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As reported by nj.com, complaints against New Jersey State Police troopers for everything from excessive force to minor paperwork violations fell for the fourth year in a row in 2010, but more troopers faced the most serious allegations of misconduct, a new report shows. The public and other officers filed 848 complaints against troopers in 2010, down from 886 in 2009 and the fewest of any year during the past decade, according to the report, issued late last week by the division’s Office of Professional Standards.

The complaints spawned misconduct investigations of 437 troopers, the most since 2006. With only about half of these 290 investigations against the troopers completed, 62 charges were substantiated, also the most since 2006, according to the report and past statistics. The State Police did not identify the troopers involved or elaborate on their infractions. The report also said that the division received 1,137 citizen compliments last year thanking troopers for their work.

Christopher Burgos, the newly-elected president of the State Troopers Fraternal Association, said the numbers were impressive given that troopers had more than two million encounters with citizens in 2010. “Put us against any agency out there, and no one’s under the scrutiny we are,” Burgos said. “The high performance and professionalism far excels any other agency out there. But we take seriously what goes on with disciplinary matters and will defend our members appropriately.”  

The American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey said it was still reviewing the report but criticized the division for not including the race or ethnicity of those who filed complaints, the number of pending cases from prior years or the number of punishments handed down by the type of complaint. Deborah Jacobs, president of the ACLU, said it will be hard to draw any conclusions from the report because it is too vague. “Unfortunately, the state provides less and less information to the public about the State Police rather than more and more,” Jacobs said. “We’re also very concerned that it took a full calendar year to release.”

Lieutenant Stephen Jones, a spokesman for the State Police, said the report included the same information as it always has in the past. He said it came out late in the year because the office was more focused on closing outstanding cases. Jones also said a higher percentage of complaints are being generated internally, which shows the division is better policing itself.

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On July 20, 2010, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Latief Dickerson, Hudson County, Docket No.: A-1323-08T2. In the case, Latief Dickerson appealed from a final decision of the Civil Service Commission (“Commission”) terminating his employment as a corrections officer with the Hudson County Department of Corrections (“Department”).

On May 5, 2006, the Department served a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action on Dickerson charging him with: (1) incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties; (2) insubordination; (3) conduct unbecoming an employee; and (4) neglect of duty. These charges stemmed from Dickerson’s failure to satisfy mandatory training requirements and to obtain permission for his outside employment, as well as his arrest in Tuxedo, New York for various motor vehicle violations and criminal possession of a firearm.

Following a departmental hearing, Dickerson received a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action on July 19, 2006, finding him guilty of the charges and ordering his removal from office effective immediately. Dickerson contested the decision and requested a hearing before the Office of Administrative Law. That hearing was held on January 2 and March 12, 2008, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).

After the hearings, the ALJ determined that the Department failed to sustain its burden in sustaining the charges against Dickerson with the exception of conduct unbecoming a public employee by driving a motor vehicle while unlicensed. However, given Dickerson’s extensive prior disciplinary history, the ALJ ordered that Dickerson be fined 90 working days’ pay.

The Commission, upon its de novo review of the record, disagreed with the ALJ’s decision and upheld the Department’s decision to terminate Dickerson’s employment. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Dickerson argued that the Commission erred in failing to affirm the decision of the ALJ. Specifically, Dickerson contended that the Commission imposed an improper standard of review when it stated that it did not “agree” with the ALJ’s determination. Rather, Dickerson argued the Commission has the authority to modify or reverse the decision of the ALJ if the decision was not supported by credible evidence in the record or was otherwise arbitrary.

After considering Dickerson’s arguments, the Appellate Division affirmed the Commission’s determination and sustained the removal. The Court found the Commission’s decision comported with the applicable law regarding the review of ALJ decisions and was supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. Specifically, the Court found, in rejecting and modifying the ALJ’s findings and conclusions, the Commission stated with particularity the reasons for doing so and made new findings supported by competent and credible evidence in the record.

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On September 8, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Sergeant Maryelyn Conway, Docket No.: A-6162-07T3. In the case, Sergeant Maryelyn Conway appeals from an administrative determination of the New Jersey Transit Police Department suspending her for a period of four days for two related minor disciplinary infractions.

On the night of December 13, 2004, a car crashed onto an embankment above the New Jersey Transit train tracks in Waldwick. The vehicle was in a precarious position, with only a small tree preventing it from falling onto the tracks. Due to the danger that the vehicle might fall, train traffic in both directions was stopped.

Conway, a sergeant with the New Jersey Transit Police Department, was the supervising officer on duty at the time of these events. She did not go to the scene of the accident, but rather New Jersey Transit Police Officer Victor Migliorino was sent there. He reported to her that the Waldwick fire department, police, and emergency medical personnel were present, and that Waldwick personnel had taken charge of the scene. He did not believe Conway’s presence at the scene was necessary. She later deployed two other officers to the scene, contending that she did so in order that one of the officers could acquire more experience. She received periodic reports of the status of the scene from the officers present. She acknowledged in one radio transmission that it would have been easier if she were present. The New Jersey Transit police officers present did not play an active role in attending to the accident scene since Waldwick personnel were in charge. About an hour and one half after Conway was advised of the incident, the car was removed, and normal train traffic resumed.

