Suspension of Newark Police Officer Upheld

Posted on August 3, 2009 by Donald Barbati

 

On July 31, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Eddie Gonzalez, Docket No.: A-0644-07T2. In the case, Eddie Gonzalez, a Newark Police Officer, appealed from a final decision of the Merit System Board (“Board”) adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), concluding that Gonzalez engaged in conduct unbecoming a public employee and violating certain Newark Police Department (“Department”) rules and regulations. The Board adopted the ALJ’s recommendation and imposed a six-month suspension.

In June 2003, Richard Diaz lived in Newark, and Gonzalez was his next-door neighbor. Diaz and Gonzalez were involved in a dispute, which resulted in Diaz filing a harassment claim against Gonzalez alleging that Gonzalez kissed Diaz’s minor daughter. On June 9, 2003, Newark Police Officer Philip Turzani was assigned as a dispatcher for the Department. Near the end of his 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift, he received a call from Gonzalez asking Turzani if he would like Gonzalez to bring him coffee. 

Gonzalez then arrived at the Newark Police and Fire Public Safety Communications Center (“Center”) at approximately 1:30 p.m., in plainclothes, and requested that Turzani run a license plate number through the Department’s computer system. Turzani asked Gonzalez if his purposes for running the plate were “legal,” and Gonzalez responded that his neighbor was trying to obtain a job and wanted to check his driving history. Turzani admitted to running the license plate, but could not recall the name of the individual connected with the search. Turzani stated that Gonzalez viewed the screen with the results on it.

Upon returning home from vacation on June 19, 2003, Diaz received twelve motor vehicle summonses in the mail. The summonses were allegedly issued by Officer Edward Sculthorpe of the Department on June 9, 2003 at approximately 2:00 p.m. Diaz challenged the summonses, claiming that he had not been stopped by a Newark police officer on that date. At the court hearing regarding the summonses, Officer Sculthorpe denied writing them and they were dismissed.

The summonses prompted a further investigation as on June 25, 2003, Diaz filed an Internal Affairs complaint with the Department against Gonzalez. In response to the complaint, Captain Robert Sbaraglio of the Department spoke with Sculthorpe, who confirmed that he had not written the summonses. Following the dismissal of the summonses, Sbaraglio conducted a preliminary investigation and identified the summons book that had been issued to Sculthorpe as the source of the summonses. Sbaraglio then had both Gonzalez and Sculthorpe submit administrative reports regarding the summonses. Both denied issuing the summonses.

 

At this point, Captain Brian Gaven of Internal Affairs directed Sbaraglio to turn over the investigation to Internal Affairs. Captain Gaven reviewed the summonses and noticed that they contained Diaz’s full name, address, driver’s license and vehicle registration, which led him to believe that someone had obtained this information from the NCIC computer system in the Department. With the assistance of the F.B.I., Gaven found that on June 9, 2003, at 1:34 p.m., someone had accessed Diaz’s license plate number and driver information through the Department’s dispatch center, specifically on channel two. Gaven discovered that Turzani operated channel two during the time the check occurred.

In a subsequent interview with Gaven, Turzani confirmed his earlier statement of his interaction with Gonzalez. Following this interview, Gaven contacted William Davis, a document examiner with the Division of Criminal Justice of New Jersey, in an effort to analyze the handwriting on the summonses. 

Davis appeared before the ALJ as an expert in forensic document examination, specifically handwriting. He indicated that his examination of the summonses and the writing samples allowed him to eliminate Sculthorpe as the author of the summonses. Although Davis found similarities between the summonses and the examples of appellant’s handwriting, he could not state Gonzalez was the author. However, Davis concluded in his report that, “the suspect was probably the author…” On October 28, 2003, Gaven conducted a videotaped interview of Gonzalez. During that interview, Gonzalez denied having any knowledge of the summonses. He also provided a differing version of his interaction with Turzani. Based upon his investigation, Gaven filed charges against Gonzalez.

