Appellate Division Affirms Police Officer's Removal for Misconduct

On June 3, 2010, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Torres Mayfield, Docket No.: A-2969-08T1. In the case, Torres Mayfield appealed from the final decision of the Civil Service Commission (“Commission”) terminating him as an Atlantic City police officer for misconduct.

Mayfield was charged with violations of Atlantic City Police Department Rules and Regulations relating to a domestic dispute involving J.M., who is deaf. In the early morning hours on April 1, 2006, J.M. sought help from police complaining that she was assaulted by her boyfriend, Mayfield. She was bruised and beaten by Mayfield because he thought she was communicating on the computer with an old boyfriend. Mayfield punched her in the face and threatened to hang himself if she left him. That night J.M. was distraught, upset and scared. She was treated in the hospital and photographed.

J.M. eventually dismissed her municipal court charges against Mayfield. She refused to testify at the administrative hearing because Mayfield is the father of her child and they resided together. She was arrested and forced to appear at the administrative hearing. At the hearing, she was defiant and appeared distraught, upset and scared.

During the investigation, Mayfield said that on the night in question he was with Rodney Jamal Armstrong and Ali Cottrell. Mayfield told the investigating detective that when they arrived at his house, J.M. said she was hit by a boot thrown by Mayfield’s son. Armstrong testified he was at a club with Cottrell, but not Mayfield. Armstrong said Mayfield called him telling him and Cottrell about the boot.

The Administrative Law Judge disbelieved the testimony from J.M. that she was struck by a boot. The injuries were not consistent with being struck by a boot, and it was clear to the ALJ that J.M. did not want to contribute to the case against Mayfield. The ALJ found that Mayfield was untruthful by attempting to create an alibi and blame his son. As such, the ALJ found Mayfield assaulted J.M. and was untruthful in his response to the investigation. The Commission adopted the findings of fact made by the ALJ and found the termination of Mayfield as a police officer was justified. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Mayfield contended the administrative decision was not based on legally competent evidence and that, even if the record supports a finding of guilt, his termination was not in accordance with the principles of progressive discipline.  The Appellate Division rejected his arguments and affirmed his termination. Specifically, the Court found that Mayfield failed to demonstrate that the ALJ’s decision was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Moreover, the Court agreed with the ALJ that Mayfield’s offenses in this case were severe enough to warrant his removal despite lack of a substantial prior disciplinary history.

Termination of Corrections Officer Sustained

 

On December 21, 2009, the Appellate Division decidedIn the Matter of Edwin Garcia, Department of Corrections Hudson County, Docket No.: A-1404-08T3. In the case, Edwin Garcia appeals from the final administrative action of the Civil Service Commission, terminating his employment as a corrections officer with the Hudson County Department of Corrections.

At issue were two disciplinary matters. In the first, the County maintained that Garcia failed to include in a report the fact that another officer had lunged at a handcuffed inmate and grabbed the inmate’s shirt. As a result, the County charged Garcia with insubordination, conduct unbecoming a public employee, neglect of duty, and other sufficient cause. In the second disciplinary matter, the County asserted that, while involved in an incident with an inmate, Garcia used excessive force despite being ordered numerous times to cease. For this incident, Garcia was charged with conduct unbecoming a public employee, neglect of duty, and other sufficient cause. The County sought to terminate Garcia’s employment.

The County held a hearing on the disciplinary charges on March 2, and April 4, 2007, wherein the hearing officer sustained the charges. A final notice of disciplinary action terminating Garcia’s employment was issued on June 7, 2007. Garcia appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission and a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge.

The ALJ sustained both charges, finding, with respect to the first incident, that “Garcia submitted a report omitting the use of excessive force on an inmate” and, with respect to the second incident, that “Garcia used excessive force to subdue inmate E.B. by striking him, although ordered to desist by superior officers.” In the Initial Decision, the ALJ concluded that Garcia had committed conduct unbecoming a public employee, neglect of duty, and insubordination. In light of Garcia’s prior record and the nature of these offenses, the ALJ imposed the sanction of removal. The Commission, in its independent evaluation of the record, concluded that the removal was justified. This appeal ensued.

 On appeal, Garcia argued the findings of the Commission were not justified and the sanction of removal was arbitrary and capricious. The Appellate Division affirmed Garcia’s termination. Specifically, the Court found that there was substantial credible evidence supporting the findings of the ALJ and the conclusions reached by the Commission. The Court also determined the sanction of termination for the infractions is not unreasonable or disproportionate in light of the offenses, particularly when viewed in conjunction with Garcia’s prior disciplinary record.     

