Denial of Accidental Disability Retirement Application Upheld

 

On October 13, 2009, the Appellate Division decided Raymond Joseph Foster, III v. Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, Docket No.: A-5666-07T2. In the case, Raymond Joseph Foster, III, a member of the Police and Firemen’s Retirement System (“PFRS”), appealed from the final decision of the Board of Trustees (“Board”), upholding the May 5, 2008 initial decision of Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Jeff Masin, finding that Foster “has failed to meet his burden to prove that the total and permanent disability from which he suffers is the direct result of the injuries received in the traumatic event [Foster suffered on March 5, 2002].”

Foster started working as a Bordentown Township police officer in February 1998. On March 5, 2002 at 9:51 p.m., Foster was injured in a motor vehicle accident, while working as a police officer. The police report indicated that it was a one-vehicle accident. Foster was responding to the ACME supermarket. As he entered the parking lot, he turned right, but missed the entrance and struck a light pole to the left of the entrance. At the time, Foster was thirty-seven years old.

More than four years later, in September 2006, Foster stopped working. According to Foster, he could no longer tolerate the pain, which had become more constant and excruciating. It was undisputed that Foster was totally and permanently disabled and unable to perform his work duties. Thereafter, Foster applied to the Board for accidental disability retirement benefits. The Board denied the application on the grounds that Foster’s disability was not a direct result of the automobile accident, thus he did not qualify for accidental disability benefits.

Foster challenged that decision. The matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case. After hearings were conducted, ALJ Masin found that Foster’s application should be denied, concluding that Foster’s present disability was not the direct result of the accident. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Foster contended that the decision of ALJ Masin and the Board was not supported by the evidence. The Appellate Division disagreed. Based on its review of the record, the Court found that the Board’s findings were supported by the appropriate proofs and, therefore, its decision was supported by sufficient credible evidence on the record as a whole. As such, the Board’s decision was affirmed.

Four New Jersey Police Officers Shot

 

Illustrating the potential dangers New Jersey Public Safety Officers encounter on a daily basis, gunfire erupted as a police tactical squad executed a no-knock search warrant in Lakewood on September 23, 2009, leaving four officers and a suspect shot. The incident was reported by the Associated Press in an article on September 24, 2009.  

One Lakewood police officer who was shot in the face and another who was shot in the foot were taken to the hospital, Deputy Chief Michael Mohel of the Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office said. Two others sustained minor injuries when they were struck in their bulletproof vests. The suspect, Jamie Gonzalez, 39, was taken to this hospital with multiple gunshot wounds. There was no word on their conditions and the names of the officers have not been released.  

Police had planned to search the home for narcotics and weapons. The shooting comes more than two months after Jersey City Police Detective Marc DiNardo was shot in the face storming an apartment where two armed robbery suspects were holed up. Four other officers were wounded in the gun battle and the suspects were killed. DiNardo was taken off life support and pronounced dead one day before his 38th birthday.   

To view the article in its entirety, please click on the following link.

Suspension of Union Police Officer Upheld

 

On July 28, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Donald Michelson, Department of Safety, City of Union. In the case, Donald Michelson sought review of the Final Administrative Action of the Merit System Board accepting and adopting the initial decision of the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”). The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that the City of Union had proven its charges of neglect of duty, other sufficient cause, and absence without leave against Michelson and concluded that the penalty of suspension without pay for six (6) work days was reasonable and consistent with progressive discipline.

On October 14, 2005, Michelson, a sergeant in the Union Police Department, was assigned to work in the communication center from 2330 hours to 0730 hours but did not report for duty. The Police Department schedule cycle requires officers to report for duty four days on and three days off per week for three weeks, then report for duty four days on and two days off for one week (called “the short week”). Before 0400 hours, Sergeant Botti, the Desk Officer Supervisor called Michelson to inquire about his absence. Apparently, Michelson mistakenly believed he was on the short week and not scheduled to work that day. He ultimately reported for duty at 0400 hours.

The Police Department charged Michelson with neglect of duty, absence without leave, and other sufficient cause. Due to his absence, which was undisputed, the ALJ determined: (1) the communication center was without supervision for approximately four and one-half hours; and (2) the desk sergeant put aside his regular duties to conduct an inquiry into Michelson’s absence. The ALJ also noted the police department operates as a paramilitary organization and prompt attendance is critical to the efficient operation of the department. The ALJ further found that the six-day suspension comported with the concept of progressive discipline. The ALJ, reasoning that Michelson had no intention to report for duty until Botti called him, rejected Michelson’s contention that he was merely tardy, not absence without leave.   

The ALJ, noting that superior officers such as Michelson must set an example for subordinate officers, also rejected Michelson’s claim that he was subjected to disparate treatment because no other officer had been suspended for arriving late. Additionally, the ALJ concluded that the record was insufficient to support a claim of disparate treatment as it did not contain the prior disciplinary records of the other employees, a factor bearing on the discipline to be imposed. Thus, no reasoned comparison could be made. Consequently, the ALJ affirmed Union’s determination that Michelson be suspended for six (6) days.

