New Jersey Public Safety Officers Law Blog : New Jersey Public Safety Employee Lawyer & Attorney : Pellettieri, Rabstein & Altman Law Firm : Workers Compensation, Discipline Representation for Police & Firefighters : New Jersey

On August 17, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Juan Melendez, Docket No.: A-4617-07T1. In the case, Juan Melendez, a Hudson County Corrections Officer, appealed from a final administrative determination of the Merit System Board (“Board”) imposing a fifteen-day suspension for neglect of duty and other sufficient cause warranting discipline.

The Board adopted the initial determination of an Administrative Law Judge on a remand following his first determination that the suspension should only be for three days following Hudson County’s suspension of thirty days. On appeal, Melendez argues that: (1) the decision of the Board upholding the charges is not supported by credible evidence in the record; (2) the penalty of a fifteen day suspension is at odds with the concept of progressive discipline and appellant’s prior disciplinary history; and (3) he is entitled to attorneys’ fees based on having prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues.

The testimony before the ALJ revealed that Sgt. Kevin Orlik reported, and testified, that Melendez was asleep at his post in a trailer annexed to the jail on March 19, 2006 when Orlik and other officers arrived to conduct a search of the cells. In his testimony, Orlik testified that when he entered the trailer he “saw Officer Melendez reclined back in a chair with a roll of toilet paper as a pillow or cushion behind his neck,” “his eyes were closed,” and he was “motionless” as he was observed “for approximately a minute to two minutes” until other officers entered the trailer and started to make noise. Melendez testified that he wasn’t sleeping and told that to Orlik when he directed Melendez “to write a report on why [he] was sleeping.” Melendez challenged Orlik’s credibility by noting that his written report omitted details embodied in his testimony.

There was also testimony about the practice of standing when a superior officer enters the room. Melendez did not do so on the night in questions, and testified that it wasn’t a “regular routine” and he generally did not do so. Although the failure to stand was not itself a basis for discipline, it was determined to be relevant to the issue of “attentiveness” at the time, as well as to the ALJ’s finding that the inattentive conduct was a “sufficient cause” for the three-day suspension he initially imposed.

On the remand, despite making credibility determinations against Orlik because of the failure to include certain details in his written report, the ALJ found neglect of duty and “other sufficient cause” for the discipline, and found that “the failure to stand and acknowledge Sgt. Orlik’s when he entered the trailer to constitute being inattentive.”

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On July 2, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided United Steel v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Company, No. 08-1911. In two consolidated cases, Plaintiffs are unions who were seeking to compel Defendants, employers of the unions’ members, to arbitrate Plaintiffs’ grievances about unilateral changes the Defendants made to employee benefit plans. In both cases, the lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the unions on the grounds that: (1) a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the parties provided for arbitration; and (2) there is no strong and forceful evidence that the parties intended to exclude these disputes from arbitration. 

In appealing the lower courts’ determinations, Defendants contended that the Plaintiff’s grievances are disputes over benefit eligibility and, thus, should be resolved using the dispute resolution provisions of the Summary Plan Description rather than the CBA. Moreover, Defendants argued that ERISA, which governs the employee benefit plans maintained by Defendants, mandates that benefit eligibility disputes of this nature should be resolved by the designated ERISA fiduciary.

In affirming the determination of the lower courts, the Third Circuit noted that the arbitration clauses in the CBAs at issue were broadly worded. Specifically, the New Jersey CBAs provide for arbitration of grievances “relating to the interpretation or to any alleged violation” of those CBAs, while the Delaware CBA provides for arbitration of “[a]ny question as to the interpretation, or any alleged violation, of any provision of” that CBA. There was no express provision in any of the CBAs that excluded Plaintiffs’ grievances. Therefore, a presumption of arbitrability applied and Defendants could only overcome this presumption by showing forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude these claims from arbitration.

The Court determined that there was no forceful evidence that the parties did not intend to submit these disputes to arbitration. In rejecting Defendants’ argument which characterized the grievances as disputes about “benefit eligibility”, the Court found the disputed issue is not whether any particular employee was eligible under the terms of the plan, but rather whether Defendants violated the CBAs by unilaterally modifying its terms. Moreover, the Court noted that were it to accept Defendants’ characterization of the grievances, this would eliminate any opportunity for a meaningful challenge to Defendants’ unilateral plan amendments and thereby thwarting the CBAs’ arbitration clauses. As such, the Court affirmed the determination of the lower courts.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Employees in New Jersey’s largest state-worker union overwhelmingly ratified a revised contract agreement on Tuesday, June 30, 2009 that defers a raise and trades furloughs this year for future vacation days. With a little over 13,000 votes cast online or by phone by the deadline, the margin was 69 percent to 31 percent according to the Communication Workers of America. All four bargaining units, those represented clerical workers, professionals and two tiers of supervisors, voted for the revised deal, which bars layoffs until 2011. 