Disciplinary charges were filed against Conway on January 10, 2005, due to her failure to go to the accident scene. She was charged with violating a General Order, which requires a police sergeant, as part of her duties and responsibilities, to “direct[ ] and participate[ ] in activities at the scene of emergencies.” Conway was also charged with “unsatisfactory performance” due to her failure to respond to the scene herself. 

The internal disciplinary hearing was conducted on May 20, 2008. In a lengthy written opinion, the hearing officer found the charges to be substantiated. In the final agency decision dated July 1, 2008, New Jersey Transit Police Chief Jospeh C. Bober found Conway guilty of both charges and imposed a two-day suspension for each charge, for a total suspension of four days. This appeal ensued.

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On July 28, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Donald Michelson, Department of Safety, City of Union. In the case, Donald Michelson sought review of the Final Administrative Action of the Merit System Board accepting and adopting the initial decision of the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”). The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that the City of Union had proven its charges of neglect of duty, other sufficient cause, and absence without leave against Michelson and concluded that the penalty of suspension without pay for six (6) work days was reasonable and consistent with progressive discipline.

On October 14, 2005, Michelson, a sergeant in the Union Police Department, was assigned to work in the communication center from 2330 hours to 0730 hours but did not report for duty. The Police Department schedule cycle requires officers to report for duty four days on and three days off per week for three weeks, then report for duty four days on and two days off for one week (called “the short week”). Before 0400 hours, Sergeant Botti, the Desk Officer Supervisor called Michelson to inquire about his absence. Apparently, Michelson mistakenly believed he was on the short week and not scheduled to work that day. He ultimately reported for duty at 0400 hours.

The Police Department charged Michelson with neglect of duty, absence without leave, and other sufficient cause. Due to his absence, which was undisputed, the ALJ determined: (1) the communication center was without supervision for approximately four and one-half hours; and (2) the desk sergeant put aside his regular duties to conduct an inquiry into Michelson’s absence. The ALJ also noted the police department operates as a paramilitary organization and prompt attendance is critical to the efficient operation of the department. The ALJ further found that the six-day suspension comported with the concept of progressive discipline. The ALJ, reasoning that Michelson had no intention to report for duty until Botti called him, rejected Michelson’s contention that he was merely tardy, not absence without leave.   

The ALJ, noting that superior officers such as Michelson must set an example for subordinate officers, also rejected Michelson’s claim that he was subjected to disparate treatment because no other officer had been suspended for arriving late. Additionally, the ALJ concluded that the record was insufficient to support a claim of disparate treatment as it did not contain the prior disciplinary records of the other employees, a factor bearing on the discipline to be imposed. Thus, no reasoned comparison could be made. Consequently, the ALJ affirmed Union’s determination that Michelson be suspended for six (6) days.

On review by the Board, it accepted and adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and found “that the action of the appointing authority in suspending [Michelson] was justified.” Accordingly, it affirmed the action and dismissed Michelson’s appeal. This appeal ensued.

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On March 31, 2008, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, decided the case Detective Sergeant Dean Ackermann v. Borough of Glen Rock and Glen Rock Police Department, Docket Number A-2947-07T2. In the case, the parties appealed and cross-appealed from an order entered by the trial court.

Plaintiff has been a member of the Glen Rock Police Department for more than twenty years. He holds the rank of sergeant and the title of detective. Defendants are the Borough of Glen Rock and its police department. On October 3, 2006, Steven D. Cherry, Chief of the Department, served Plaintiff with a disciplinary notice, charging him with acting contrary to good order and discipline and violating Glen Rock’s “No Tolerance Policy” with respect to wrongdoing in the workplace. The notice contained no recommendation with respect to discipline.

Three days later, Chief Cherry served an amended notice of disciplinary action which set forth nine charges. In the amended notice, Chief Cherry recommended that Plaintiff be suspended for three days without pay and be required to attend an approved course in sensitivity training. The charges were based upon complaints by Anna Maria Mattina, the Borough’s first female police officer. She alleged certain conduct by Plaintiff toward her was unwanted and harassing.

Plaintiff denied any wrongdoing, would not accept the proposed discipline, and requested a hearing. The hearing officer sustained the charges, but rejected the recommendation as to discipline. He recommended Plaintiff be suspended without pay for ten days as well as attend an approved course in sensitivity training. The report was submitted to the mayor and council, which accepted his findings but rejected the recommendation for discipline. The council passed a resolution suspending Plaintiff without pay for sixty days, demoting him to police officer and requiring completion of a course in sensitivity training before returning to active duty. 