On review by the Board, it accepted and adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and found “that the action of the appointing authority in suspending [Michelson] was justified.” Accordingly, it affirmed the action and dismissed Michelson’s appeal. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Michelson contended that the Board erred in concluding that he was absent without leave and urges that the agency erred in failing to consider disparate treatment in this case. After reviewing the record, the Appellate Division affirmed the determination by the Board. Specifically, the Court determined the findings and conclusions of the agency were supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. As such, Michelson’s six (6) working day suspension was upheld.

Officer's Warrantless Entry Into Apartment Justified

 

On July 7, 2009, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided State v. Anthony Bogan, Docket No.: A-7-08. In the case, the Court considered whether, during an investigation into an alleged sexual assault, a police officer’s warrantless entry into an apartment was justified under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement.

In 2004, a receptionist at Passaic Mill Work noticed a young girl outside on the sidewalk crying hysterically. The receptionist invited the girl inside. The girl’s name was Kathleen and she was fourteen years old. Kathleen stated that a person who was supposed to drive her to school had molested her. The police were called and Kathleen informed the officers that she had been offered a ride by a male family friend, later identified as Defendant Anthony Bogan. Instead of taking her to school, Bogan drove Kathleen to an apartment in Clifton, where he lured her into a second-floor apartment and molested her. Kathleen gave a description of Bogan that included his race, age, height, and clothing, and told the officers that while she was inside the apartment a young boy named Wally was there.

Accompanied by Kathleen, three officers proceeded to the apartment. On their arrival, they found parked in front a gray Audi, which Kathleen identified as the car driven by Bogan. The officers rang the bell to the second-floor apartment. They heard an adult-sounding male voice yell from inside the apartment, “Who is it?” The officers identified themselves as police. Wally, who was approximately twelve years old, answered the door in his pajamas. The officers followed Wally up the stairs toward the apartment, asking him if he was home alone. Wally’s response that no one was home was inconsistent with the adult male voice that had responded when they rang the doorbell. At the top of the stairs, with Wally inside the apartment and the officers on the landing outside the doorway, the conversation continued. When officers asked the whereabouts of Wally’s mother, he gave conflicting answers and seemed nervous. The officers thought that Wally might be in danger. When the telephone rang in the kitchen, which was located immediately inside the apartment, Wally picked up the receiver and told the officers that his father was on the phone. One of the officers asked Wally if he could speak with his parent, and Wally responded “certainly.” The officer walked a few steps into the apartment and was handed the receiver by Wally. While on the telephone, the officer was able to see into a bedroom where Bogan was lying on the bottom level of a bunk bed. Bogan fit the description given by Kathleen, and the officer motioned for the other officers to enter the apartment.

An officer read Bogan the Miranda warnings. Bogan identified himself as “Anthony Green.” Another officer, who was on the telephone with Wally’s mother, was told that Anthony Bogan was supposed to be caring for Wally. Upon further questioning, Defendant stated that Bogan was his “maiden name.” While communicating with headquarters, the officers learned that there were multiple arrest warrants for Anthony Bogan. 

 

Defendant was handcuffed and again read his Miranda rights. As he was led from the apartment, Defendant admitted that he had given Kathleen a ride to the apartment in the gray Audi.  He denied touching her, however, and added that he thought she was eighteen years old. Defendant was charged with luring or enticing a child, criminal sexual contact, hindering apprehension, and endangering the welfare of a child. He moved to suppress the statements he made to the police, claiming that because the officers entered the apartment without a warrant, they engaged in an unreasonable search and seizure. Bogan claimed also that he did not knowingly and voluntarily relinquish his Miranda rights.

The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress on both grounds. The court held that the officers were justified in entering the apartment based on the exigent circumstances and community caretaking exceptions to the warrant requirement. Thereafter, a jury convicted Bogan on all charges.

The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court, suppressed Bogan’s inculpatory statements, and ordered a new trial. It concluded that the police, armed with probable cause, approached the apartment for the purpose of conducting an investigation and should have secured a search warrant before entering the premises. It also held that the issuance of Miranda warnings before Bogan made his incriminating statements did not break the causal chain of events precipitated by the officers’ illegal entry. This appeal ensued.

The Supreme Court held that the police officer’s warrantless entry into the apartment for the purpose of taking the telephone from an unattended child to speak with his parent was justified by the community caretaking doctrine because the officer had a duty to identify a responsible adult for the child to ensure his safety. Because the officer was lawfully on the premises when he observed in plain view Defendant, who fit the suspect’s description, he had a right to direct his fellow officers to question the Defendant. In addition, the Court held that Defendant’s Mirandized statements in response to questioning were properly admitted at trial. As such, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstated the convictions.

Arbitrator Decision Reinstated

 

On June 23, 2009, the Appellate Division decided New Jersey Transit Corporation v. P.B.A. Local 304, Docket No.: A-3341-07T3. In the case, PBA Local 304 (“PBA”) appealed from an order of the Chancery Division, General Equity Part, overturning an arbitration award that declared that New Jersey Transit (“NJT”) police officers who are transferred involuntarily by the Chief of Police are entitled to additional pay for travel time. The court held that the arbitrator’s decision violated public policy because it restricted the chief’s authority to reassign officers, thereby limiting his ability to enhance operational awareness and public safety.