Workers in the CWA, which covers about half the state’s workforce, agreed to defer a 3.5 percent raise that was due July 1, 2009 by 18 months; they will get two 3.5 percent raises in fiscal 2011. Workers also agreed to nine furlough days over the coming year, on top of one taken in May. In exchange, they receive seven days off from work they can take starting in July 2010 or cash out when they leave state employment, at their pay rate at that time. 

The State agreed not to layoff any workers until January 2011 or add more unpaid furloughs before July 2011. If the State lays off any worker before January 2011, not counting any fired for disciplinary reasons or for cause, all state workers immediately get the deferred 3.5 percent raise and no further furloughs are required.

Workers due to receive increment raised in fiscal 2010 based on their years of service will get those increases. The nine unpaid furlough days include the day after Thanksgiving this year and Lincoln’s Birthday in 2010. The other seven dates will be worked out by workers and their supervisors and must be taken by the end of June 2010.

Republicans, who are hopeful that Governor Corzine will be replaced in this fall’s election, said the agreement ties the hands of the next governor to deal with next year’s multi-billion dollar deficit. “The governor did not need to negotiate these costly, election-year concessions. The courts had upheld his right to furlough workers as he originally proposed. The governor traded a plan that would have saved money during a recession for one that may very well slow the state’s recovery,” said Senate Minority Leader Thomas Kean, Jr., R-Union.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On June 29, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that white firefighters in New Haven, Connecticut were unfairly denied promotions because of their race, reversing a decision that high court nominee Sonia Sotomayor endorsed as an appeals court judge.

New Haven was wrong to scrap a promotion exam because no African-Americans and only two Hispanic firefighters were likely to be made lieutenants or captains based on the results, the Court said in a 5-4 decision. The city said that it had acted to avoid a lawsuit from minorities.

The ruling could alter employment practices nationwide and make it harder to prove discrimination when there is no evidence it was intentional. “Fear of litigation alone cannot justify an employer’s reliance on race to the detriment of individuals who passed the examinations and qualified for promotions,” Justice Anthony Kennedy said in his opinion for the Court. He was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas.

In dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said the white firefighters “understandably attract this court’s sympathy. But they had no vested right to promotion. Nor have persons received promotions in preference to them.” Justices Stephen Breyer, David Souter, and John Paul Stevens signed onto Ginsburg’s dissent, which she read aloud in Court.

The decision had its origins in New Haven’s need to fill vacancies for lieutenants and captains in its fire department. It hired an outside firm to design a test, which was given to 77 candidates for lieutenant and 41 candidates for captain. Fifty six firefighters passed the exams, including 41 whites, 22 blacks and 18 hispanics. Of those, only 17 whites and two whites could expect promotion. 

The city eventually decided to not use the exam to determine promotions. It said it acted because it might have been vulnerable to claims that the exam had a “disparate impact” on minorities in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The white firefighters said the decision violated the same law’s protection on intentional discrimination.  

The city declined to validate the test after it was given, a step that could have identified flaws or determined that there were no serious problems with it. In addition, city officials could not say what was wrong with the test, other than the racially skewed results. 

Justice Kennedy said, “The city could be liable for disparate-impact discrimination only if the examinations were not job related” or the city failed to use a less discriminatory alternative. We conclude that there is no strong basis in evidence to establish that the test was deficient in either of these respects.” 

Alternatively, Ginsburg said the court should have assessed “the starkly disparate results” of the exams against the backdrop of historical and ongoing inequality in the New Haven fire department. As of 2003, she said, only one of the city’s 21 fire captains was African-American.

Until this decision, Ginsburg said, the civil rights law’s prohibitions on intentional discrimination and disparate impact were complimentary, both aimed at ending workplace discrimination. “Today’s decision sets these paired directives at odds,” she said.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On June 3, 2009, the State of New Jersey’s largest public employee union indicated it would accept a wage freeze and unpaid furlough days to help reduce spending under a tentative deal according to Governor Jon Corzine.

Corzine called the agreement with the Communication Workers of America “very important for our budget to make sure that we get something that is a very substantial giveback.” According to Corzine, negotiations are continuing with other unions along with CWA.

Corzine stated, “There is a tentative agreement on wage givebacks and furloughs that has yet more details to be ironed out, and that has to be appropriately negotiated with other unions. I expect there will be an agreement on the terms that are negotiated at the collective bargaining table, not just with CWA but with all of the various parties that are involved.”