On appeal, Gonzalez asserted that the action of the Board was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, and contrary to law. The Appellate Division disagreed. According to the Court, the thrust of Gonzalez’s arguments on appeal focused on the ALJ’s findings as to credibility. In her decision, the ALJ rejected Gonzalez’s testimony as “self-serving.” She found Turzani and Sculthorpe to be credible and concluded that Gonzalez issued the twelve summonses to Diaz. The Court noted the totality of the evidence presented at the hearing supported her findings and, therefore, there was no basis for the Court’s intervention. As such, the action of the Board was affirmed.
Tags: , , , , , , , ,

Termination of Municipal Patrolman Upheld

Posted on June 16, 2009 by Donald Barbati

 

On June 11, 2009, the Appellate Division decided Michael Kappre v. Borough of Paulsboro, Docket No.: A-3573-07T3. In the case, the Paulsboro Police Chief filed misconduct charges against Michael Kappre, a former patrolman and sniper for the Paulsboro Police Department’s SWAT team. The Borough of Paulsboro sought Kappre’s termination. Kappre pleaded not guilty to the charges filed and a hearing was held before a hearing officer. Following administrative review, the hearing officer upheld the decision to terminate Kappre.

Kappre filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs, seeking a de novo review pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150. Judge Farrell heard additional testimony from Kappre and Chief Thomas Sullivan of the Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office and rendered factual findings and conclusions in a written opinion. The trial judge sustained three charges of insubordination and untruthfulness and one charge of incapacity to hold office. Accordingly, Judge Farrell concluded the charges warranted Kappre’s removal. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Kappre argued the charges lodged against him should have been dismissed because the record does not support his conduct demonstrated insubordination. Moreover, Kappre asserted there was a lack of credible evidence in the record to suggest he committed misconduct and the trial judge erred in discounting the testimony of his expert.

After evaluating the record in light of the arguments raised by Kappre in conjunction with the applicable legal standards, the Appellate Division affirmed Judge Farrell’s determinations. The Court was satisfied from its review of the record that Judge Farrell’s findings of fact were supported by substantial credible evidence and the conclusions based thereon should not be disturbed. Specifically, the Court noted that deference to Judge Farrell’s findings, which include determinations of credibility, was particularly appropriate in this case since they were substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the “feel” of the case, which the Appellate Division, as a reviewing court, cannot enjoy.

Tags: , , , , , , , , ,

Potential for Reimbursement of Wages Received During Period of Suspension

Posted on March 27, 2009 by Frank Crivelli

On March 20, 2009, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey decided the case of Wade v. Colaner. In the case, plaintiff, a Tinton Falls police officer, was pulled over by New Jersey State Troopers for speeding. Plaintiff was subsequently charged with careless driving, obstruction of administration of law, and resisting arrest. On account of this incident, he was suspended from his position of employment.

Ultimately, plaintiff brought this action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference. Defendants counterclaimed against Plaintiff for reimbursement of the wages paid to Plaintiff during his suspension and moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s other claims. The Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, but dismissed Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. Moreover, the Court granted the Tinton Falls Defendants’ motion for summary judgment finding that Plaintiff was not entitled to a pre-suspension hearing and also granted the motion for summary judgment for reimbursement of the wages paid to Plaintiff during his suspension.

This case shows that a public safety officer who is suspended from his or her employment and is continuing to receive their wages during the period of suspension potentially may have to reimburse their employer for the wages they have received. As a result, public safety officers should be conscious of this possibility in the event they are suspended from employment.

A similar type concept was the subject of previous posts to this blog regarding the 180 day bill recently signed into law. As you will recall, the bill, in essence, allows certain law enforcement officers and firefighters to regain pay status when appeals of termination are not resolved within 180 days. Under this bill, if an officer and/or firefighter has been receiving his/her base salary after expiration of the 180 day period and he/she ultimately loses their appeal, the officer and/or firefighter will be required to reimburse the employing agency of department all of the base salary received during the period of appeal. Certain rules of law such as these make it imperative for public safety officers to be informed regarding all the potential consequences in the event they are targeted for suspension and/or removal.   

 

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Merit System Board Increase of Disciplinary Penalty Upheld

Posted on March 24, 2009 by Frank Crivelli

 On March 20, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Larry Martin, Docket No.: A-3271-07T3. In the case, Larry Martin, a police officer with the City of Jersey City, appealed from a disciplinary penalty imposed upon him by the Merit System Board.