This matter concerned the arbitrator’s interpretation of Article XXIII, Section 6 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The article provides in relevant part:

(a) A temporary position may, at the discretion of the Chief of Police, be assigned to an officer for a period not to exceed 30 calendar days.

(b) After a 30 calendar day period or less, the assigned officer will then be reassigned to his original position, and a second officer may then be assigned, then the third, etc.

On March 1, 2005, the NJT Chief of Police issued orders temporarily assigning two police officers to each other’s regular assignments for a period of twenty-eight calendar days. Specifically, Officer Trumble was transferred from his position in Hoboken, and assigned to Officer Sepe’s position in Newark, while Officer Sepe was assigned to Officer Trumble’s Hoboken position. The assignment orders were effective from March 5, 2005 until April 1, 2005.

On March 22, 2005, the PBA filed a grievance, alleging that the assignments constituted an “involuntary tour swap,” because the affected orders were required to change their bid work location (regular assignment) and to work each other’s bid position. On May 9, 2006, the matter was submitted to arbitration. The parties framed the issue thusly: “Was the effectuation of personnel orders P 05-047 and/or P 05-048 in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement?”

At arbitration, the PBA argued that the assignments are limited under the Article to positions that are open or vacant, and not to those positions that are already filled by officers who had been awarded those positions. NJT argued that, except for certain time limitations, the Article does not limit the Chief’s discretionary authority to assign temporary positions.

 

The arbitrator ruled in favor of the PBA, and directed that the officers be compensated for having their work location changed. The award did not include a specific amount of compensation. The matter proceeded to Superior Court by way of the PBA’s action to confirm. NJT sought to vacate the award. Initially, the trial court confirmed the arbitration, determining that the arbitrator’s decision was reasonably debatable. On an order to show cause for reconsideration, the court reversed itself, determining that the award violated public policy by severely restricting the Chief’s statutory responsibility to promote and provide for public safety.  This appeal ensued. 

After reviewing the record and considering prevailing legal standards, the Appellate Division reversed. The Court was satisfied that the arbitrator’s interpretation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement was reasonable and, therefore, entitled to deferential treatment. According to the Court, the arbitrator merely found, from an interpretation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, that officers who are involuntarily reassigned from certain positions are entitled to compensation. The issue was about compensation, not the authority of the Chief to reassign officers as he sees fit. Since the arbitrator’s decision was based on a reasonable, although albeit fairly debatable interpretation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court was compelled to uphold it.

Termination of Municipal Patrolman Upheld

 

On June 11, 2009, the Appellate Division decided Michael Kappre v. Borough of Paulsboro, Docket No.: A-3573-07T3. In the case, the Paulsboro Police Chief filed misconduct charges against Michael Kappre, a former patrolman and sniper for the Paulsboro Police Department’s SWAT team. The Borough of Paulsboro sought Kappre’s termination. Kappre pleaded not guilty to the charges filed and a hearing was held before a hearing officer. Following administrative review, the hearing officer upheld the decision to terminate Kappre.

Kappre filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs, seeking a de novo review pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150. Judge Farrell heard additional testimony from Kappre and Chief Thomas Sullivan of the Gloucester County Prosecutor’s Office and rendered factual findings and conclusions in a written opinion. The trial judge sustained three charges of insubordination and untruthfulness and one charge of incapacity to hold office. Accordingly, Judge Farrell concluded the charges warranted Kappre’s removal. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Kappre argued the charges lodged against him should have been dismissed because the record does not support his conduct demonstrated insubordination. Moreover, Kappre asserted there was a lack of credible evidence in the record to suggest he committed misconduct and the trial judge erred in discounting the testimony of his expert.

After evaluating the record in light of the arguments raised by Kappre in conjunction with the applicable legal standards, the Appellate Division affirmed Judge Farrell’s determinations. The Court was satisfied from its review of the record that Judge Farrell’s findings of fact were supported by substantial credible evidence and the conclusions based thereon should not be disturbed. Specifically, the Court noted that deference to Judge Farrell’s findings, which include determinations of credibility, was particularly appropriate in this case since they were substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the “feel” of the case, which the Appellate Division, as a reviewing court, cannot enjoy.

Appeal of Removal for Failure to Complete PTC Course Dismissed

 

On June 8, 2009, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Tanya Johnson, Docket No.: A-0482-07T2. In the case, Tanya Johnson appealed from a final decision of the Merit System Board (“Board”) terminating her employment as a parole officer recruit.

In her position as a recruit, Johnson was required to complete a Police Training Commission (“PTC”) course. She began the basic course on January 9, 2006. On March 24, 2006, she failed a test for unarmed defensive tactics. She was given remediation training, but on March 29, Johnson failed the test again and was dismissed from the PTC course.

On the same date, March 29, 2006, Johnson was served with a notice of dismissal from her position as a parole officer recruit. On March 31, 2006, she was served with a preliminary notice of disciplinary action for failure to comply with N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(11), which required her to successfully complete all of the instructional areas of the training cycle. She was removed effective April 4, 2006, and a departmental hearing was held on July 19, 2006. The charge was sustained.