Although details of the deal were not provided, senior Democratic officials told the Star Ledger the pact would include ten (10) furlough days in the budget year starting July 1, along with a wage freeze and some “bankable” paid personal days that workers could take in the future.

Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee char Barbara Buono said the tentative agreement, if approved by other unions, would lead to at least $300 million in savings for the $28.6 billion budget proposed for the new fiscal year. 

Corzine imposed two furlough days before the current budget year ends June 30 and was seeking 12 more days in the new budget. Union members have protested the furloughs and criticized the Governor. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

New York Governor David Patterson dropped a bombshell on two powerful unions yesterday when he unexpectedly vetoed a routine measure that for nearly thirty (30) years had allowed New York city cops and firefighters to retire with generous pensions.

“These are not routine times,” Paterson said in vetoing the “temporary” measure that, since 1981, had been habitually renewed by legislators, giving the Finest and Bravest gold-plated pensions known as “Tier II” even as new, less-generous tiers were created for non-uniformed workers. Paterson added, “Instead of a rubber stamp on a temporary fix, we need to move forward with real reform to the pension system.”

In recent months, the New York Post has detailed the spiraling costs of public-employee pensions and the growing threat they pose to state and local budgets. Paterson’s veto, which caught the lawmakers off guard, was his most aggressive move yet in his push to establish a pared-down pension tier for newly hired employees. Recently, the governor re-introduced his cost-saving pension proposal, which legislators flatly rejected during this year’s budget negotiations. In fact, Paterson estimates that his proposal for a new pension tier would save the state $48 billion over the next thirty (30) years. 

Labor unions and their allies in the Legislature said they were blindsided by the governor’s veto and argued that state and local governments will see no savings from the move because it’s unclear which pension tiers new cops and firefighters would join. According to Civil Service Committee Chairwoman Diane Savino, who sponsored the bill, “There was no cost to extending the current system. We don’t know what the cost would be. We don’t know what the savings will be.” 

The bill passed overwhelmingly, 136-6 in the Assembly and 58-0 in the Senate, leading to talk of a veto override, which requires a two-thirds majority of each house. 

The savings would come from, among other items, raising the minimum retirement age and banning overtime “spiking,” where workers run up OT in their final years to boost pension payouts.

As one can expect, developments such as these do not bode well for public safety officers across the county, to include those of our state. As detailed in previous entries, public pension reform has become an important topic, especially during these tough economic times. This article illustrates the types of responses that are being taken by government in response to the issue and the resulting effect upon public safety officers. Please continue to check this blog periodically to ascertain updates in regard to this matter.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On May 16, 2009, the Public Employment Relations Commission (“PERC”) issued a decision in response to certain unfair practice charges and requests for interim relief filed against the State of New Jersey regarding the imposition of unpaid, “furlough” days. 

By way of background, on April 14, 2009, the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (“CWA”), filed an unfair practice charge and a request for interim relief against the State of New Jersey. CWA alleged that the State committed unfair practices proscribed by the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act by: (1) unilaterally imposing a reduction in the work year and compensation of employees represented by CWA by requiring them to take unpaid leave days; (2) failing to negotiate over the effects of the decision to impose involuntary unpaid leave days; and (3) conspiring with the Civil Service Commission to enact temporary layoff rules for the purpose of circumventing the State’s obligation to negotiate over staggered unpaid leave days. The charges alleged that, through these actions, the State repudiated various sections of the collective negotiations agreements it has entered into with CWA and breached its duty to negotiate over terms and conditions of employment in violation of the Employer-Employee Relations Act. Additional charges and requests for interim relief were filed between April 14 and April 29 by other employee organizations representing units of various State employees, including P.B.A. 105.

An order to show cause was executed and the return date was ultimately scheduled on May 14. Once numerous briefs, certifications, and exhibits were filed, all parties appeared on the return date.  After entertaining argument, the Commission Designee Stuart Reichman, in an extensive written opinion, denied the applications for interim relief. The Designee found that where a monetary remedy could normally be issued by the Commission in the event the furloughs were found to constitute an unfair practice, as is the case here, an injunction to prevent the institution of the furloughs is not appropriate because monetary loss does not constitute irreparable harm. As a result, the unfair practice charges will proceed in the normal course. To read the decision in its entirety, download the same from the PERC website.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On May 14, 2009, the Appellate Division decided Harry G. Parkin v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees Retirement System, Docket No.: A-2466-07T1. In the case, Harry Parkin appealed from the final agency decision of the Board of Trustees of the Public Employee Retirement System (“Board”) resulting in the partial forfeiture of his service and salary credits. Specifically, Parkin contended that the Board failed to follow its own regulations governing partial forfeiture of pension benefits and further contended that the Board “adopted a rule regarding the partial termination of pension benefits without going through the regulatory process.” 

