Board’s action was supported by sufficient, credible evidence in the record as well as well-established statutory law and, therefore, was not arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.

 

Officer's Resignation Not Attributed to Duress, Upheld

 

In In the Matter of Thomas F. Fricano, Borough of Freehold, Docket No.: A-2280-07T3, the Appellate Division addressed Appellant Thomas Fricano’s appeal from final decisions of the Merit System Board (“Board”), dated September 27, 2007 and December 7, 2007, upholding his resignation in good standing from the Borough of Freehold Police Department.

By way of background, Fricano received a regular appointment as a police officer in Freehold on April 3, 2006. The appointment was subject to the successful completion of a one-year probationary working test period, commencing after completion of a police training course. On February 2, 2007, Fricano, in a written letter, resigned to pursue other opportunities in law enforcement. The appointing authority accepted the resignation, which was made effective February 22, 2007. 

The circumstances surrounding Fricano’s resignation are in dispute and at the core of the appeal. According to Fricano, on February 2, 2007, after having served ten months of his one-year probationary working term, he was summoned to the office of the Police Chief. Allegedly, the Chief ordered Fricano “to resign or be terminated immediately.” Denied his request for legal representation or to have a PBA representative present, Fricano drafted and submitted a letter of resignation under duress and coercion. Thereafter, on February 16, 2007, Fricano’s counsel wrote to the Chief requesting that he be able to rescind the resignation. The Borough attorney advised Fricano that he would not be reinstated, instead stating that “they could have fired him instead.” Subsequently, on March 13, 2007, Fricano was issued a preliminary notice of disciplinary action, charging him with numerous violations. On March 22, 2007, the appointing authority withdrew the charges and, thereafter, on March 28, 2007, issued Fricano a letter indicating that he did not satisfactorily complete his working test period and that he was being terminated effective April 3, 2007.

The Borough offers a different version. When called to his office, the Chief advised Fricano that his performance during the working test period had not been satisfactory, and, therefore, offered him the option to resign effective February 22 or face termination for failure to satisfactorily complete his working test period. This offer was made so that Fricano could avoid any stigma which might attach to an involuntary termination. Fricano decided to resign and submitted a resignation letter the same day. In the letter, Fricano explain that he resigned to pursue “a different choice in the Law Enforcement Career.” Although he did not work after February 2, he was paid through February 22, and his resignation was recorded effective February 22, 2007. After being subsequently informed of Fricano’s intention to challenge his resignation, the police department issued the preliminary notice of disciplinary action on March 13, 2007. On March 22, 2007, the police department withdrew the charges and, instead, as a cautionary measure, issued a letter to

 

Fricano informing him that he had not successfully completed his working test period. 

Thereafter, Fricano filed an administrative appeal challenging his resignation. In a September 27, 2007 decision, the Board upheld the resignation, finding insufficient evidence that Fricano’s resignation was the product of duress or coercion. This appeal followed.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s finding that Fricano voluntarily resigned his position. The Court determined there was sufficient credible evidence that Fricano was told he would be terminated because he had not satisfactorily performed during his working test period. Moreover, the Court found that Fricano voluntarily chose to accept the offered opportunity to resign to avoid any stigma attached to termination. According to the Court, Fricano’s deliberate choice of available alternatives cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be ascribed to duress.

Promotional Guarantee Can Violate Rule of Three

 In the Matter of Martinez, A-0090-07T2, the Appellate Division held a civil service appointing authority violates the Rule of Three, N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8, in guaranteeing a promotional candidate that he or she will receive the appointment if he or she attains the highest score on the examination. 

 

After taking the civil service examination for promotion to deputy fire chief on March 30, 2006, appellant Kenneth Martinez, a fire captain in Passaic, was ranked first among the eligible nonveterans. A promotional list listing Martinez first was promulgated by the State Department of Personnel on June 22, 2006. However, the City was separately arranging for another candidate, Captain Christopher Szczygiel, to receive the promotion. The City had previously bypassed Szczygiel and appointed lower-ranked individuals to the rank of captain, causing Szczygiel to file an administrative appeal before the Merit System Board, as well as a civil action in the Law Division. 

 

A settlement of Szczygiel’s litigation was attained and on January 31, 2007, the Board issued a final decision approving the proposed settlement terms that the parties had disclosed it. Although it was not disclosed to the Board at the time, the settlement terms would allow Szczygiel to compete for the deputy chief position. In fact, the settlement guaranteed Szczygiel appointment to deputy chief, so long as his exam grade proved to be higher than that of anyone else who sat for the exam. 

 

Following the Board’s approval of the settlement, the Department of Personnel graded Szczygiel’s exam and determined that he had the highest score. It then generated a new promotional list for deputy chief ranking Szczygiel first and Martinez second. Thereafter, the City appointed Szczygiel deputy chief on April 1, 2007. 

 

Martinez filed an administrative appeal, contending that the Board’s ratification of the settlement, and the City’s actions in guaranteeing Szczygiel the appointment, violated the longstanding “Rule of Three” principle of New Jersey Civil Service Law, as well as the merit and fitness clause of the state constitution. On July 27, 2007, the Board rejected Martinez’s challenge and this appeal followed.

 

On appeal, Judge Sabatino opined that the guarantee in the Szczygiel was troublesome because it provided that Szczygiel would receive the promotion to deputy chief so long as he scored first on the promotional exam. The Board was not informed of the guarantee prior to its January 31, 2007 approval, final determination of Martinez’s appeal, nor was the guarantee disclosed to Martinez, who had every right to expect that the normal selection processes under the Rule of Three would be observed.

 

In addition, the Court stated it is doubtful that the Legislature wished to allow municipalities to dispense with the Rule of Three and reach agreements with applicants guaranteeing them a position if they scored high enough on an exam. Such individualized guarantees run contrary to the objectives of the civil service system and also deviate from the Rule of Three’s aim to include “other merit criteria” in the selection process.

 

This decision reinforces the importance for an appointing authority to follow the requisite procedures in granting promotions. The Rule of Three, much like other required procedures, cannot be usurped in favor of settlement agreements which undermine the goals of the Civil Service System, namely a fair and objective selection process based on merit and other criteria.