Changes To Way Police Eyewitness Identifications Are Used In Court

 

As reported by nj.com, New Jersey’s standards for eyewitness testimony in the courtroom is unreliable and can encourage police misconduct, the New Jersey Supreme Court said in ordering a revision of investigative and court practices. The unanimous ruling follows a recent report recommending tighter restrictions on eyewitness testimony and is likely to have far-reaching effects beyond New Jersey.

The decision tightens standards adopted by New Jersey after the U.S. Supreme Court 34 years ago announced the rules for allowing eyewitness testimony in the courtroom. Since that time, however, “a vast body of scientific research about human memory has emerged,” Chief Justice Stuart Rabner wrote. “That body of work casts doubt on some commonly held views relating to memory.”

Noting most wrongful convictions in the United States are the result of misidentification, the court said judges should conduct pretrial hearings when there is a question about whether police suggestion influenced the outcome of an identification. The court also said jurors should be given greater instruction about how eyewitness testimony can be influenced.

Public Defender Joseph Krakora, who argued the case before the Supreme Court, praised the decision and said it would help eliminate wrongful convictions based on misidentifications. “I am deeply gratified that the court recognized the validity of over 30 years of scientific research on memory and eyewitness identification.”

The case was based on appeals filed by Larry Henderson, who was convicted in 2004 of manslaughter. Krakora argued police pressured a witness into naming him as an accomplice in the fatal shooting in Camden. Krakora argued the officer displaying an array of photos started moving them around as if he were “nudging” the witness toward Henderson’s photo.

An appellate panel in 2008 reversed Henderson’s conviction. Before the Supreme Court would take up the case, it sent the matter to a special master, retired state appellate judge Geoffrey Gaulkin, to determine whether New Jersey’s identification procedures are flawed. Gaulkin’s 86-page report issued last June concluded police need to change the way they obtain identifications and courts have to treat the identifications in a more scientific fashion.

The decision only affects future cases and the two on which this decision was based.

Towns Must Provide Explanations When Hiring Less Qualified Workers

 

As reported by nj.com, municipalities hiring from a civil service list have to give a “legitimate” reason for skipping over a candidate in favor of one who placed lower in test ranking, the state Supreme Court ruled yesterday.

The 4-2 decision reverses a practice that labor experts said had given too much power to hiring authorities who in the past gave vague reasons for bypassing qualified candidates in favor of family members or those with political connections.

The court ruled in the case of Nicholas Foglio, who was skipped over for a firefighter’s position in Ocean City in 2007. In hiring three firefighters that year, the city picked a bartender and a lifeguard over Foglio, an eight-year volunteer fireman and emergency medical technician in several communities, despite his higher ranking on the civil service test.

The city initially cited the other candidates’ better educational background, but Foglio had the relevant firefighter educational experience. The city then said the other candidates performed better in their interviews, but city officials could not produce any notes or a list of standard questions they asked all the candidates. Finally, the city said the other candidates “best met the needs” of the fire department. The Civil Service Commission upheld the city’s finding, saying it was Foglio’s obligation to prove the city had improper motives, such as age or gender discrimination, in selecting others. An appeals court agreed.

However, the Supreme Court said a “boilerplate” reason is insufficient and the city was obligated to provide to the state Department of Personnel a statement of “legitimate” reasons why Foglio was not selected. “In the absence of such reasons, the appointment is presumably in violation of the principles of merit and fitness and it is the city that bears the burden of justifying its actions,” Justice Virginia Long wrote for the majority.

Dissenting Justices Jaynee LaVecchia and Helen Hoens said the ruling creates a “new rigidity” in hiring practices where the appointing authorities ought to have some discretion to appoint from the top three candidates.

Ocean City’s solicitor, Dorothy McCrosson, declined to comment on the case. She said many of those officials involved in the selection process in 2007 no longer work for the city. The city now has to decide whether to give Foglio a legitimate reason for why he was skipped or it has to give him a job on the fire department.

Officer's Warrantless Entry Into Apartment Justified

 

On July 7, 2009, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided State v. Anthony Bogan, Docket No.: A-7-08. In the case, the Court considered whether, during an investigation into an alleged sexual assault, a police officer’s warrantless entry into an apartment was justified under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement.