With the exception of a four-year break in service, from 1972 to January 1, 2004, Parkin was continuously employed in various public positions until he retired as Mercer County Chief of Staff. Based upon his veteran’s status, his service time, and additional credit he received as part of an early retirement incentive program, he had accumulated twenty-eight (28) years and nine (9) months of service credit equating to a monthly pension of $5,864.49.

On March 11, 2004, Parkin was indicted by a Federal grand jury and charged with having participated in a wide-ranging, corrupt scheme utilizing his office as Chief of Staff to defraud Mercer County and its citizens. The indictment alleged numerous acts Parkin committed in furtherance of the plan while employed as Chief of Staff. After a jury trial, in March 2005, he was convicted of all charges. In August 2005, he was sentenced to a period of ninety (90) months imprisonment.

The Board considered Parkin’s entitlement to pension benefits at its September 2005 meeting. Applying the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c), the Board determined a partial forfeiture was warranted for the period of time Parkin served as Chief of Staff, i.e., from June 1, 1994, to the date of his retirement. As a result, Parkin became ineligible for veteran retirement status and additionally lost early retirement incentives. His monthly pension was significantly reduced and he no longer qualified for lifetime medical benefits.        

Thereafter, Parkin appealed to the Office of Administrative Law, wherein he argued that the Board had arbitrarily chosen the forfeiture period to run from his first day as Chief of Staff, rather than the time his misconduct allegedly first occurred, i.e., in September 2000. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) initially recommended the Board supplement the record regarding its selection of the date upon which to commence the forfeiture period. In September 2007, the Board filed a supplementary statement of its reasons for selecting the initial date of Parkin’s employment as Chief of Staff as the operative date of forfeiture, relying heavily upon the statements made by the sentencing judge in which he outlined the nature and extent of Parkin’s criminal conduct. Subsequently, the ALJ issued his initial decision in November 2007 ordering forfeiture of all of Parkin’s service from the date he became Chief of Staff. The Board adopted the ALJ’s recommendations and this appeal followed.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On May 12, 2009, Kate Benner published an article entitled “The Public Pension Bomb” in Fortune Magazine. The article addresses how states all across the country, for many years, have been starving their retirement plans. More importantly, however, the article focuses upon how the crisis is playing out in New Jersey, where the bill is coming due and the State does not have the money to pay it.

According to Benner, the New Jersey public pension situation is dire. In June 2008, the State estimated that the plan, one of the nation’s largest covering teachers, state employees, firefighters, and police officers, had $34 billion less than it needed to meet its obligations. Since then the market value of the plan has dropped from $82 billion to $56 billion. A new estimate of underfunding is due in July.

Benner also indicated that, overall, states nationwide have shortchanged the retirement programs that cover teachers, police, and other public employees. Now, the stock market plunge has wiped out billions of dollars from already underfunded plans. California, New York, and Illinois are among the states scrambling to plug multibillion dollar holes in their pension systems. As a result, these growing obligations raise the specter of higher taxes, diminished services, or even another round of costly federal bailouts.

Lastly, the article traces a 20 year time line to figure out how New Jersey dug itself into this hole. It also delineates the steps that have been and currently are being taken to address the problem. As such, any current or retired New Jersey public safety officer should read this article in order to fully understand the problems with the New Jersey public pension system. The status of the New Jersey public pension system is vital to every resident of this state and especially crucial to public safety employees. Consequently, one must be conscious of this in order to adequately prepare for its financial impact. To read the full article, click on the following link.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On May 4, 2009, the Appellate Division decided City of Clifton v. Clifton P.B.A. Local #36, Docket No.: A-4806-07T3. In the case, Defendant, Clifton P.B.A. Local #36, appealed from a trial judge’s decision vacating an arbitrator’s award of thirteen (13) shift differential (SD) days to police detectives. 

The trial judge ruled that, in a case in which the union’s grievance was filed eighteen (18) months after the alleged wrong first occurred, and not within the twenty (20) days provided for in the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator exceeded his powers when stated that he had waived the twenty (20) day contractual time limit. In reaching that conclusion, the judge discussed the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Ed. Of Borough of Alpha v. Alpha Ed. Ass’n, a case in which the Court recognized and applied the continuing violation doctrine to preserve a late-filed grievance by the union resulting from the Board’s cessation of payment of health insurance benefits. Because the trial judge found that the arbitrator exceeded his powers in considering the matter, the judge did not render an opinion on any substantive issue raised by the parties.