Suspension of Hudson County Corrections Officer Upheld

 

On August 17, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Juan Melendez, Docket No.: A-4617-07T1. In the case, Juan Melendez, a Hudson County Corrections Officer, appealed from a final administrative determination of the Merit System Board (“Board”) imposing a fifteen-day suspension for neglect of duty and other sufficient cause warranting discipline.

The Board adopted the initial determination of an Administrative Law Judge on a remand following his first determination that the suspension should only be for three days following Hudson County’s suspension of thirty days. On appeal, Melendez argues that: (1) the decision of the Board upholding the charges is not supported by credible evidence in the record; (2) the penalty of a fifteen day suspension is at odds with the concept of progressive discipline and appellant’s prior disciplinary history; and (3) he is entitled to attorneys’ fees based on having prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues.

The testimony before the ALJ revealed that Sgt. Kevin Orlik reported, and testified, that Melendez was asleep at his post in a trailer annexed to the jail on March 19, 2006 when Orlik and other officers arrived to conduct a search of the cells. In his testimony, Orlik testified that when he entered the trailer he “saw Officer Melendez reclined back in a chair with a roll of toilet paper as a pillow or cushion behind his neck,” “his eyes were closed,” and he was “motionless” as he was observed “for approximately a minute to two minutes” until other officers entered the trailer and started to make noise. Melendez testified that he wasn’t sleeping and told that to Orlik when he directed Melendez “to write a report on why [he] was sleeping.” Melendez challenged Orlik’s credibility by noting that his written report omitted details embodied in his testimony.

There was also testimony about the practice of standing when a superior officer enters the room. Melendez did not do so on the night in questions, and testified that it wasn’t a “regular routine” and he generally did not do so. Although the failure to stand was not itself a basis for discipline, it was determined to be relevant to the issue of “attentiveness” at the time, as well as to the ALJ’s finding that the inattentive conduct was a “sufficient cause” for the three-day suspension he initially imposed.

On the remand, despite making credibility determinations against Orlik because of the failure to include certain details in his written report, the ALJ found neglect of duty and “other sufficient cause” for the discipline, and found that “the failure to stand and acknowledge Sgt. Orlik’s when he entered the trailer to constitute being inattentive.”

 

In its opinion, the Board agreed with Melendez that “his failure to stand was not a specific infraction or charge,” but concluded that it constituted “evidence that he was inattentive, which he was charged with,” and “[i]t was the appellant’s inattentiveness that constituted his neglect of duty as it could have resulted in harm to the inmates.”  

The Appellate Division affirmed the determination of the Board in its entirety. The Court agreed with Melendez that the failure to stand when Orlik entered the trailer was neither a basis for the disciplinary charges nor can be a basis by itself for disciplinary action. However, the Court noted that it could be considered by the Board to be part of the overall neglect of the circumstances by Melendez. His response to the entry of a superior officer was relevant to whether he was paying proper attention and was sufficiently attentive to his circumstances. While it may not be a specific violation for not standing when a superior officer entered the trailer, the Court did not disagree that the subject related to Melendez’s “inattentiveness,” and “[i]t was the appellant’s inattentiveness that constituted his neglect of duty as it could have resulted in harm to the inmates.” 

The Court also determined that the discipline imposed cannot be considered “shocking to one’s sense of fairness,” although the Court may have reached a different result. Lastly, the Court found that the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that Melendez did not prevail on “substantially all of the primary issues,” and thereby denying him counsel fees. Some of the charges were sustained and a fifteen-day suspension was imposed on the Board’s review and, therefore, the Court agreed with the Board that Melendez was not entitled to fees despite the reduction of fifteen days of the suspension.

Suspension of Union Police Officer Upheld

 

On July 28, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Donald Michelson, Department of Safety, City of Union. In the case, Donald Michelson sought review of the Final Administrative Action of the Merit System Board accepting and adopting the initial decision of the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”). The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that the City of Union had proven its charges of neglect of duty, other sufficient cause, and absence without leave against Michelson and concluded that the penalty of suspension without pay for six (6) work days was reasonable and consistent with progressive discipline.

On October 14, 2005, Michelson, a sergeant in the Union Police Department, was assigned to work in the communication center from 2330 hours to 0730 hours but did not report for duty. The Police Department schedule cycle requires officers to report for duty four days on and three days off per week for three weeks, then report for duty four days on and two days off for one week (called “the short week”). Before 0400 hours, Sergeant Botti, the Desk Officer Supervisor called Michelson to inquire about his absence. Apparently, Michelson mistakenly believed he was on the short week and not scheduled to work that day. He ultimately reported for duty at 0400 hours.