Johnson appealed to the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Training Academy on April 20, 2006. The Training Academy, however, was not the proper venue for the appeal and Johnson’s counsel was advised that the appeal had been filed with the wrong party and had to be filed with the PTC. The appeal was not sent to the proper venue until almost a year after her dismissal, however.

Ultimately, the matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”) and, thereafter, the appointing authority moved to dismiss on the grounds that the appeal was not timely filed with the PTC. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) granted the motion and the matter was dismissed with prejudice. Johnson appealed to the Board and the Board affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal of the appeal. However, the Board dismissed the appeal without prejudice. This appeal ensued.

Since the dismissal of the appeal was without prejudice, the Appellate Division held the matter was not ripe for appeal because it did not know whether Johnson was ultimately successful in having the PTC accept her untimely appeal. Although Johnson argued that the Court should order a preliminary hearing on the merits, the Court determined it could not do so since Johnson has not complied with the procedural requirements for an administrative hearing. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice because is interlocutory.     

New York Governor Vetoes Routine Pension Measure

 

New York Governor David Patterson dropped a bombshell on two powerful unions yesterday when he unexpectedly vetoed a routine measure that for nearly thirty (30) years had allowed New York city cops and firefighters to retire with generous pensions.

“These are not routine times,” Paterson said in vetoing the “temporary” measure that, since 1981, had been habitually renewed by legislators, giving the Finest and Bravest gold-plated pensions known as “Tier II” even as new, less-generous tiers were created for non-uniformed workers. Paterson added, “Instead of a rubber stamp on a temporary fix, we need to move forward with real reform to the pension system.”

In recent months, the New York Post has detailed the spiraling costs of public-employee pensions and the growing threat they pose to state and local budgets. Paterson’s veto, which caught the lawmakers off guard, was his most aggressive move yet in his push to establish a pared-down pension tier for newly hired employees. Recently, the governor re-introduced his cost-saving pension proposal, which legislators flatly rejected during this year’s budget negotiations. In fact, Paterson estimates that his proposal for a new pension tier would save the state $48 billion over the next thirty (30) years. 

Labor unions and their allies in the Legislature said they were blindsided by the governor’s veto and argued that state and local governments will see no savings from the move because it’s unclear which pension tiers new cops and firefighters would join. According to Civil Service Committee Chairwoman Diane Savino, who sponsored the bill, “There was no cost to extending the current system. We don’t know what the cost would be. We don’t know what the savings will be.” 

The bill passed overwhelmingly, 136-6 in the Assembly and 58-0 in the Senate, leading to talk of a veto override, which requires a two-thirds majority of each house. 

The savings would come from, among other items, raising the minimum retirement age and banning overtime “spiking,” where workers run up OT in their final years to boost pension payouts.

As one can expect, developments such as these do not bode well for public safety officers across the county, to include those of our state. As detailed in previous entries, public pension reform has become an important topic, especially during these tough economic times. This article illustrates the types of responses that are being taken by government in response to the issue and the resulting effect upon public safety officers. Please continue to check this blog periodically to ascertain updates in regard to this matter.

Court Permits Suit Alleging Violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement to Continue

 

On May 28, 2009, the Honorable Peter A. Buchsbaum, J.S.C. decided Mark Petersen v. Township of Raritan, Docket No. HNT-L-446-08. The complaint alleged contractual violations of the 1997-1999 collective bargaining agreement between the Township of Raritan and the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff was police officer who retired in 1999. The 1997-99 collective bargaining agreement included retiree health benefits at Article XXII. As of July 1, 2008, current employees and retirees would no longer be able to enroll in the Traditional Plan. Those who were already enrolled in that plan, such as Plaintiff, could switch to the POS plan without any cost to them. They could, however, choose to remain in the Traditional Plan, provided they agreed to pay the excess premium between these two plans from that point in time.

Count one of the complaint alleges a violation of Section 5 of the insurance clause of the collective bargaining agreement because, as of July 1, 2008, Plaintiff is paying a premium differential for the Traditional Plan in which he is enrolled, that is, the difference in premium costs between the Traditional Plan and the POS plan offered by the Township. Count two of the complaint alleges a violation of Section 5 of the insurance clause of the collective bargaining agreement because, as of July 1, 2008, Plaintiff’s co-pays for certain prescription drugs have increased. In response to the complaint, Defendant moved for summary judgment.

The trial court found the language of the collective bargaining agreement sufficiently complex to warrant further examination. Specifically, the court found ambiguity in the insurance clause as to whether the language “shall continue to receive all health and medical benefits provided by the employer for the remainder of his life” would reasonably lead Plaintiff to believe that he would receive health coverage equivalent to the Traditional Plan for the remainder of his life. Therefore, the court determined Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was premature and, thus, factual exploration of the issues in this matter is necessary.

Court Suppresses Evidence Obtained in Vehicular Search

 

On May 19, 2009, the Appellate Division decided State of New Jersey v. Yusef Gethers, Docket No.: A-5323-06T4. By way of background, on March 24, 2005, a Union County grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant, Yusef Gethers, with second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). On the same date, a Union County grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant with third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count one), and fourth-degree possession of a prohibited device, hollow point bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f). 