On appeal, the union claimed that the award was timely pursuant to the continuing violation doctrine as recognized by the Supreme Court. The City of Clifton argued, like the trial judge, that the arbitrator did not find a continuing violation to have occurred, but rather, determined to waive the contractual twenty (20) day requirement.

The Appellate Division determined the arbitrator’s decision is susceptible to both interpretations. According to the Court, the arbitrator’s decision suggests that he nominally declined to decide the applicability of the continuing violation doctrine, instead couching his decision in terms of waiver. However, the result reached was identical to the one reached in Alpha by application of the continuing violation doctrine. Consequently, the Court remanded the matter to the arbitrator for clarification of the basis for his decision on the timeliness of the action.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Recently, the primary authors of this blog, Frank M. Crivelli, Esq. and Donald Barbati, Esq., released a publication entitled “Taking the Necessary Steps to Win Your New Jersey Public Employee Disability Pension Appeal.” 

The publication thoroughly examines the different New Jersey Pension Systems, including the Public Employees’ Retirement System, Police and Firemen’s Retirement System, and the State Police Retirement System and the difference between accidental and ordinary disability benefits under the various pension systems. Moreover, the publication analyzes the applicable decisional and statutory law surrounding public employee disability pension appeals and articulates the necessary criteria to be satisfied and the steps one must take in order to obtain accidental and/or ordinary disability benefits.

This publication is a must have for all State of New Jersey, County and Municipal employees, especially New Jersey Public Safety Officers. Public employee disability pension law is a specialized and highly complex area of law. Should you ever find yourself in need of accidental or ordinary disability benefits, you would be hard pressed to find as useful a resource.

To obtain a free copy of the publication or, alternatively, to discuss its contents in more detail, please contact Frank Crivelli, Esq. or Donald Barbati, Esq. at (609) 890-1900 or via mail at: 2653 Nottingham Way, Hamilton, New Jersey 08619.  

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On March 30, 2009, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division decided the case In the Matter of Richard J. Rivera, Docket No. A-3672-07T2. In the case, Richard J. Rivera, a county corrections officer assigned to the Monmouth County Correctional Institute (“MCCI”), appealed from a final decision of the Merit System Board suspending him for ten (10) days without pay for violating Rule 4.1.28 of the Monmouth County Sheriff’s Department.

The alleged violation was based upon Rivera’s failure to disclose a relationship with a “current offender,” which includes probationers, after he purchased a home with a woman who was on probation. On appeal, Rivera contended the rule was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to him. The Court, in rejecting Rivera’s arguments, noted that a serious conflict of interest could arise if a corrections officer maintained a close relationship with a probationer who violated his/her probation and ultimately became incarcerated. To support this, the Court cited Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, a 1993 Appellate Division case, which held, “[t]he need for proper control over the conduct of inmates in a correctional facility and the part played by proper relationships between those who are required to maintain order and enforce discipline and the inmates cannot be doubted.” Consequently, the Court affirmed the Board’s final decision and upheld the penalty imposed.

This case illustrates that correction officers who become socially and/or intimately associated with persons who are either incarcerated or on parole could be subject to discipline. As a result, all correction officers should consult their respective collective bargaining agreements and/or department policies to determine whether their particular employer places limits on fraternization with certain persons.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On February 3, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided the case of LaPosta v. Borough of Roseland. In the case, plaintiff, Joseph LaPosta, a police officer, alleges Defendants, the Borough of Roseland and its Police Chief, retaliated against him after he attempted to join a police organization of which the Police Chief did not approve. Plaintiff’s claims were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and state tort law. 

Plaintiff was employed as a police officer with the Borough of Roseland. After completing his police academy training, Plaintiff was forced to join the Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”) union. When Plaintiff expressed an interest in joining an alternative union, the Policemen’s Benevolent Association (“PBA”), the Police Chief advised Plaintiff that neither he nor any other officers were to have any influence from the PBA. Nevertheless, Plaintiff joined the PBA. Thereafter, the Police Chief allegedly retaliated against Plaintiff, specifically by subjecting Plaintiff to smoke from cigarettes, cigars, and scented candles, charging him with insubordination, denying him an earned stipend, belittling him in front of other officers, filing frivolous internal affairs claims against him, and denying him the opportunity to attend career-advancing classes and seminars.