The Police Department charged Michelson with neglect of duty, absence without leave, and other sufficient cause. Due to his absence, which was undisputed, the ALJ determined: (1) the communication center was without supervision for approximately four and one-half hours; and (2) the desk sergeant put aside his regular duties to conduct an inquiry into Michelson’s absence. The ALJ also noted the police department operates as a paramilitary organization and prompt attendance is critical to the efficient operation of the department. The ALJ further found that the six-day suspension comported with the concept of progressive discipline. The ALJ, reasoning that Michelson had no intention to report for duty until Botti called him, rejected Michelson’s contention that he was merely tardy, not absence without leave.   

The ALJ, noting that superior officers such as Michelson must set an example for subordinate officers, also rejected Michelson’s claim that he was subjected to disparate treatment because no other officer had been suspended for arriving late. Additionally, the ALJ concluded that the record was insufficient to support a claim of disparate treatment as it did not contain the prior disciplinary records of the other employees, a factor bearing on the discipline to be imposed. Thus, no reasoned comparison could be made. Consequently, the ALJ affirmed Union’s determination that Michelson be suspended for six (6) days.

On review by the Board, it accepted and adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and found “that the action of the appointing authority in suspending [Michelson] was justified.” Accordingly, it affirmed the action and dismissed Michelson’s appeal. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Michelson contended that the Board erred in concluding that he was absent without leave and urges that the agency erred in failing to consider disparate treatment in this case. After reviewing the record, the Appellate Division affirmed the determination by the Board. Specifically, the Court determined the findings and conclusions of the agency were supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record. As such, Michelson’s six (6) working day suspension was upheld.

Termination of Police Officer Arising from Substance Abuse Upheld

On April 15, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Cornelius Caruso, Docket No.: A-1612-07T1. In the case, Cornelius Caruso appealed his termination as police officer in the City of Orange Police Department.

Caruso became a police officer in 2000. In 2005, he began to experience serious problems related to his use of alcohol. He voluntarily entered a program at the Carrier Clinic in December 2005. When he did so, he failed to follow the Department’s requirement that he notify the communication supervisor and apply for a leave of absence. No charges were filed with respect to that omission.

Caruso left the Carrier Clinic in March 2006. He was found by the Department to be fit for duty and returned to work on April 1, 2006. Caruso was instructed to make periodic reports concerning his recovery, which instruction was confirmed in a letter from the City’s attorney to Caruso’s attorney. No such periodic reports were ever made.

The Department permits fifteen days of sick leave per year. The Department assessed Caruso for use of 2006 sick leave only during the period from January 1 to January 10, 2006. The period from January 11 to March 31, 2006, was charged as a combination of administrative and compensatory leave. After Caruso’s return to duty in April, he went out on sick leave from April 6 to April 18; May 10 to July 7; October 25 to November 4; and December 12 to the end of 2006. Consequently, by December 2006, Caruso had taken significantly more sick leave than was permitted by the Department.

On December 12, 2006, Caruso left work because of an eye infection. However, according to Caruso, his problem with alcohol use returned in December 2006. On December 22, 2006, Caruso left his home and traveled to Hazelden, a rehabilitation clinic located in Minnesota. He again failed to notify the communications supervisor, although others apparently notified one of his superiors who subsequently contacted Caruso and arranged for him to surrender his service weapon. Caruso also failed to complete the required form for a leave of absence.

As a result, on January 18, 2007, the City filed formal disciplinary charges against Caruso. The disciplinary charges were as follows: (1) performance of duty; (2) insubordination; (3) obedience to laws and rules; and (4) abuse of sick leave. 

Caruso left Hazelden and returned to New Jersey on January 19, 2007. He started intensive outpatient aftercare on January 23, 2007, which required his attendance at a program for four hours a day, four days per week, as well as attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous sessions.

 

On January 25, 2007, Caruso attended a meeting at the Department, at which time he was served with the notice of discipline and preliminarily suspended. On February 12, 2007, Caruso was terminated pursuant to a final notice of disciplinary action. 

Caruso appealed to the Merit System Board, which referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested case. A hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) in August 2007. The ALJ’s initial decision upheld Caruso’ removal, sustaining three of the four charges in the City’s notice of discipline. The Board adopted the ALJ’s decision and upheld the termination. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Caruso argued the Board’s decision “was not based on credible evidence in the record and was not consistent with case law” and that the termination was an excessive penalty. The Appellate Division disagreed. The Court upheld the Board’s decision in its entirety, including Caruso’s termination. Specifically, the Court noted the City complied with certain requirements delineated in the case law and previous decisions when it permitted Caruso to take the leave of absence for the Carrier Clinic. In addition, the Court noted that there was no basis to overturn the City’s decision that termination was an appropriate penalty. 

The case illustrates the importance of a New Jersey public safety officer being cognizant of the policies and procedures of his/her department in the event a leave of absence is necessitated by substance abuse.  In the event the requisite policies and procedures are not adhered to, missing time from employment could lead to the imposition of disciplinary charges and possible termination from employment.