Martin, who had been a member of the Jersey City Police Department for 22 years, failed to attend mandatory weapons qualification training for a new service weapon, a Glock .45 caliber handgun, on May 10, 2005. As a result, he was charged with “disobedience to a lawful order” and “absence without leave” in violation of the Police Department’s rules. After holding a hearing, Jersey City sustained the charges and imposed an eight-day loss of vacation days. Martin appealed to the Board.

The matter was referred to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who conducted a hearing. The ALJ, in his decision, found that Martin had been given a direct order by his superior officer to attend the training session and failed to do so. The ALJ sustained the charges and the disciplinary penalty. Neither party filed exceptions and the matter went to the Merit System Board for a final decision.

After conducting its independent review of the record, the Merit System Board agreed the charges had been proven. However, the Board increased the penalty to a 120 day suspension based on Martin’s previous major disciplinary history. In reaching this conclusion, the Board considered the seriousness of the underlying incident, the concept of progressive discipline, and Martin’s prior record. This appeal ensued. 

On appeal, Martin contended that the Board’s decision to increase the penalty was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and unsupported by the record. The Appellate Division disagreed and affirmed the Board’s determination. The Court found no basis to overturn the decision and noted that Martin had defied a direct order of his superior officer, on a very important issue, namely firearms training. The Court further noted that Martin had a prior history of four substantial disciplinary sanctions. Based on the nature of the underlying infraction, Martin’s past history of disciplinary sanctions, and the Board’s policy of progressive discipline, the Court did not find the increase in the penalty to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 

The case illustrates the principle that an agency can increase the penalty imposed upon a public safety officer in appealing a disciplinary determination. Many times, the increase will be upheld if the agency, such as the Civil Service Commission, adequately considered an officer’s disciplinary history, the nature of the underlying matter, and the policy of progressive discipline.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Defense to Lawsuit Arising Out of Action During Side-Business Not Subject to Reimbursement

Posted on March 17, 2009 by Frank Crivelli

On March 16, 2009, the Appellate Division decided Siaw v. Valenzuala. In the case, Defendant Diomedes Valenzuala, a police officer, appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying his claims against his former employer, the Township of Irvington, for indemnification pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-155 in connection with his defense of a lawsuit against him arising out of his exercise of police powers in arresting Plaintiff.

TheCourt indicated that the central question in the case was whether, at the time Valenzuala lawfully arrested Plaintiff, Valenzuala was acting “in the furtherance of his official duties.” If he stopped to investigate a suspicious incident on his way to the police station in response to a call for him to report there on police business, as Valenzuala maintained, then Valenzuala would be entitled to reimbursement under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-155. If he was engaged in a side-business of “keeping the peace” for a towing company, as the trial judge found, then he was not acting “in the furtherance of his official duties” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-155, even if he acted lawfully in arresting Plaintiff.

The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the trial court appropriately determined that Valenzuala was engaged in a side-business of “keeping the peace” for a towing company at the time of the arrest and not “acting in the furtherance of his official duties.” As a result, the Court dismissed Valenzuala’s action seeking reimbursement for costs associated with his defense of a civil action filed by Plaintiff. 

This case illustrates the principle that officers who work a side-job may not be reimbursed for defending a legal proceeding brought against them for actions which arose out of their performance of the side-job. Many public safety employees, especially during these economic times, work side-jobs in order to obtain additional compensation. All of these officers, however, should be aware of this case. In the event a lawsuit is brought against you, on account of your exercise of police powers while engaged in the side-job, the potential is great that you will not be reimbursed for defending such a lawsuit.

 

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Freedom of Association Claim Permitted to Go Forward

Posted on March 10, 2009 by Frank Crivelli

On February 3, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided the case of LaPosta v. Borough of Roseland. In the case, plaintiff, Joseph LaPosta, a police officer, alleges Defendants, the Borough of Roseland and its Police Chief, retaliated against him after he attempted to join a police organization of which the Police Chief did not approve. Plaintiff’s claims were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and state tort law. 