Following denial of his motion to suppress evidence, Defendant pled guilty to count one of the indictment, third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon. Pursuant to a plea bargain reached with the State, Defendant was sentence to five (5) years probation, conditioned upon 364 days of house arrest. The trial court dismissed the remaining charges under the indictments as well as an outstanding municipal court warrant. The trial court also imposed the appropriate fees and penalties. Thereafter, this appeal ensued when Defendant appealed the suppression ruling.

In this case, the Appellate Division determined the motion to suppress evidence obtained in a vehicular search, specifically, a gun found in a backpack not in plain view, was improperly denied by the trial judge. The Court found the State did not carry its burden of demonstrating a recognized exception to the warrant requirement where: (1) both occupants were outside the car and did not have access to the backpack; (2) there was no possibility they would leave the area; (3) the officers’ conduct did not indicate a belief the occupants were armed and dangerous; (4) there was no evidence of accomplices who might have come onto the scene or other persons who had access to the car destroying or disposing of the evidence or moving the car; (5) the car was parked in a residential driveway so there was no issue of traffic obstruction; (6) the ratio of officers to suspects was 4-to-2; and (7) the Defendant was in a wheelchair. Consequently, the Court reversed the trial judge’s ruling and remanded the case back to the trial court.

Arbitrator's Decision Remanded for Clarification on Timeliness Issue

On May 4, 2009, the Appellate Division decided City of Clifton v. Clifton P.B.A. Local #36, Docket No.: A-4806-07T3. In the case, Defendant, Clifton P.B.A. Local #36, appealed from a trial judge’s decision vacating an arbitrator’s award of thirteen (13) shift differential (SD) days to police detectives. 

The trial judge ruled that, in a case in which the union’s grievance was filed eighteen (18) months after the alleged wrong first occurred, and not within the twenty (20) days provided for in the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator exceeded his powers when stated that he had waived the twenty (20) day contractual time limit. In reaching that conclusion, the judge discussed the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Ed. Of Borough of Alpha v. Alpha Ed. Ass’n, a case in which the Court recognized and applied the continuing violation doctrine to preserve a late-filed grievance by the union resulting from the Board’s cessation of payment of health insurance benefits. Because the trial judge found that the arbitrator exceeded his powers in considering the matter, the judge did not render an opinion on any substantive issue raised by the parties.

On appeal, the union claimed that the award was timely pursuant to the continuing violation doctrine as recognized by the Supreme Court. The City of Clifton argued, like the trial judge, that the arbitrator did not find a continuing violation to have occurred, but rather, determined to waive the contractual twenty (20) day requirement.

The Appellate Division determined the arbitrator’s decision is susceptible to both interpretations. According to the Court, the arbitrator’s decision suggests that he nominally declined to decide the applicability of the continuing violation doctrine, instead couching his decision in terms of waiver. However, the result reached was identical to the one reached in Alpha by application of the continuing violation doctrine. Consequently, the Court remanded the matter to the arbitrator for clarification of the basis for his decision on the timeliness of the action.

 

Termination of Police Officer Arising from Substance Abuse Upheld

On April 15, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Cornelius Caruso, Docket No.: A-1612-07T1. In the case, Cornelius Caruso appealed his termination as police officer in the City of Orange Police Department.

Caruso became a police officer in 2000. In 2005, he began to experience serious problems related to his use of alcohol. He voluntarily entered a program at the Carrier Clinic in December 2005. When he did so, he failed to follow the Department’s requirement that he notify the communication supervisor and apply for a leave of absence. No charges were filed with respect to that omission.

Caruso left the Carrier Clinic in March 2006. He was found by the Department to be fit for duty and returned to work on April 1, 2006. Caruso was instructed to make periodic reports concerning his recovery, which instruction was confirmed in a letter from the City’s attorney to Caruso’s attorney. No such periodic reports were ever made.

The Department permits fifteen days of sick leave per year. The Department assessed Caruso for use of 2006 sick leave only during the period from January 1 to January 10, 2006. The period from January 11 to March 31, 2006, was charged as a combination of administrative and compensatory leave. After Caruso’s return to duty in April, he went out on sick leave from April 6 to April 18; May 10 to July 7; October 25 to November 4; and December 12 to the end of 2006. Consequently, by December 2006, Caruso had taken significantly more sick leave than was permitted by the Department.

On December 12, 2006, Caruso left work because of an eye infection. However, according to Caruso, his problem with alcohol use returned in December 2006. On December 22, 2006, Caruso left his home and traveled to Hazelden, a rehabilitation clinic located in Minnesota. He again failed to notify the communications supervisor, although others apparently notified one of his superiors who subsequently contacted Caruso and arranged for him to surrender his service weapon. Caruso also failed to complete the required form for a leave of absence.

As a result, on January 18, 2007, the City filed formal disciplinary charges against Caruso. The disciplinary charges were as follows: (1) performance of duty; (2) insubordination; (3) obedience to laws and rules; and (4) abuse of sick leave. 

Caruso left Hazelden and returned to New Jersey on January 19, 2007. He started intensive outpatient aftercare on January 23, 2007, which required his attendance at a program for four hours a day, four days per week, as well as attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous sessions.

