Lawsuit Alleges New Jersey Sergeant Promotional Exams are Badly Biased

Posted on January 8, 2010 by Donald Barbati

 

As reported in the Trentonian on January 8, 2010, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the State of New Jersey alleging that New Jersey’s widespread use of a written exam to promote police sergeants discriminates against blacks and Hispanics. The lawsuit, filed in federal court in Newark, accuses New Jersey of civil rights violations for using a written exam in which black and Hispanic candidates scored significantly and consistently lower than their white counterparts.

Moreover, according to the complaint, even when minority candidates passed the test, they were not promoted as often as white candidates because their scores were lower and promotions were granted first to those with the highest scores and most seniority. Significantly, the Department of Justice has not taken issue with using seniority as a factor for promotions. As such, the lawsuit seeks to stop New Jersey from continuing to use the exam and asks the court to order it to offer relief to officers “harmed” by the exam by extending them promotions, back pay and retroactive seniority.

Test scores from 2000 to 2008 reviewed by the Justice Department showed that 89 percent of the white candidates who took the exam passed, compared to 77 percent of Hispanics and 73 percent of black candidates. With the exception of the New Jersey State Police, most law enforcement agencies across the state use the exam.

“This complaint should send a clear message to all public employers that employment practices with unlawful discriminatory impact on account of race or national origin will not be tolerated,” said Thomas Perez, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division. “The Justice Department will take all necessary action to ensure that such discriminatory practices are eliminated and that the victims of such practices are made whole.”

In a similar case, a federal judge in July sided with the Justice Department in ruling that New York City had discriminated against minorities in its hiring of firefighters, causing blacks and Hispanics to comprise only 10 percent of the fire department’s work force, even though most city residents are minorities.

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Civil Service Commission's Denial of Appeal Upheld

Posted on November 4, 2009 by Donald Barbati

 

On November 4, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Michael Curtin, Battalion Fire Chief (PM3593G), Elizabeth, Docket No.: A-4861-07T2. In the case, Michael Curtin appealed from the decision of the former Merit System Board (“Board”), now the New Jersey Civil Service Commission (“Commission”), denying his appeal of the scoring of his promotional examination as well as the Commission’s decision again denying the appeal following remand for consideration of supplemental information.

Curtin is employed by the Elizabeth Fire Department with the rank of captain. He took the Department of Personnel’s examination for the position of battalion fire chief, and received an overall score of 89.270. He was ranked third on the eligible list. He appealed the scoring of the oral portions of the examination to the Board. In a five-page decision dated October 11, 2007, the Board denied the appeal.

Curtis appealed to the Appellate Division. On April 14, 2009, in response to Curtin’s motion to supplement the record, the Appellate Division remanded the matter temporarily to the Commission, which had replaced the Board as of June 30, 2008, for consideration of the arguments raised in Curtin’s motion. Following its review of Curtin’s additional arguments and documents, the Commission issued its remand decision on August 20, 2009, again denying the appeal. As a result, the Court permitted Curtin to supplement his brief on appeal.

The Appellate Division noted that the burden is on a petitioner, not the Commission, when challenging the administration and scoring of examination. Moreover, when reviewing examinations, the Commission shall decide any appeal on the written record or such other proceeding as the Board deems appropriate. Finally, the Court indicated that courts should defer to an agency’s grading of a civil service examination except in the most exceptional of circumstances that disclose a clear abuse of discretion.

Applying these principles, the Court was satisfied that the Commission’s decision on the remand was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The Commission duly re-evaluated the Board’s original decision in light of Curtin’s additional arguments and explained its reasons for disagreeing with his position. Moreover, the Court noted that it was not its role to second-guess the Commission with respect to the scoring of civil service examination and this case does not present “the most exceptional of circumstances that disclose a clear abuse of discretion” warranting such interference.

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Promotional Examination Results Remanded in Light of USERRA

Posted on October 12, 2009 by Donald Barbati

 

On October 5, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of John Fasanella, Docket No.: A-4455-07T1. In the case, John Fasanella, a sheriff’s officer in Mercer County, appealed a decision of the Merit System Board (“Board”) upholding adverse administrative determinations regarding a promotional examination for lieutenant.

The promotional examination for lieutenant was announced with a closing date of December 21, 2004. Fasanella was one of the nine individuals who applied for and were admitted to that examination. The examination was conducted in written form on June 9, 2005, however, Fasanella, who was on active military duty from May 12, 2004 to June 25, 2006, was unavailable to take the examination on the date it was given.