Plaintiff’s complaint asserted six claims: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Police Chief; (3) hostile work environment; (4) negligence; (5) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage against the Police Chief; and (6) conspiracy. Both the Borough and Police Chief filed motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thereafter, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey entered an opinion and order granting the motions. This appeal followed.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further consideration. Specifically, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all but one of Plaintiff’s claims for failing to file a notice of claim under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. However, the Third Circuit determined the District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s §1983 claim. The Third Circuit held the retaliation claim was not barred by the statute of limitations and should be remanded to the District Court to be adequately analyzed as a claim based on freedom of association.

This case illustrates the importance of obtaining an experienced, qualified attorney prior to initiating an action similar to the one recounted above. There are many procedural hurdles one must follow, to include filing certain notices, to perfect the filing of such a claim. Consequently, it is imperative one obtains a qualified, experienced attorney to ensure their rights are protected. Moreover, this case shows that viable retaliation claims can be pursued against public employers. With the right set of facts, many courts are willing to explore such a claim and, potentially, hold the employer liable for infringing on one's right to join a certain collective bargaining unit.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Jerry DeMarco, a reporter with the website www.examiner.com has reported that significantly more police unions around the state are turning towards interest arbitration as a means to settle their contract due to the hard line stance that many municipalities and county governments have taken during negotiations.

DeMarco reported that the average salary increase for arbitration awards dipped slightly last year, to 3.73 percent from 3.77 percent, according to the New Jersey Public Employee Relations Commission (PERC). Furthermore, salary increases from voluntary settlements averaged 3.92 percent, down from 3.97 percent in 2007. PERC records show that in Northern New Jersey, nearly a half-dozen awards made by arbitrators this year average 3.92 a year in their overall impact on police salaries over the life of the contracts.

The article further reports that a long-running contract dispute in Englewood, New Jersey, finally ended in December, with police getting a 4% hike for 2007 through 2009, and a 3.8% increase for 2010. Fort Lee police, similarly, got 4%for 2007 and 2008 and 3.5%for 2009 and 2010.  North Arlington police, who filed for arbitration nearly a year ago, were awarded 15.25%over four years in September, 2008.

Interest arbitration is always a viable option for dispute resolution when public safety unions reach an impasse with their governmental employers. The Police and Fire Public Interest Arbitration Reform Act is the statute that governs interest arbitration within the state of New Jersey; and should a public safety collective bargaining unit make the decision that contract negotiations have reached an impasse, this act will be the controlling piece of legislation in the arbitration process. 

Prior to filing for interest arbitration, it is advisable that the union’s executive board familiarize themselves with the Police and Fire Public Interest Arbitration Reform Act, and the criteria that is utilized by arbitrators in issuing an award. Furthermore, the collective bargaining unit should ensure that they do not walk into the arbitration process alone. It is imperative that they consult with and hire competent counsel prior to the initiation of the petition for interest arbitration.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In the matter of Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, Civil Action No. 05-3619, the United States District Court, District of New Jersey, addressed the issue of strip searches of non-indictable offenders.

Plaintiffs consisted of a certified class to include all arrestees charged with non-indictable offenses, which were processed at Burlington County Jail and/or the Essex County Correctional Facility and were strip searched without a reasonable belief that they were concealing contraband, drugs, or weapons. Defendants were the Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington County, Burlington County Jail, Warden Juel Cole, Essex County Correctional Facility, Essex County Sheriff’s Department, and several John Does.

Plaintiffs sought summary judgment on the issue of whether Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by their policy of strip searching non-indictable arrestees without reasonable suspicion. Plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief on behalf of the class against the correctional facilities’ strip search policies.

In response, Defendants also sought summary judgment as to whether the strip searches were constitutional. In addition, Defendants sought summary judgment on the following issues: (1) 11^th Amendment immunity for the Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington County, Burlington County Jail, and Warden Cole in his official capacity; (2) qualified immunity for Warden Cole in his individual capacity; and (3) the dismissal of count five involving section 1983 municipality custom violations regarding Essex County.

The District Court held that blanket strip searches of non-indictable offenders, performed without reasonable suspicion for drugs, weapons or other contraband are unconstitutional. Specifically, the Court indicated that the search policies at Burlington and Essex County jails do not pass constitutional muster under the balancing test set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish. The Court also determined the justification for the blanket policy is not compelling, where it is based on general security concerns and health concerns, as nothing prohibits jail officials from searching non-indictable offenders, assuming they have reasonable suspicion to do so.  

Based upon its finding that blanket strip searches of non-indictable offenders, performed without reasonable suspicion for drugs, weapons or other contraband, are unconstitutional, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. As to a remedy, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief on account of a lack of standing, since Plaintiffs have failed to show irreparable harm in that they are unlikely to be subjected to strip searches in the future. 