Plaintiff was employed as a police officer with the Borough of Roseland. After completing his police academy training, Plaintiff was forced to join the Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”) union. When Plaintiff expressed an interest in joining an alternative union, the Policemen’s Benevolent Association (“PBA”), the Police Chief advised Plaintiff that neither he nor any other officers were to have any influence from the PBA. Nevertheless, Plaintiff joined the PBA. Thereafter, the Police Chief allegedly retaliated against Plaintiff, specifically by subjecting Plaintiff to smoke from cigarettes, cigars, and scented candles, charging him with insubordination, denying him an earned stipend, belittling him in front of other officers, filing frivolous internal affairs claims against him, and denying him the opportunity to attend career-advancing classes and seminars.

Plaintiff’s complaint asserted six claims: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Police Chief; (3) hostile work environment; (4) negligence; (5) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage against the Police Chief; and (6) conspiracy. Both the Borough and Police Chief filed motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thereafter, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey entered an opinion and order granting the motions. This appeal followed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further consideration. Specifically, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all but one of Plaintiff’s claims for failing to file a notice of claim under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. However, the Third Circuit determined the District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s §1983 claim. The Third Circuit held the retaliation claim was not barred by the statute of limitations and should be remanded to the District Court to be adequately analyzed as a claim based on freedom of association.

This case illustrates the importance of obtaining an experienced, qualified attorney prior to initiating an action similar to the one recounted above. There are many procedural hurdles one must follow, to include filing certain notices, to perfect the filing of such a claim. Consequently, it is imperative one obtains a qualified, experienced attorney to ensure their rights are protected. Moreover, this case shows that viable retaliation claims can be pursued against public employers. With the right set of facts, many courts are willing to explore such a claim and, potentially, hold the employer liable for infringing on one's right to join a certain collective bargaining unit.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Police Promotion Discrimination Suit Dismissed

Posted on March 4, 2009 by Frank Crivelli

 On February 9, 2009, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey decided the case of Martin v. City of East Orange. In the case, plaintiffs, two police officers, alleged that in failing to promote them in 2003, when officers ranked below them were recommended for promotion, although not promoted, the defendants discriminated against them in favor of officers more politically favored in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983, the federal and state constitutions, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. 

The Court dismissed all of plaintiffs’ federal claims. The Court held the officers had no constitutional right to promotion and they failed to produce any evidence of political favoritism or retaliation for having complained about being improperly bypassed for promotion. Further, the Court declined to assert subject-matter jurisdiction over the state law claim, thereby not addressing those issues. 

This case illustrates the importance of producing credible, substantive evidence in support of a claim alleging that one was improperly bypassed for promotion. It is vital that any public safety officer who seeks to assert such a claim should consult with a qualified attorney who is able to produce such competent evidence or determine whether such evidence exists so as to avoid the pitfalls present in this matter. Without the necessary proofs, such a claim will likely fail, as articulated by the Court in this case.

 

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Legislative Proposal Seeks to Provide Law Enforcement Officers Pay Status When Appeals of Termination Are Not Resolved Within 180 Days

Posted on February 4, 2009 by Frank Crivelli

 

This blog entry will focus upon our review of certain statutory proposals currently pending in the New Jersey Legislature concerning the pay status of law enforcement officers when appeals of termination are not resolved within 180 days. These proposals are set forth in Assembly Bill Number 3481. 

Assembly Bill 3481 concerns the suspensions of certain law enforcement officers and firefighters and supplements Title 40A of the New Jersey statutes and specifically amends N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150 and N.J.S.A. 40A:14-22. In essence, the bill allows certain law enforcement officers and firefighters to regain pay status when appeals of termination are not resolved within 180 days.

The first part of the bill provides:

When a law enforcement officer employed by a law enforcement agency…that is subject to the provisions of Title 11A of the New Jersey Statutes is suspended from performing his official duties without pay for a complaint or charges, other than (1) a complaint or charges relating to the subject matter of a pending criminal investigation…whether pre-indictment or post indictment, or (2) when the complaint or charges allege conduct that also would constitute a violation of the criminal laws of this State or any other jurisdiction, and the law enforcement agency employing the officer…seeks to terminate that officer’s…employment for the conduct that was the basis for the officer’s…suspension without pay, a final determination on the officer’s…suspension and termination shall be rendered within 180 calendar days from the date the officer…is suspended without pay.