The June 9, 2005 examination resulted in a four-name eligibles list, promulgated on September 29, 2005, with an expiration date of September 28, 2008. The first-ranked person on that list, a non-veteran, was appointed effective December 1, 2005.

On July 24, 2006, shortly after Fasanella’s return from active military duty, the Department of Military and Veterans Affairs granted his application for veteran’s status. He made several requests of the Department of Personnel (“DOP”) to schedule his make-up examination for the lieutenant position. His examination occurred in June 2007. A memorandum from DOP, dated September 10, 2007, noted an “employment list change” with Fasanella ranked first on the list with veteran’s status. An October 15, 2007 memorandum from the Sheriff’s Office to Fasanella advised that the ranking had been modified as “for future certifications only.” Fasanella promptly filed his internal appeal from the latter determination.     

Subsequently, DOP notified Fasanella that his veteran’s status designation had been incorrect and that the eligibles list had been corrected to reflect his rank on the then-existing list as “A1 non-veteran.” Fasanella appealed that decision.

In considering the issues raised in the two appeals, the Board rejected Fasanella’s contention that he was entitled to the lieutenant appointment because he was, ultimately, first on the eligibles list and had veteran’s status. The Board determined that Fasanella did not qualify for veteran’s status at the time the list was certified. The Board also decided that the latitude conferred on the appointing authority by operation of the “rule of three” validated the appointment of the person who had been designated, notwithstanding that he was second on the list after Fasanella’s name had been added.  This appeal ensued.

 

On appeal, Fasanella argues that: (1) the eligible list resulting from the initial examination should have been conditional pending his return from the active military service; (2) his name should have been added to the eligibles list as first-ranked following the result of the make-up examination; and (3) he was entitled to veteran’s status in that listing.

The Appellate Division agreed with the Board that Fasanella was not entitled to veteran’s status on the eligibles list since when he qualified for the examination, Fasanella had not yet engaged in his active military service. However, the Court remanded this matter to the Board for a determination of Fasanella’s rights in light of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). On remand, the Board must determine what the promotions result would have been or should have been if the choice had been properly made from the superseding list on which Fasanella’s name appeared as first-ranked, without veteran’s status, subject to the rule of three.
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Candidate Properly Bypassed Under Rule of Three

Posted on June 18, 2009 by Donald Barbati

 

On June 18, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Andre Ruiz, Firefighter (M2271E), City of Camden, Docket No.: A-2611-07T2. In the case, Andrte Ruiz appealed the Final Administrative Action of the Merit System Board (“Board”) issued on October 11, 2007, concluding that the City of Camden (“City”) properly bypassed Ruiz under the “Rule of Three.” Ruiz also appeals from the Board’s January 22, 2008 Final Administrative Action denying his petition for reconsideration.

On October 3, 2005, the Department of Personnel (“DOP”) issued Certification Number Ol052133 to the City respecting open-competitive lists M2013A and M2271E containing the names of 150 eligible candidates for the position of firefighter. Ruiz was on list M2271E. The City returned the certification in March 2006 proposing the removal of several names, including that of Ruiz, ranked thirty-sixth, on the ground that he failed to meet the City’s residency requirements. On April 3, 2006, the City appointed thirty-five eligible candidates to the position of firefighter while the propriety of the proposed removals was still pending before the DOP.

On January 18, 2007, the Board determined that the City had failed to establish that Ruiz and five other eligible candidates, including Ruiz’s brother who resided at the same address as Ruiz, did not reside in the City. As such, the Board ordered the City to either produce sufficient documentation to support removal of the six eligible candidates based on non-residency, appoint them, or produce adequate justification for bypassing them or removing them on other grounds within sixty (60) days. 

On March 14, 2007, the City responded to the Board’s January 18, 2007 decision by submitting additional documentation to the DOP seeking to establish that Ruiz and the five other eligible candidates did not meet the City’s residency requirements. Thereafter, on April 3, 2006, the City notified the DOP that it had used the Rule of Three to appoint thirty-five eligible candidates to the position of firefighter. Despite stating it employed the Rule of Three, the City represented that no eligible candidates had been bypassed and appointments had been made through eligible candidate No. 74. The City sought entry of an order that it had properly disposed of open-competitive lists M2013A and M2271E.

On March 20, 2007, the DOP issued a disposition-deficiency notice to the City, notifying it that the reasons it had submitted for removal of Ruiz and two other eligible candidates, including Ruiz’s brother, based upon non-residency were not acceptable. It permitted the City to bypass two of the three eligible candidates provided the City submitted a short, written positive statement explaining why other lower or equally ranked eligible candidates were appointed. However, it required that the City appoint one of the three eligible candidates.

