BOROUGH'S PROMOTIONAL PROCESS UPHELD

 

In the matter of Paul Weber v. Borough of Glen Rock, A-1079-07T3, Plaintiff, Paul Weber, appealed from two trial court orders: (1) an order dated May 3, 2006 dismissing some of his claims; and (2) an order dated September 5, 2007 granting summary judgment to defendants on the balance of the claims. After reviewing the contentions raised on appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s determinations. 

Weber is a member of the Glen Rock Police Department. After joining the Department as a patrolman in 1978, he was promoted to the rank of sergeant in 1985. Since 1985, there have been four occasions when there was an opening within the Department for a member to be promoted to the rank of lieutenant. Weber applied for this promotion on each occasion and was unsuccessful. 

In 2004, the successful applicant was Garret Merselis, who was promoted from sergeant to lieutenant. In 2005, a vacancy developed for the position of captain. Thereafter, Merselis, the only lieutenant on the Glen Rock force at that time, was promoted to the rank of captain. The promotion of Merselis to captain created a vacancy for the position of lieutenant. Plaintiff applied, as did three other members of the Department. On this occasion, Frederick Stahman was selected for promotion to the rank of lieutenant.

Plaintiff, who had more seniority than did either Merselis or Stahman at the time of their respective promotions, filed suit contending that the promotional process was flawed. Specifically, he sought to reopen the process relating to the most recent promotional opening. In support, Weber contended: (1) the Borough was required to administer examinations to those applying for promotion and not rely exclusively on interviews; and (2) the Borough, in passing him over for promotion, did not comply with N.J.S.A. 40A:14-129. 

The Court rejected both of Weber’s assertions. The Borough is not a civil service municipality and followed its own two-step promotional process, a written test followed by interviews, until 1992 when, under the new police chief, only interviews were used to select a candidate for promotion to lieutenant. The Court found that where all members of the committee participated in the interviews of all the candidates, the process employed by Glen Rock does not suffer from the same deficiencies criticized in Rox v. Dep’t of Civil Service, 141 N.J. Super. 463, 467 (App. Div. 1976). In Rox, different panels interviewed the various candidates and used different criteria in making promotional decisions. This was not the situation in this case.

Moreover, the Court held that seniority, in and of itself, is not determinative of promotion. The Court indicated seniority is merely an additional factor to be considered on the merits of the evaluation of individuals for promotion and not a mechanical rule which guarantees promotion to a senior employee. In this case, it was established Weber’s seniority was considered. That is all he was entitled to; he was not entitled to have it treated as controlling.          

         

Policy of Progressive Discipline Circumvented/Dismissal of Officer Upheld

 

In the case of In the Matter of Carpenito, Sergeant Vincent Capenito appealed a final agency decision dismissing him from the Division of State Police. The Appellate Division sustained Carpenito’s dismissal and rejected his contention that the policy of progressive discipline required a less severe sanction.

On March 24, 2006, Carpenito was charged with five disciplinary infractions of the rules and regulations of the Division of State Police. The case was eventually transferred to the Office of Administrative Law as contested matter. A seven day hearing was conducted by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), who issued an initial decision finding Carpenito guilty of the charges against him and recommending his termination of employment. Thereafter, Colonel Joseph Fuentes, Superintendent of the State Police, adopted the findings of the ALJ and dismissed Carpenito from the Division. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Carpenito argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the findings that he engaged in conduct that warranted discipline; and (2) the sanction of dismissal was inconsistent with the general policy of progressive discipline. The Court, in rejecting Carpenito’s arguments, found that the Superintendent’s determination that Carpenito left his post while on duty and lied to investigators was based on Carpenito’s own admissions and, therefore, Carpenito’s contention that he was denied his right to cross-examine his wife because of her invocation of her Fifth Amendment right was of no consequence. 

Moreover, the Court found the Superintendent was entirely justified in terminating Carpenito’s employment due to the seriousness of the misconduct. The Court held that the Superintendent properly: (1) recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished record and; (2) considered Carpenito’s prior disciplinary history and numerous occasions of alleged domestic disputes. As a result, the Court determined the application of progressive discipline was not appropriate in light of Carpenito’s egregious conduct.

This case illustrates an instance of where a general policy of progressive discipline will not be adhered to by a public employer. Should a disciplinary infraction be very serious in nature, a policy of progressive discipline can and will be abandoned so as to ensure a proper disciplinary response. This outcome should be noted by all public safety officers who intend to rely upon their employer’s policy of progressive discipline when contesting a disciplinary action. The seriousness of the misconduct, along with prior disciplinary history, may be used to circumvent a policy of progressive discipline and, therefore, may impose more serious consequences upon an officer than originally anticipated.