 

Should a final determination of the discipline not be rendered within those 180 days, the proposal states that the officer shall, commencing on the 181st calendar day, begin to receive the base salary he/she was being paid at the time of the suspension and shall continue to do so until a final determination on the termination is rendered. Simply put, this addition to the statute would allow officers who are suspended without pay to begin collecting their base pay once again if the appeal of their termination is not resolved within 180 days. It goes without saying that this addition helps to alleviate the problem many officers find themselves in currently, namely being economically starved for an extended amount of time while trying to challenge their removal from employment.    

The proposal also instructs how the 180 day period should be calculated. While the 180 day period seems to be a favorable time period for the officers, it is important to note that this time period might be significantly extended and keep an officer without pay for a period much larger than 180 days. For example, time periods such as: (1) the period between an officer’s termination and the date on which his/her appeal is filed; and (2) the days that accrue during a postponement, should an officer have requested one, will not toll the 180 day period. Therefore, it is imperative that New Jersey public safety officers become intimately familiar with the events which can extend the 180 day time frame should this bill be accepted into law. That way, the officers can maximize their resources efficiently so as to ensure the time frame without pay remains as close to the 180 days as possible.

Next, it is important to note that if the Civil Service Commission denies the officer’s appeal, the officer will be required to reimburse his employing agency or department all of the base salary received during the period of the appeal. Put another way, if an officer has been receiving his base salary after the 180 day period expired and he/she ultimately loses, the officer has to pay all the monies he or she has received. Moreover, the proposal provides that if an officer fails to reimburse the employing agency for the payments, the employing agency may obtain a lien for those amounts on any property and income of the officer, including the officer’s pension, sick and vacation leave to which the officer is entitled.

Finally, the bill directs the Director of the Office of Administrative Law to establish a special unit, known as the Law Enforcement and Firefighter Unit, to deal with removal cases. The unit will be made up of Administrative Law Judges who are qualified and experienced in disciplinary matters and cases which fall under the purview of this statute. As a result of the establishment of this unit, the Office of Administrative Law will be better able to adhere to the 180 day time frame which will, potentially, result in quicker resolutions than what is currently being experienced for all parties involved.

Based on our review of these proposals, I am of the opinion that while many of the proposals are favorable to New Jersey public safety officers, the benefits are somewhat misleading. I believe the Legislature in: (1) installing a deadline for resolving cases regarding the termination of an officer; (2) allowing the officer to regain pay status when appeals are not resolved within that deadline; and (3) establishing the Law Enforcement and Firefighter Unit addresses a number of important concerns, namely forcing these types of cases to be resolved in an expedited fashion and allowing officers certain financial alleviation should an appeal persist for an extended amount of time.

However, (1) the various ways in which the 180 day deadline could be significantly extended; (2) the provision providing reimbursement to the employment agency in the event the appeal is unsuccessful; and (3) permitting a lien on an officer’s property to include his/her pension, severely undermines many of the advantages of the bill. Therefore, it is important that, if this bill passes, officers are mindful of what it specifically includes, excludes, and requires by way of affirmative action on the part of the member or association. Our office will keep apprised of the bill’s progression through the Legislature so make sure to check this blog periodically to ascertain any updates.
Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Officer's Resignation Not Attributed to Duress, Upheld

Posted on January 21, 2009 by Frank Crivelli

 

In In the Matter of Thomas F. Fricano, Borough of Freehold, Docket No.: A-2280-07T3, the Appellate Division addressed Appellant Thomas Fricano’s appeal from final decisions of the Merit System Board (“Board”), dated September 27, 2007 and December 7, 2007, upholding his resignation in good standing from the Borough of Freehold Police Department.

By way of background, Fricano received a regular appointment as a police officer in Freehold on April 3, 2006. The appointment was subject to the successful completion of a one-year probationary working test period, commencing after completion of a police training course. On February 2, 2007, Fricano, in a written letter, resigned to pursue other opportunities in law enforcement. The appointing authority accepted the resignation, which was made effective February 22, 2007. 