 

In the meantime, open-competitive list M2271E was scheduled to expire on June 20, 2007, and the DOP Director of Selection Services requested that the expiration date be extended until new employment lists could be issued based on a new examination. The Board extended the expiration date and, pursuant to that extension, the City appointed Ruiz’s brother, the highest ranked of the three remaining candidates as a firefighter. 

Subsequently, on July 26, 2007, Ruiz filed a notice of appeal and petition for enforcement of the January 18, 2007, final agency action. He alleged that thirty-five eligible candidates had been appointed and that the City had failed to comply with the Board’s requirements for either adequate documentation of nonresidency or justification for removal or bypass. He further alleged that the City had appointed thirty-five firefighters, but had failed to appoint him.

On October 11, 2007, the Board issued its Final Administrative Action on Ruiz’s notice of appeal and petition for enforcement. The Board concluded that N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.4(c) and N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b)(4) placed the burden of proof on Ruiz to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the City’s decision to bypass him was improper. The Board found that Ruiz had not even alleged “a specific improper reason underlying the appointing authority’s bypass of his name” and found that the City had fully complied with the Board’s January 18, 2007 decision. Accordingly, the Board found that the current disposition of the certification, including the bypass of Ruiz’s name, was in compliance with its prior decision and the Rule of Three. Thereafter, Ruiz filed a petition for reconsideration, which the Board ultimately found to be without merit. This appeal ensued.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision in determining that Ruiz failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the Board’s actions were arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. First, the Court found that all of the issues raised by Ruiz on appeal were not properly before the Court. Specifically, Ruiz’s time to appeal the January 18, 2007 Final Administrative Action expired ling before his July 26, 2007 notice of appeal and petition for enforcement. Second, the Court explained that any expectation that Ruiz had of mandatory appointment was defeated by the possibility of being bypassed that the Board specifically permitted on January 18, 2007, a final agency action from which Ruiz did not appeal. Further, as the Board observed, there is no evidence that Ruiz was not considered by the City when it selected the most qualified of the three remaining eligible candidates.
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Non-Civil Service Municipality's Promotion Decision Overturned

Posted on November 18, 2008 by Frank Crivelli

 

On November 17, 2008, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the case of Borough v. Glassboro v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 108,  A-75-07. In this case, the Court addressed the validity of an arbitrator’s award addressing the legality of a police officer promotion made by the Borough of Glassboro, a non-civil service municipality.

In 2004, the Borough of Glassboro Police Department (“Borough”) announced an opening for the position of lieutenant. Three candidates applied, including Sergeants Peter Amico and William Highley. As a non-civil service municipality, the Borough is not subject to the statutory requirements of a comprehensive promotional procedure. Rather, state law only requires that due consideration is given to the officer proposed for promotion and to the length and merit of the officer’s service, with preference being given to seniority in service.

The Borough implemented a three stage promotional procedure. The scores from Phase I and II were aggregated for a total possible score of 100%. Phase I consisted of an interview with the Borough Chief of Police and was worth 20%. Phase II involved an oral and written exam and was worth 80%. Phase IIA, the written portion, was a multiple-choice test designed by the International Association of Police Chiefs. Phase IIB, the oral component, consisted of interviews with a panel of four independent police chiefs. Following Phase I and II, the cumulative final scores were as follows: Sergeant Amico, 93.8, and Sergeant Highley, 92.4.

In Phase III, each applicant was interviewed by the Borough Public Safety Committee, which included Borough Council members, the Borough Administrator, and the Chief of Police. Candidates were advised that they would be asked questions “concerning their department’s SOPs Rules and Regulations, in addition to questions concerning the Boro Personnel Policy & Procedures and Boro Ordinances.” The purpose of Phase III was to test leadership intangibles that are necessary for the position and evade formal testing. After the completion of Phase III, Highley, ranked second in the Phase I and II testing, was awarded the promotion.

Amico learned in subsequent conversations with the Chief of Police and the Borough Administrator that his move out of the Borough had a possible negative effect on the promotional decision. The Fraternal Order of Police, Local 108 (“FOP”) filed a grievance on Amico’s behalf, thereby claiming: (1) that the use of Phase III as more than a “confirmatory interview” altered the terms and conditions of employment in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the Borough and FOP; and (2) the Borough violated N.J.S.A. 40A:14-122.6 by making residency a factor in its promotional decision.