In 2004, a receptionist at Passaic Mill Work noticed a young girl outside on the sidewalk crying hysterically. The receptionist invited the girl inside. The girl’s name was Kathleen and she was fourteen years old. Kathleen stated that a person who was supposed to drive her to school had molested her. The police were called and Kathleen informed the officers that she had been offered a ride by a male family friend, later identified as Defendant Anthony Bogan. Instead of taking her to school, Bogan drove Kathleen to an apartment in Clifton, where he lured her into a second-floor apartment and molested her. Kathleen gave a description of Bogan that included his race, age, height, and clothing, and told the officers that while she was inside the apartment a young boy named Wally was there.

Accompanied by Kathleen, three officers proceeded to the apartment. On their arrival, they found parked in front a gray Audi, which Kathleen identified as the car driven by Bogan. The officers rang the bell to the second-floor apartment. They heard an adult-sounding male voice yell from inside the apartment, “Who is it?” The officers identified themselves as police. Wally, who was approximately twelve years old, answered the door in his pajamas. The officers followed Wally up the stairs toward the apartment, asking him if he was home alone. Wally’s response that no one was home was inconsistent with the adult male voice that had responded when they rang the doorbell. At the top of the stairs, with Wally inside the apartment and the officers on the landing outside the doorway, the conversation continued. When officers asked the whereabouts of Wally’s mother, he gave conflicting answers and seemed nervous. The officers thought that Wally might be in danger. When the telephone rang in the kitchen, which was located immediately inside the apartment, Wally picked up the receiver and told the officers that his father was on the phone. One of the officers asked Wally if he could speak with his parent, and Wally responded “certainly.” The officer walked a few steps into the apartment and was handed the receiver by Wally. While on the telephone, the officer was able to see into a bedroom where Bogan was lying on the bottom level of a bunk bed. Bogan fit the description given by Kathleen, and the officer motioned for the other officers to enter the apartment.

An officer read Bogan the Miranda warnings. Bogan identified himself as “Anthony Green.” Another officer, who was on the telephone with Wally’s mother, was told that Anthony Bogan was supposed to be caring for Wally. Upon further questioning, Defendant stated that Bogan was his “maiden name.” While communicating with headquarters, the officers learned that there were multiple arrest warrants for Anthony Bogan. 

 

Defendant was handcuffed and again read his Miranda rights. As he was led from the apartment, Defendant admitted that he had given Kathleen a ride to the apartment in the gray Audi.  He denied touching her, however, and added that he thought she was eighteen years old. Defendant was charged with luring or enticing a child, criminal sexual contact, hindering apprehension, and endangering the welfare of a child. He moved to suppress the statements he made to the police, claiming that because the officers entered the apartment without a warrant, they engaged in an unreasonable search and seizure. Bogan claimed also that he did not knowingly and voluntarily relinquish his Miranda rights.

The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress on both grounds. The court held that the officers were justified in entering the apartment based on the exigent circumstances and community caretaking exceptions to the warrant requirement. Thereafter, a jury convicted Bogan on all charges.

The Appellate Division disagreed with the trial court, suppressed Bogan’s inculpatory statements, and ordered a new trial. It concluded that the police, armed with probable cause, approached the apartment for the purpose of conducting an investigation and should have secured a search warrant before entering the premises. It also held that the issuance of Miranda warnings before Bogan made his incriminating statements did not break the causal chain of events precipitated by the officers’ illegal entry. This appeal ensued.

The Supreme Court held that the police officer’s warrantless entry into the apartment for the purpose of taking the telephone from an unattended child to speak with his parent was justified by the community caretaking doctrine because the officer had a duty to identify a responsible adult for the child to ensure his safety. Because the officer was lawfully on the premises when he observed in plain view Defendant, who fit the suspect’s description, he had a right to direct his fellow officers to question the Defendant. In addition, the Court held that Defendant’s Mirandized statements in response to questioning were properly admitted at trial. As such, the Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstated the convictions.