The circumstances surrounding Fricano’s resignation are in dispute and at the core of the appeal. According to Fricano, on February 2, 2007, after having served ten months of his one-year probationary working term, he was summoned to the office of the Police Chief. Allegedly, the Chief ordered Fricano “to resign or be terminated immediately.” Denied his request for legal representation or to have a PBA representative present, Fricano drafted and submitted a letter of resignation under duress and coercion. Thereafter, on February 16, 2007, Fricano’s counsel wrote to the Chief requesting that he be able to rescind the resignation. The Borough attorney advised Fricano that he would not be reinstated, instead stating that “they could have fired him instead.” Subsequently, on March 13, 2007, Fricano was issued a preliminary notice of disciplinary action, charging him with numerous violations. On March 22, 2007, the appointing authority withdrew the charges and, thereafter, on March 28, 2007, issued Fricano a letter indicating that he did not satisfactorily complete his working test period and that he was being terminated effective April 3, 2007.

The Borough offers a different version. When called to his office, the Chief advised Fricano that his performance during the working test period had not been satisfactory, and, therefore, offered him the option to resign effective February 22 or face termination for failure to satisfactorily complete his working test period. This offer was made so that Fricano could avoid any stigma which might attach to an involuntary termination. Fricano decided to resign and submitted a resignation letter the same day. In the letter, Fricano explain that he resigned to pursue “a different choice in the Law Enforcement Career.” Although he did not work after February 2, he was paid through February 22, and his resignation was recorded effective February 22, 2007. After being subsequently informed of Fricano’s intention to challenge his resignation, the police department issued the preliminary notice of disciplinary action on March 13, 2007. On March 22, 2007, the police department withdrew the charges and, instead, as a cautionary measure, issued a letter to

 

Fricano informing him that he had not successfully completed his working test period. 

Thereafter, Fricano filed an administrative appeal challenging his resignation. In a September 27, 2007 decision, the Board upheld the resignation, finding insufficient evidence that Fricano’s resignation was the product of duress or coercion. This appeal followed.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s finding that Fricano voluntarily resigned his position. The Court determined there was sufficient credible evidence that Fricano was told he would be terminated because he had not satisfactorily performed during his working test period. Moreover, the Court found that Fricano voluntarily chose to accept the offered opportunity to resign to avoid any stigma attached to termination. According to the Court, Fricano’s deliberate choice of available alternatives cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be ascribed to duress.
Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Discipline Regading Dissemination of Internal Affairs Documents Upheld

Posted on January 14, 2009 by Frank Crivelli

 

In Division of State Police v. In the Matter of Detective Sergeant First Class Daniel Flaherty, Docket No. A-0257-07T20257-07T2, the Appellate Division addressed the validity and ultimate imposition of disciplinary charges lodged against a Detective Sergeant of the New Jersey State Police. The appeal arose out of disciplinary charges filed by the New Jersey Division of State Police (“Division”) against Detective Sergeant First Class Daniel Flaherty, charging him with: (1) disseminating Division documents without proper authorization; (2) behaving in an official capacity to the personal discredit of a member of the State Police or to the Division; and (3) willfully disobeying a lawful verbal or written order.

The underlying facts of this case were not substantially in dispute. In 2001, Flaherty filed an age discrimination complaint with the New Jersey State Police Equal Employment Opportunity/Affirmative Action (“EEO/AA”) intake unit. He alleged that since 1995, the State Police had denied him numerous specialist positions because of his age. The EEO/AA assigned Lieutenant Patrick Reilly to investigate his claim. After two years, in which the allegations still had not been resolved, the EEO/AA replaced Reilly with DSFC Kevin Rowe.

On May 5, 2003, Flaherty filed a New Jersey State Police Reportable Incident Form alleging “culpable inefficiency” against Reilly. Pursuant to a Division policy regarding non-disclosure of confidential internal investigations, the Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”) denied his request to access the file regarding his complaint against Reilly.

The following month, the State Police administratively closed Flaherty’s complaint file against Reilly and transferred the matter to the Attorney General’s EEO/AA section. In a letter dated September 24, 2003, a Senior Deputy Attorney General informed Flaherty that his claim against Reilly could not be substantiated. 