Lastly, the Court denied Defendants’ Motion to dismiss in its entirety. The Court found Defendants’ arguments and factual averments are too scant to support a finding of 11^th Amendment immunity and Plaintiffs’ factual allegations regarding municipal liability under section 1983 sufficiently complied with pleading requirements under Federal rules. Finally, the Court determined Warden Cole was not entitled to qualified immunity since a constitutional violation was present and Warden Cole ought to have been put on notice that the strip search policy was unconstitutional.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

This blog entry will focus upon our review of certain statutory proposals currently pending in the New Jersey Legislature concerning the pay status of law enforcement officers when appeals of termination are not resolved within 180 days. These proposals are set forth in Assembly Bill Number 3481. 

Assembly Bill 3481 concerns the suspensions of certain law enforcement officers and firefighters and supplements Title 40A of the New Jersey statutes and specifically amends N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150 and N.J.S.A. 40A:14-22. In essence, the bill allows certain law enforcement officers and firefighters to regain pay status when appeals of termination are not resolved within 180 days.

The first part of the bill provides:

When a law enforcement officer employed by a law enforcement agency…that is subject to the provisions of Title 11A of the New Jersey Statutes is suspended from performing his official duties without pay for a complaint or charges, other than (1) a complaint or charges relating to the subject matter of a pending criminal investigation…whether pre-indictment or post indictment, or (2) when the complaint or charges allege conduct that also would constitute a violation of the criminal laws of this State or any other jurisdiction, and the law enforcement agency employing the officer…seeks to terminate that officer’s…employment for the conduct that was the basis for the officer’s…suspension without pay, a final determination on the officer’s…suspension and termination shall be rendered within 180 calendar days from the date the officer…is suspended without pay.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In In the Matter of Thomas F. Fricano, Borough of Freehold, Docket No.: A-2280-07T3, the Appellate Division addressed Appellant Thomas Fricano’s appeal from final decisions of the Merit System Board (“Board”), dated September 27, 2007 and December 7, 2007, upholding his resignation in good standing from the Borough of Freehold Police Department.

By way of background, Fricano received a regular appointment as a police officer in Freehold on April 3, 2006. The appointment was subject to the successful completion of a one-year probationary working test period, commencing after completion of a police training course. On February 2, 2007, Fricano, in a written letter, resigned to pursue other opportunities in law enforcement. The appointing authority accepted the resignation, which was made effective February 22, 2007. 

The circumstances surrounding Fricano’s resignation are in dispute and at the core of the appeal. According to Fricano, on February 2, 2007, after having served ten months of his one-year probationary working term, he was summoned to the office of the Police Chief. Allegedly, the Chief ordered Fricano “to resign or be terminated immediately.” Denied his request for legal representation or to have a PBA representative present, Fricano drafted and submitted a letter of resignation under duress and coercion. Thereafter, on February 16, 2007, Fricano’s counsel wrote to the Chief requesting that he be able to rescind the resignation. The Borough attorney advised Fricano that he would not be reinstated, instead stating that “they could have fired him instead.” Subsequently, on March 13, 2007, Fricano was issued a preliminary notice of disciplinary action, charging him with numerous violations. On March 22, 2007, the appointing authority withdrew the charges and, thereafter, on March 28, 2007, issued Fricano a letter indicating that he did not satisfactorily complete his working test period and that he was being terminated effective April 3, 2007.

The Borough offers a different version. When called to his office, the Chief advised Fricano that his performance during the working test period had not been satisfactory, and, therefore, offered him the option to resign effective February 22 or face termination for failure to satisfactorily complete his working test period. This offer was made so that Fricano could avoid any stigma which might attach to an involuntary termination. Fricano decided to resign and submitted a resignation letter the same day. In the letter, Fricano explain that he resigned to pursue “a different choice in the Law Enforcement Career.” Although he did not work after February 2, he was paid through February 22, and his resignation was recorded effective February 22, 2007. After being subsequently informed of Fricano’s intention to challenge his resignation, the police department issued the preliminary notice of disciplinary action on March 13, 2007. On March 22, 2007, the police department withdrew the charges and, instead, as a cautionary measure, issued a letter to

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In Division of State Police v. In the Matter of Detective Sergeant First Class Daniel Flaherty, Docket No. A-0257-07T20257-07T2, the Appellate Division addressed the validity and ultimate imposition of disciplinary charges lodged against a Detective Sergeant of the New Jersey State Police. The appeal arose out of disciplinary charges filed by the New Jersey Division of State Police (“Division”) against Detective Sergeant First Class Daniel Flaherty, charging him with: (1) disseminating Division documents without proper authorization; (2) behaving in an official capacity to the personal discredit of a member of the State Police or to the Division; and (3) willfully disobeying a lawful verbal or written order.

