New Jersey Public Safety Officers Law Blog : New Jersey Public Safety Employee Lawyer & Attorney : Pellettieri, Rabstein & Altman Law Firm : Workers Compensation, Discipline Representation for Police & Firefighters : New Jersey

On June 3, 2010, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Torres Mayfield, Docket No.: A-2969-08T1. In the case, Torres Mayfield appealed from the final decision of the Civil Service Commission (“Commission”) terminating him as an Atlantic City police officer for misconduct.

Mayfield was charged with violations of Atlantic City Police Department Rules and Regulations relating to a domestic dispute involving J.M., who is deaf. In the early morning hours on April 1, 2006, J.M. sought help from police complaining that she was assaulted by her boyfriend, Mayfield. She was bruised and beaten by Mayfield because he thought she was communicating on the computer with an old boyfriend. Mayfield punched her in the face and threatened to hang himself if she left him. That night J.M. was distraught, upset and scared. She was treated in the hospital and photographed.

J.M. eventually dismissed her municipal court charges against Mayfield. She refused to testify at the administrative hearing because Mayfield is the father of her child and they resided together. She was arrested and forced to appear at the administrative hearing. At the hearing, she was defiant and appeared distraught, upset and scared.

During the investigation, Mayfield said that on the night in question he was with Rodney Jamal Armstrong and Ali Cottrell. Mayfield told the investigating detective that when they arrived at his house, J.M. said she was hit by a boot thrown by Mayfield’s son. Armstrong testified he was at a club with Cottrell, but not Mayfield. Armstrong said Mayfield called him telling him and Cottrell about the boot.

The Administrative Law Judge disbelieved the testimony from J.M. that she was struck by a boot. The injuries were not consistent with being struck by a boot, and it was clear to the ALJ that J.M. did not want to contribute to the case against Mayfield. The ALJ found that Mayfield was untruthful by attempting to create an alibi and blame his son. As such, the ALJ found Mayfield assaulted J.M. and was untruthful in his response to the investigation. The Commission adopted the findings of fact made by the ALJ and found the termination of Mayfield as a police officer was justified. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Mayfield contended the administrative decision was not based on legally competent evidence and that, even if the record supports a finding of guilt, his termination was not in accordance with the principles of progressive discipline.  The Appellate Division rejected his arguments and affirmed his termination. Specifically, the Court found that Mayfield failed to demonstrate that the ALJ’s decision was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Moreover, the Court agreed with the ALJ that Mayfield’s offenses in this case were severe enough to warrant his removal despite lack of a substantial prior disciplinary history.

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On December 21, 2009, the Appellate Division decidedIn the Matter of Edwin Garcia, Department of Corrections Hudson County, Docket No.: A-1404-08T3. In the case, Edwin Garcia appeals from the final administrative action of the Civil Service Commission, terminating his employment as a corrections officer with the Hudson County Department of Corrections.

At issue were two disciplinary matters. In the first, the County maintained that Garcia failed to include in a report the fact that another officer had lunged at a handcuffed inmate and grabbed the inmate’s shirt. As a result, the County charged Garcia with insubordination, conduct unbecoming a public employee, neglect of duty, and other sufficient cause. In the second disciplinary matter, the County asserted that, while involved in an incident with an inmate, Garcia used excessive force despite being ordered numerous times to cease. For this incident, Garcia was charged with conduct unbecoming a public employee, neglect of duty, and other sufficient cause. The County sought to terminate Garcia’s employment.

The County held a hearing on the disciplinary charges on March 2, and April 4, 2007, wherein the hearing officer sustained the charges. A final notice of disciplinary action terminating Garcia’s employment was issued on June 7, 2007. Garcia appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission and a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge.

The ALJ sustained both charges, finding, with respect to the first incident, that “Garcia submitted a report omitting the use of excessive force on an inmate” and, with respect to the second incident, that “Garcia used excessive force to subdue inmate E.B. by striking him, although ordered to desist by superior officers.” In the Initial Decision, the ALJ concluded that Garcia had committed conduct unbecoming a public employee, neglect of duty, and insubordination. In light of Garcia’s prior record and the nature of these offenses, the ALJ imposed the sanction of removal. The Commission, in its independent evaluation of the record, concluded that the removal was justified. This appeal ensued.

 On appeal, Garcia argued the findings of the Commission were not justified and the sanction of removal was arbitrary and capricious. The Appellate Division affirmed Garcia’s termination. Specifically, the Court found that there was substantial credible evidence supporting the findings of the ALJ and the conclusions reached by the Commission. The Court also determined the sanction of termination for the infractions is not unreasonable or disproportionate in light of the offenses, particularly when viewed in conjunction with Garcia’s prior disciplinary record.     

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On July 28, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Donald Michelson, Department of Safety, City of Union. In the case, Donald Michelson sought review of the Final Administrative Action of the Merit System Board accepting and adopting the initial decision of the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”). The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that the City of Union had proven its charges of neglect of duty, other sufficient cause, and absence without leave against Michelson and concluded that the penalty of suspension without pay for six (6) work days was reasonable and consistent with progressive discipline.

On October 14, 2005, Michelson, a sergeant in the Union Police Department, was assigned to work in the communication center from 2330 hours to 0730 hours but did not report for duty. The Police Department schedule cycle requires officers to report for duty four days on and three days off per week for three weeks, then report for duty four days on and two days off for one week (called “the short week”). Before 0400 hours, Sergeant Botti, the Desk Officer Supervisor called Michelson to inquire about his absence. Apparently, Michelson mistakenly believed he was on the short week and not scheduled to work that day. He ultimately reported for duty at 0400 hours.

The Police Department charged Michelson with neglect of duty, absence without leave, and other sufficient cause. Due to his absence, which was undisputed, the ALJ determined: (1) the communication center was without supervision for approximately four and one-half hours; and (2) the desk sergeant put aside his regular duties to conduct an inquiry into Michelson’s absence. The ALJ also noted the police department operates as a paramilitary organization and prompt attendance is critical to the efficient operation of the department. The ALJ further found that the six-day suspension comported with the concept of progressive discipline. The ALJ, reasoning that Michelson had no intention to report for duty until Botti called him, rejected Michelson’s contention that he was merely tardy, not absence without leave.   

The ALJ, noting that superior officers such as Michelson must set an example for subordinate officers, also rejected Michelson’s claim that he was subjected to disparate treatment because no other officer had been suspended for arriving late. Additionally, the ALJ concluded that the record was insufficient to support a claim of disparate treatment as it did not contain the prior disciplinary records of the other employees, a factor bearing on the discipline to be imposed. Thus, no reasoned comparison could be made. Consequently, the ALJ affirmed Union’s determination that Michelson be suspended for six (6) days.

On review by the Board, it accepted and adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and found “that the action of the appointing authority in suspending [Michelson] was justified.” Accordingly, it affirmed the action and dismissed Michelson’s appeal. This appeal ensued.

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