 

The matter was ultimately submitted to arbitration after the grievance was unable to be resolved. The arbitrator concluded that Amico was improperly deprived of the promotion contrary to statute and that he should be promoted with full back pay. In making his ruling, the arbitrator noted that Amico, whose education and seniority were greater than Highley’s, was 1.4 points ahead of Highley after Phases I and II, but then fell behind following the Phase III interview. The arbitrator also pointed out that there was nothing in the record to positively determine what elements in that interview caused Amico to fall behind Highley. The arbitrator further surmised from the testimony that Amico had recently moved away from the Borough and that a non-civil service municipality can only use residency in a tiebreaker on the promotional test, which was not the case here.

Thereafter, the Borough filed a complaint in the Superior Court, wherein the arbitrator’s award was stayed pending the outcome of the case. In the complaint, the Borough alleged: (1) that it had placed substantial evidence in the record noting what occurred during the Phase III interview; and (2) the arbitrator disregarded the testimony of the Borough Administrator, the Police Chief, and all the Phase III documentation referenced during the arbitration. Attached to the complaint were two pages of questions asked of each candidate in Phase III, as well as the Chief’s corresponding notes concerning each candidate’s answers.

The trial judge denied the Borough’s motion to vacate the arbitrator’s award or to hold a plenary hearing. In so holding, the judge noted that so long as the arbitrator’s determination is reasonably debatable it should not be disturbed. Accordingly, the judge affirmed the arbitrator’s award, but granted the Borough’s motion for a stay pending appeal. 

The Appellate Division affirmed on appeal, essentially because it agreed with the arbitrator and the trial judge that the record was bare regarding the Borough’s reasoning for elevating Highley over Amico, thereby rendering the promotion of Highley arbitrary and capricious. The Borough appealed and the Supreme Court granted certification.

The Supreme Court held the arbitrator properly determined that the record did not adequately support the elevation of Highley over Amico. However, the Court did indicate it was beyond the arbitrator’s power to fashion a remedy that promoted Amico. Therefore, the judgment of Appellate Division was affirmed and reversed in part and the case was remanded for proceedings consistent with its holding.

In support, the Court noted that an arbitrator must uphold a non-civil service municipality’s promotion decision unless the decision was clearly arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, since judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision is limited and the decision should not be set aside easily. The New Jersey Arbitration Act permits courts to vacate an arbitration award in only limited defined circumstances. In addition, a court may vacate an arbitration award that is contrary to existing law or public policy as embodied in legislative enactments, administrative regulations, or legal precedents.

After reviewing the record in this case, the Court agreed with the arbitrator’s decision. The Court noted that the arbitrator’s conclusion that the record shows no reasoning by the Borough for elevating Highley is unassailable. The Court further noted this case stands for the unremarkable proposition that, should a grievant make the type of showing that Amico made here, and should the municipality not provide even the simplest explanation on the record for some kind of rational reason for its decision, the decision cannot stand. 

The Court also indicated that the Legislature, through statue, clearly established residence as a tie-breaker in non-civil service municipalities. However, in this case, there was no tie after the first two phases, simply out, Amico was ahead of Highley. Moreover, the Court also noted that if the record was inadequate regarding how Highley passed Amico during Phase III, it was equally deficient in respect of Amico’s leadership skills and how, upon testing, he lost his lead. Therefore, it was beyond the arbitrator’s power to fashion a remedy that promoted Amico and, thus, the matter must be remanded to the Borough to conduct a new Phase III proceeding.
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BOROUGH'S PROMOTIONAL PROCESS UPHELD

Posted on November 10, 2008 by Frank Crivelli

 

In the matter of Paul Weber v. Borough of Glen Rock, A-1079-07T3, Plaintiff, Paul Weber, appealed from two trial court orders: (1) an order dated May 3, 2006 dismissing some of his claims; and (2) an order dated September 5, 2007 granting summary judgment to defendants on the balance of the claims. After reviewing the contentions raised on appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s determinations. 

Weber is a member of the Glen Rock Police Department. After joining the Department as a patrolman in 1978, he was promoted to the rank of sergeant in 1985. Since 1985, there have been four occasions when there was an opening within the Department for a member to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant. Weber applied for this promotion on each occasion and was unsuccessful. 

In 2004, the successful applicant was Garret Merselis, who was promoted from sergeant to lieutenant. In 2005, a vacancy developed for the position of captain. Thereafter, Merselis, the only lieutenant on the Glen Rock force at that time, was promoted to the rank of captain. The promotion of Merselis to captain created a vacancy for the position of lieutenant. Plaintiff applied, as did three other members of the Department. On this occasion, Frederick Stahman was selected for promotion to the rank of lieutenant.