The underlying facts of this case were not substantially in dispute. In 2001, Flaherty filed an age discrimination complaint with the New Jersey State Police Equal Employment Opportunity/Affirmative Action (“EEO/AA”) intake unit. He alleged that since 1995, the State Police had denied him numerous specialist positions because of his age. The EEO/AA assigned Lieutenant Patrick Reilly to investigate his claim. After two years, in which the allegations still had not been resolved, the EEO/AA replaced Reilly with DSFC Kevin Rowe.

On May 5, 2003, Flaherty filed a New Jersey State Police Reportable Incident Form alleging “culpable inefficiency” against Reilly. Pursuant to a Division policy regarding non-disclosure of confidential internal investigations, the Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”) denied his request to access the file regarding his complaint against Reilly.

The following month, the State Police administratively closed Flaherty’s complaint file against Reilly and transferred the matter to the Attorney General’s EEO/AA section. In a letter dated September 24, 2003, a Senior Deputy Attorney General informed Flaherty that his claim against Reilly could not be substantiated. 

Thereafter, on May 31, 2003, the Division assigned Flaherty to the OPS, which was then called the State Police Internal Affairs Investigation Bureau. Pursuant to Division of Internal Affairs policies and procedures, “[t]he nature and source of internal allegations, the progress of internal affairs investigations, and the resulting materials are confidential information. The contents of internal investigation case files shall be retained in the internal affairs unit and clearly marked as confidential.” Notwithstanding these provisions, internal investigation files can be released in certain enumerated circumstances.  As such, Flaherty executed a confidentiality agreement which provided the dissemination of all confidential information and/or documents.

In a letter dated February 20, 2004, the Department of Law and Public Safety found that Flaherty’s age discrimination claims could not be substantiated. In his appeal to the Department of Personnel, Flaherty questioned the manner in which the State Police and the Attorney General’s office investigated his

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In Brennan v. Township of Fairfield, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey addressed an important topic for public safety officers, freedom of speech. In this case, Plaintiff, a police officer, alleged he was retaliated against for distributing a memorandum on police letterhead to the Mayor and Township Council. The memorandum contained the officer’s reasons for having issued two motor vehicle summonses to a township administrator.   

Defendants moved for summary judgment of plaintiff’s claim. The Court granted the motion because Plaintiff’s speech was made pursuant to his duties as a police officer. Therefore, his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. In addition to seeking summary judgment, Defendants also moved for sanctions against Plaintiff for the assertion of a claim which Plaintiff later withdrew. The Court denied this motion along with Defendants’ other motions to disqualify counsel and to compel mediation.   

This case, although very brief, illustrates how one’s freedom of speech can be limited based on the context in which the speech is offered. Speech made pursuant to one’s duties as a public safety officer will not be protected by the First Amendment, thereby negating support of a retaliation claim. As a result, it is important for public safety officers to be cognizant of the distinction between speech made pursuant to their employment from all other forms.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In Frohner v. City of Wildwood, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey addressed a very unusual and interesting factual scenario. The lawsuit asserted numerous claims arising out of the arrest and handcuffing of plaintiff, an undercover FBI agent, by defendants, local police officers. Defendants suspected plaintiff was a motorcyclist impersonating an FBI agent.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on a variety of plaintiff’s claims. First, the Court denied defendants’ motions as to the false-arrest claims because defendants failed to show as a matter of law that they had probable cause or arguable probable cause to believe plaintiff was impersonating an FBI agent. Next, the Court denied defendants’ motion as to the claim that defendants’ conducted an unlawful search and seizure of plaintiff’s car. The Court indicated that it could not be concluded that the search was incident to a lawful arrest.

The Court also denied defendants’ motion as to plaintiff’s excessive-force and punitive damages claims. The Court held that such a claim will lie for the use of excessively tight handcuffs and that expert testimony is not required. With regard to plaintiff’s punitive damages claim, the Court noted that the issue as to whether any defendant was recklessly indifferent to plaintiff’s rights was a jury question. 

Although the vast majority of plaintiff’s claims were upheld, the Court did grant defendants summary judgment on one of the claims. The Court determined that since plaintiff has not shown a pattern of constitutional violations indicating defendants were deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that constitutional violations such as those alleged in this case would occur, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on that claim.

This case shows that arrests of undercover agents by local police departments, much like arrests of everyday citizens, can give rise to various claims being brought against the departments. Even with the unusual nature of the facts of this case, this case also illustrates that Courts are typically reluctant to dismiss certain claims as long as some evidence in support thereof has been offered.    

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link