 

On January 25, 2007, Caruso attended a meeting at the Department, at which time he was served with the notice of discipline and preliminarily suspended. On February 12, 2007, Caruso was terminated pursuant to a final notice of disciplinary action. 

Caruso appealed to the Merit System Board, which referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) in August 2007. The ALJ’s initial decision upheld Caruso’ removal, sustaining three of the four charges in the City’s notice of discipline. The Board adopted the ALJ’s decision and upheld the termination. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Caruso argued the Board’s decision “was not based on credible evidence in the record and was not consistent with case law” and that the termination was an excessive penalty. The Appellate Division disagreed. The Court upheld the Board’s decision in its entirety, including Caruso’s termination. Specifically, the Court noted the City complied with certain requirements delineated in the case law and previous decisions when it permitted Caruso to take the leave of absence for the Carrier Clinic. In addition, the Court noted that there was no basis to overturn the City’s decision that termination was an appropriate penalty. 

The case illustrates the importance of a New Jersey public safety officer being cognizant of the policies and procedures of his/her department in the event a leave of absence is necessitated by substance abuse.  In the event the requisite policies and procedures are not adhered to, missing time from employment could lead to the imposition of disciplinary charges and possible termination from employment.

 

Trial Court Authority to Impose Discipline Different From Municipality Upheld

On March 31, 2008, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, decided the case Detective Sergeant Dean Ackermann v. Borough of Glen Rock and Glen Rock Police Department, Docket Number A-2947-07T2. In the case, the parties appealed and cross-appealed from an order entered by the trial court.

Plaintiff has been a member of the Glen Rock Police Department for more than twenty years. He holds the rank of sergeant and the title of detective. Defendants are the Borough of Glen Rock and its police department. On October 3, 2006, Steven D. Cherry, Chief of the Department, served Plaintiff with a disciplinary notice, charging him with acting contrary to good order and discipline and violating Glen Rock’s “No Tolerance Policy” with respect to wrongdoing in the workplace. The notice contained no recommendation with respect to discipline.

Three days later, Chief Cherry served an amended notice of disciplinary action which set forth nine charges. In the amended notice, Chief Cherry recommended that Plaintiff be suspended for three days without pay and be required to attend an approved course in sensitivity training. The charges were based upon complaints by Anna Maria Mattina, the Borough’s first female police officer. She alleged certain conduct by Plaintiff toward her was unwanted and harassing.

Plaintiff denied any wrongdoing, would not accept the proposed discipline, and requested a hearing. The hearing officer sustained the charges, but rejected the recommendation as to discipline. He recommended Plaintiff be suspended without pay for ten days as well as attend an approved course in sensitivity training. The report was submitted to the mayor and council, which accepted his findings but rejected the recommendation for discipline. The council passed a resolution suspending Plaintiff without pay for sixty days, demoting him to police officer and requiring completion of a course in sensitivity training before returning to active duty. 

In response, Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint in lieu of prerogative writ, contending that the evidence presented did not support the findings that were made, the procedure utilized did not conform to the Attorney General’s Internal Affairs policies and procedures that the Borough adopted, and that the increase in penalty was retaliatory.

The trial court, hearing the matter as a trial de novo, concluded that only two of the violations had been proven and that the penalty imposed by the Borough was excessive. The Court directed Plaintiff be suspended for two concurrent periods of thirty days without pay and complete a course in sensitivity training. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, the Appellate Division held that, when hearing a police disciplinary matter de novo, a trial court has the authority to impose a sanction other than that imposed by the municipality. In this case, the Court found no error in directing that Plaintiff not be demoted and instead imposing a suspension and directing attendance at sensitivity training. Moreover, the Court found that although Defendants violated the Attorney General’s guidelines for conducting a disciplinary hearing, the trial court correctly found that the errors did not prejudice the Plaintiff.

         

 

Freedom of Association Claim Permitted to Go Forward

On February 3, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided the case of LaPosta v. Borough of Roseland. In the case, plaintiff, Joseph LaPosta, a police officer, alleges Defendants, the Borough of Roseland and its Police Chief, retaliated against him after he attempted to join a police organization of which the Police Chief did not approve. Plaintiff’s claims were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and state tort law. 

Plaintiff was employed as a police officer with the Borough of Roseland. After completing his police academy training, Plaintiff was forced to join the Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”) union. When Plaintiff expressed an interest in joining an alternative union, the Policemen’s Benevolent Association (“PBA”), the Police Chief advised Plaintiff that neither he nor any other officers were to have any influence from the PBA. Nevertheless, Plaintiff joined the PBA. Thereafter, the Police Chief allegedly retaliated against Plaintiff, specifically by subjecting Plaintiff to smoke from cigarettes, cigars, and scented candles, charging him with insubordination, denying him an earned stipend, belittling him in front of other officers, filing frivolous internal affairs claims against him, and denying him the opportunity to attend career-advancing classes and seminars.

Plaintiff’s complaint asserted six claims: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Police Chief; (3) hostile work environment; (4) negligence; (5) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage against the Police Chief; and (6) conspiracy. Both the Borough and Police Chief filed motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thereafter, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey entered an opinion and order granting the motions. This appeal followed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further consideration. Specifically, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all but one of Plaintiff’s claims for failing to file a notice of claim under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. However, the Third Circuit determined the District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s §1983 claim. The Third Circuit held the retaliation claim was not barred by the statute of limitations and should be remanded to the District Court to be adequately analyzed as a claim based on freedom of association.