Plaintiff, who had more seniority than did either Merselis or Stahman at the time of their respective promotions, filed suit contending that the promotional process was flawed. Specifically, he sought to reopen the process relating to the most recent promotional opening. In support, Weber contended: (1) the Borough was required to administer examinations to those applying for promotion and not rely exclusively on interviews; and (2) the Borough, in passing him over for promotion, did not comply with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-129. 

The Court rejected both of Weber’s assertions. The Borough is not a civil service municipality and followed its own two-step promotional process, a written test followed by interviews, until 1992 when, under the new police chief, only interviews were used to select a candidate for promotion to lieutenant. The Court found that where all members of the committee participated in the interviews of all the candidates, the process employed by Glen Rock does not suffer from the same deficiencies criticized in Rox v. Dep’t of Civil Service, 141 N.J. Super. 463, 467 (App. Div. 1976). In Rox, different panels interviewed the various candidates and used different criteria in making promotional decisions. This was not the situation in this case.

Moreover, the Court held that seniority, in and of itself, is not determinative of promotion. The Court indicated seniority is merely an additional factor to be considered on the merits of the evaluation of individuals for promotion and not a mechanical rule which guarantees promotion to a senior employee. In this case, it was established Weber’s seniority was considered. That is all he was entitled to; he was not entitled to have it treated as controlling.          

         

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Promotional Guarantee Can Violate Rule of Three

Posted on October 7, 2008 by Frank Crivelli

 In the Matter of Martinez, A-0090-07T2, the Appellate Division held a civil service appointing authority violates the Rule of Three, N.J.S.A. 11A:4-8, in guaranteeing a promotional candidate that he or she will receive the appointment if he or she attains the highest score on the examination. 

 

After taking the civil service examination for promotion to deputy fire chief on March 30, 2006, appellant Kenneth Martinez, a fire captain in Passaic, was ranked first among the eligible nonveterans. A promotional list listing Martinez first was promulgated by the State Department of Personnel on June 22, 2006. However, the City was separately arranging for another candidate, Captain Christopher Szczygiel, to receive the promotion. The City had previously bypassed Szczygiel and appointed lower-ranked individuals to the rank of captain, causing Szczygiel to file an administrative appeal before the Merit System Board, as well as a civil action in the Law Division. 

 

A settlement of Szczygiel’s litigation was attained and on January 31, 2007, the Board issued a final decision approving the proposed settlement terms that the parties had disclosed it. Although it was not disclosed to the Board at the time, the settlement terms would allow Szczygiel to compete for the deputy chief position. In fact, the settlement guaranteed Szczygiel appointment to deputy chief, so long as his exam grade proved to be higher than that of anyone else who sat for the exam. 

 

Following the Board’s approval of the settlement, the Department of Personnel graded Szczygiel’s exam and determined that he had the highest score. It then generated a new promotional list for deputy chief ranking Szczygiel first and Martinez second. Thereafter, the City appointed Szczygiel deputy chief on April 1, 2007. 

 

Martinez filed an administrative appeal, contending that the Board’s ratification of the settlement, and the City’s actions in guaranteeing Szczygiel the appointment, violated the longstanding “Rule of Three” principle of New Jersey Civil Service Law, as well as the merit and fitness clause of the state constitution. On July 27, 2007, the Board rejected Martinez’s challenge and this appeal followed.

 

On appeal, Judge Sabatino opined that the guarantee in the Szczygiel was troublesome because it provided that Szczygiel would receive the promotion to deputy chief so long as he scored first on the promotional exam. The Board was not informed of the guarantee prior to its January 31, 2007 approval, final determination of Martinez’s appeal, nor was the guarantee disclosed to Martinez, who had every right to expect that the normal selection processes under the Rule of Three would be observed.

 

In addition, the Court stated it is doubtful that the Legislature wished to allow municipalities to dispense with the Rule of Three and reach agreements with applicants guaranteeing them a position if they scored high enough on an exam. Such individualized guarantees run contrary to the objectives of the civil service system and also deviate from the Rule of Three’s aim to include “other merit criteria” in the selection process.

 

This decision reinforces the importance for an appointing authority to follow the requisite procedures in granting promotions. The Rule of Three, much like other required procedures, cannot be usurped in favor of settlement agreements which undermine the goals of the Civil Service System, namely a fair and objective selection process based on merit and other criteria. 

         

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