Thereafter, on May 31, 2003, the Division assigned Flaherty to the OPS, which was then called the State Police Internal Affairs Investigation Bureau. Pursuant to Division of Internal Affairs policies and procedures, “[t]he nature and source of internal allegations, the progress of internal affairs investigations, and the resulting materials are confidential information. The contents of internal investigation case files shall be retained in the internal affairs unit and clearly marked as confidential.” Notwithstanding these provisions, internal investigation files can be released in certain enumerated circumstances.  As such, Flaherty executed a confidentiality agreement which provided the dissemination of all confidential information and/or documents.

In a letter dated February 20, 2004, the Department of Law and Public Safety found that Flaherty’s age discrimination claims could not be substantiated. In his appeal to the Department of Personnel, Flaherty questioned the manner in which the State Police and the Attorney General’s office investigated his

 

discrimination claims and his complaint against Reilly. Attached to the appeal were several documents from OPS internal investigation files relating to Reilly and several documents from the internal investigation file regarding his culpable inefficiency claim against Reilly. He also claimed that two other State troopers had filed reportable incident forms against Reilly, specifically citing to one of the internal investigation files.

The Department of Personnel acknowledged receipt of Flaherty’s appeal and forwarded a copy of same to the Attorney General’s office. In responding to the appeal, it became apparent Flaherty might have breached confidentiality by attaching Division documents from internal investigation files. Consequently, an investigation was commenced regarding Flaherty’s acquisition and dissemination of several of the documents referenced in and attached to his appeal. After the investigation, on August 25, 2005, the Division filed the above referenced disciplinary charges against Flaherty. 

The case was ultimately transferred to the Office of Administrative Law. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) assigned to the case granted a summary decision in favor of the State on charges one and three, dismissed charge two, and ordered Flaherty suspended from duty for five days without pay. After the State filed exceptions seeking to increase the penalty and Flaherty challenged the grant of summary decision as well as the penalty, the Superintendent of the State Police issued a final decision on August 1, 2007, upholding the summary decision on charges one and three, but increasing the suspension to ten days. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Flaherty asserted: (1) genuine issues of material fact precluded summary decision; (2) the ALJ failed to consider relevant evidence; (3) the ALJ applied the incorrect burden of proof; (4) the Superintendent erred by adopting the Department of Personnel’s finding that his discrimination claims were “unsubstantiated”; (5) the Superintendent erred in asserting that he has “absolute discretion” to promulgate rules and regulations; (6) he was unfairly charged with two violations based on the same facts; and (7) the ten day suspension is disproportionately harsh.

The Appellate Division rejected all of Flaherty’s arguments and affirmed the Superintendant’s decision. According to the Court, the record sustained the ALJ’s grant of summary decision imposing disciplinary action on Flaherty for attaching the records from the Internal Affairs Unit of the State Police. The Court determined Flaherty knew the records he attached to and referenced in his appeal were confidential. Moreover, the Court noted Flaherty even executed a confidentiality agreement which specifically prohibited such dissemination. As such, the Court held the ten day suspension was not disproportionately harsh and sustained the findings of the ALJ and Superintendent.
Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Distinction Between Public and Private Speech

Posted on January 6, 2009 by Frank Crivelli

 

In Brennan v. Township of Fairfield, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey addressed an important topic for public safety officers, freedom of speech. In this case, Plaintiff, a police officer, alleged he was retaliated against for distributing a memorandum on police letterhead to the Mayor and Township Council. The memorandum contained the officer’s reasons for having issued two motor vehicle summonses to a township administrator.   

Defendants moved for summary judgment of plaintiff’s claim. The Court granted the motion because Plaintiff’s speech was made pursuant to his duties as a police officer. Therefore, his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. In addition to seeking summary judgment, Defendants also moved for sanctions against Plaintiff for the assertion of a claim which Plaintiff later withdrew. The Court denied this motion along with Defendants’ other motions to disqualify counsel and to compel mediation.   

This case, although very brief, illustrates how one’s freedom of speech can be limited based on the context in which the speech is offered. Speech made pursuant to one’s duties as a public safety officer will not be protected by the First Amendment, thereby negating support of a retaliation claim. As a result, it is important for public safety officers to be cognizant of the distinction between speech made pursuant to their employment from all other forms.

Tags: , , , , , , , ,