This case illustrates the importance of obtaining an experienced, qualified attorney prior to initiating an action similar to the one recounted above. There are many procedural hurdles one must follow, to include filing certain notices, to perfect the filing of such a claim. Consequently, it is imperative one obtains a qualified, experienced attorney to ensure their rights are protected. Moreover, this case shows that viable retaliation claims can be pursued against public employers. With the right set of facts, many courts are willing to explore such a claim and, potentially, hold the employer liable for infringing on one's right to join a certain collective bargaining unit.

Officer's Resignation Not Attributed to Duress, Upheld

 

In In the Matter of Thomas F. Fricano, Borough of Freehold, Docket No.: A-2280-07T3, the Appellate Division addressed Appellant Thomas Fricano’s appeal from final decisions of the Merit System Board (“Board”), dated September 27, 2007 and December 7, 2007, upholding his resignation in good standing from the Borough of Freehold Police Department.

By way of background, Fricano received a regular appointment as a police officer in Freehold on April 3, 2006. The appointment was subject to the successful completion of a one-year probationary working test period, commencing after completion of a police training course. On February 2, 2007, Fricano, in a written letter, resigned to pursue other opportunities in law enforcement. The appointing authority accepted the resignation, which was made effective February 22, 2007. 

The circumstances surrounding Fricano’s resignation are in dispute and at the core of the appeal. According to Fricano, on February 2, 2007, after having served ten months of his one-year probationary working term, he was summoned to the office of the Police Chief. Allegedly, the Chief ordered Fricano “to resign or be terminated immediately.” Denied his request for legal representation or to have a PBA representative present, Fricano drafted and submitted a letter of resignation under duress and coercion. Thereafter, on February 16, 2007, Fricano’s counsel wrote to the Chief requesting that he be able to rescind the resignation. The Borough attorney advised Fricano that he would not be reinstated, instead stating that “they could have fired him instead.” Subsequently, on March 13, 2007, Fricano was issued a preliminary notice of disciplinary action, charging him with numerous violations. On March 22, 2007, the appointing authority withdrew the charges and, thereafter, on March 28, 2007, issued Fricano a letter indicating that he did not satisfactorily complete his working test period and that he was being terminated effective April 3, 2007.

The Borough offers a different version. When called to his office, the Chief advised Fricano that his performance during the working test period had not been satisfactory, and, therefore, offered him the option to resign effective February 22 or face termination for failure to satisfactorily complete his working test period. This offer was made so that Fricano could avoid any stigma which might attach to an involuntary termination. Fricano decided to resign and submitted a resignation letter the same day. In the letter, Fricano explain that he resigned to pursue “a different choice in the Law Enforcement Career.” Although he did not work after February 2, he was paid through February 22, and his resignation was recorded effective February 22, 2007. After being subsequently informed of Fricano’s intention to challenge his resignation, the police department issued the preliminary notice of disciplinary action on March 13, 2007. On March 22, 2007, the police department withdrew the charges and, instead, as a cautionary measure, issued a letter to

 

Fricano informing him that he had not successfully completed his working test period. 

Thereafter, Fricano filed an administrative appeal challenging his resignation. In a September 27, 2007 decision, the Board upheld the resignation, finding insufficient evidence that Fricano’s resignation was the product of duress or coercion. This appeal followed.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s finding that Fricano voluntarily resigned his position. The Court determined there was sufficient credible evidence that Fricano was told he would be terminated because he had not satisfactorily performed during his working test period. Moreover, the Court found that Fricano voluntarily chose to accept the offered opportunity to resign to avoid any stigma attached to termination. According to the Court, Fricano’s deliberate choice of available alternatives cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be ascribed to duress.

Discipline Regading Dissemination of Internal Affairs Documents Upheld

 

In Division of State Police v. In the Matter of Detective Sergeant First Class Daniel Flaherty, Docket No. A-0257-07T20257-07T2, the Appellate Division addressed the validity and ultimate imposition of disciplinary charges lodged against a Detective Sergeant of the New Jersey State Police. The appeal arose out of disciplinary charges filed by the New Jersey Division of State Police (“Division”) against Detective Sergeant First Class Daniel Flaherty, charging him with: (1) disseminating Division documents without proper authorization; (2) behaving in an official capacity to the personal discredit of a member of the State Police or to the Division; and (3) willfully disobeying a lawful verbal or written order.

The underlying facts of this case were not substantially in dispute. In 2001, Flaherty filed an age discrimination complaint with the New Jersey State Police Equal Employment Opportunity/Affirmative Action (“EEO/AA”) intake unit. He alleged that since 1995, the State Police had denied him numerous specialist positions because of his age. The EEO/AA assigned Lieutenant Patrick Reilly to investigate his claim. After two years, in which the allegations still had not been resolved, the EEO/AA replaced Reilly with DSFC Kevin Rowe.

On May 5, 2003, Flaherty filed a New Jersey State Police Reportable Incident Form alleging “culpable inefficiency” against Reilly. Pursuant to a Division policy regarding non-disclosure of confidential internal investigations, the Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”) denied his request to access the file regarding his complaint against Reilly.

The following month, the State Police administratively closed Flaherty’s complaint file against Reilly and transferred the matter to the Attorney General’s EEO/AA section. In a letter dated September 24, 2003, a Senior Deputy Attorney General informed Flaherty that his claim against Reilly could not be substantiated. 

Thereafter, on May 31, 2003, the Division assigned Flaherty to the OPS, which was then called the State Police Internal Affairs Investigation Bureau. Pursuant to Division of Internal Affairs policies and procedures, “[t]he nature and source of internal allegations, the progress of internal affairs investigations, and the resulting materials are confidential information. The contents of internal investigation case files shall be retained in the internal affairs unit and clearly marked as confidential.” Notwithstanding these provisions, internal investigation files can be released in certain enumerated circumstances.  As such, Flaherty executed a confidentiality agreement which provided the dissemination of all confidential information and/or documents.

In a letter dated February 20, 2004, the Department of Law and Public Safety found that Flaherty’s age discrimination claims could not be substantiated. In his appeal to the Department of Personnel, Flaherty questioned the manner in which the State Police and the Attorney General’s office investigated his

 

discrimination claims and his complaint against Reilly. Attached to the appeal were several documents from OPS internal investigation files relating to Reilly and several documents from the internal investigation file regarding his culpable inefficiency claim against Reilly. He also claimed that two other State troopers had filed reportable incident forms against Reilly, specifically citing to one of the internal investigation files.

The Department of Personnel acknowledged receipt of Flaherty’s appeal and forwarded a copy of same to the Attorney General’s office. In responding to the appeal, it became apparent Flaherty might have breached confidentiality by attaching Division documents from internal investigation files. Consequently, an investigation was commenced regarding Flaherty’s acquisition and dissemination of several of the documents referenced in and attached to his appeal. After the investigation, on August 25, 2005, the Division filed the above referenced disciplinary charges against Flaherty. 

The case was ultimately transferred to the Office of Administrative Law. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) assigned to the case granted a summary decision in favor of the State on charges one and three, dismissed charge two, and ordered Flaherty suspended from duty for five days without pay. After the State filed exceptions seeking to increase the penalty and Flaherty challenged the grant of summary decision as well as the penalty, the Superintendent of the State Police issued a final decision on August 1, 2007, upholding the summary decision on charges one and three, but increasing the suspension to ten days. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Flaherty asserted: (1) genuine issues of material fact precluded summary decision; (2) the ALJ failed to consider relevant evidence; (3) the ALJ applied the incorrect burden of proof; (4) the Superintendent erred by adopting the Department of Personnel’s finding that his discrimination claims were “unsubstantiated”; (5) the Superintendent erred in asserting that he has “absolute discretion” to promulgate rules and regulations; (6) he was unfairly charged with two violations based on the same facts; and (7) the ten day suspension is disproportionately harsh.

The Appellate Division rejected all of Flaherty’s arguments and affirmed the Superintendant’s decision. According to the Court, the record sustained the ALJ’s grant of summary decision imposing disciplinary action on Flaherty for attaching the records from the Internal Affairs Unit of the State Police. The Court determined Flaherty knew the records he attached to and referenced in his appeal were confidential. Moreover, the Court noted Flaherty even executed a confidentiality agreement which specifically prohibited such dissemination. As such, the Court held the ten day suspension was not disproportionately harsh and sustained the findings of the ALJ and Superintendent.

Arrest of Undercover Agent Gives Rise to Various Claims

 

In Frohner v. City of Wildwood, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey addressed a very unusual and interesting factual scenario. The lawsuit asserted numerous claims arising out of the arrest and handcuffing of plaintiff, an undercover FBI agent, by defendants, local police officers. Defendants suspected plaintiff was a motorcyclist impersonating an FBI agent.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on a variety of plaintiff’s claims. First, the Court denied defendants’ motions as to the false-arrest claims because defendants failed to show as a matter of law that they had probable cause or arguable probable cause to believe plaintiff was impersonating an FBI agent. Next, the Court denied defendants’ motion as to the claim that defendants’ conducted an unlawful search and seizure of plaintiff’s car. The Court indicated that it could not be concluded that the search was incident to a lawful arrest.

The Court also denied defendants’ motion as to plaintiff’s excessive-force and punitive damages claims. The Court held that such a claim will lie for the use of excessively tight handcuffs and that expert testimony is not required. With regard to plaintiff’s punitive damages claim, the Court noted that the issue as to whether any defendant was recklessly indifferent to plaintiff’s rights was a jury question. 

Although the vast majority of plaintiff’s claims were upheld, the Court did grant defendants summary judgment on one of the claims. The Court determined that since plaintiff has not shown a pattern of constitutional violations indicating defendants were deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that constitutional violations such as those alleged in this case would occur, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on that claim.

This case shows that arrests of undercover agents by local police departments, much like arrests of everyday citizens, can give rise to various claims being brought against the departments. Even with the unusual nature of the facts of this case, this case also illustrates that Courts are typically reluctant to dismiss certain claims as long as some evidence in support thereof has been offered.