In response, Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint in lieu of prerogative writ, contending that the evidence presented did not support the findings that were made, the procedure utilized did not conform to the Attorney General’s Internal Affairs policies and procedures that the Borough adopted, and that the increase in penalty was retaliatory.

The trial court, hearing the matter as a trial de novo, concluded that only two of the violations had been proven and that the penalty imposed by the Borough was excessive. The Court directed Plaintiff be suspended for two concurrent periods of thirty days without pay and complete a course in sensitivity training. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, the Appellate Division held that, when hearing a police disciplinary matter de novo, a trial court has the authority to impose a sanction other than that imposed by the municipality. In this case, the Court found no error in directing that Plaintiff not be demoted and instead imposing a suspension and directing attendance at sensitivity training. Moreover, the Court found that although Defendants violated the Attorney General’s guidelines for conducting a disciplinary hearing, the trial court correctly found that the errors did not prejudice the Plaintiff.

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In Division of State Police v. In the Matter of Detective Sergeant First Class Daniel Flaherty, Docket No. A-0257-07T20257-07T2, the Appellate Division addressed the validity and ultimate imposition of disciplinary charges lodged against a Detective Sergeant of the New Jersey State Police. The appeal arose out of disciplinary charges filed by the New Jersey Division of State Police (“Division”) against Detective Sergeant First Class Daniel Flaherty, charging him with: (1) disseminating Division documents without proper authorization; (2) behaving in an official capacity to the personal discredit of a member of the State Police or to the Division; and (3) willfully disobeying a lawful verbal or written order.

The underlying facts of this case were not substantially in dispute. In 2001, Flaherty filed an age discrimination complaint with the New Jersey State Police Equal Employment Opportunity/Affirmative Action (“EEO/AA”) intake unit. He alleged that since 1995, the State Police had denied him numerous specialist positions because of his age. The EEO/AA assigned Lieutenant Patrick Reilly to investigate his claim. After two years, in which the allegations still had not been resolved, the EEO/AA replaced Reilly with DSFC Kevin Rowe.

On May 5, 2003, Flaherty filed a New Jersey State Police Reportable Incident Form alleging “culpable inefficiency” against Reilly. Pursuant to a Division policy regarding non-disclosure of confidential internal investigations, the Office of Professional Standards (“OPS”) denied his request to access the file regarding his complaint against Reilly.

The following month, the State Police administratively closed Flaherty’s complaint file against Reilly and transferred the matter to the Attorney General’s EEO/AA section. In a letter dated September 24, 2003, a Senior Deputy Attorney General informed Flaherty that his claim against Reilly could not be substantiated. 

Thereafter, on May 31, 2003, the Division assigned Flaherty to the OPS, which was then called the State Police Internal Affairs Investigation Bureau. Pursuant to Division of Internal Affairs policies and procedures, “[t]he nature and source of internal allegations, the progress of internal affairs investigations, and the resulting materials are confidential information. The contents of internal investigation case files shall be retained in the internal affairs unit and clearly marked as confidential.” Notwithstanding these provisions, internal investigation files can be released in certain enumerated circumstances.  As such, Flaherty executed a confidentiality agreement which provided the dissemination of all confidential information and/or documents.

In a letter dated February 20, 2004, the Department of Law and Public Safety found that Flaherty’s age discrimination claims could not be substantiated. In his appeal to the Department of Personnel, Flaherty questioned the manner in which the State Police and the Attorney General’s office investigated his

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In the matter of O’Rourke v. City of Lambertville, Docket No. A-0481-07T3, the Defendants appeal the trial court’s decision: (1) reversing the Lambertville City Council’s decision removing Plaintiff, Michael O’Rourke, from his position as a police officer; (2) reinstating Plaintiff to his position; and (3) denying their motion for reconsideration. Defendant, Bruce Cocuzza, is the city’s civilian police director. Plaintiff, a sergeant first class, was the police department’s Terminal Agency Coordinator (“TAC”) for the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) system, which contains a wide array of law enforcement information. 

The city charged Plaintiff with conducting unauthorized and improper employee background investigations, in defiance of Cocuzza’s direct order, and engaging in conduct subversive to the good order and discipline of the department in doing so. At the disciplinary hearing, Cocuzza testified that he and Plaintiff were discussing the temporary transfer of an employee from city hall to the department when Plaintiff told him that the employee would have to submit to a background check or be fingerprinted for security purposes. Cocuzza said he told Plaintiff that no action should be taken until Cocuzza received written authorization from “somebody in authority” and spoke with the city attorney regarding same. Later, Cocuzza learned Plaintiff had performed background investigations of five civilian employees of the department, including Cocuzza, without authorization.

After the officer assigned who was assigned to the department’s internal affairs unit declined to investigate because of his long-term social relationship with Plaintiff, Cocuzza decided to conduct the investigation himself. In his report, Cocuzza wrote that Plaintiff had been insubordinate and that his actions constituted a serious breach of discipline and a flagrant abuse of authority. 

Plaintiff testified that he performed the checks under his authority as TAC officer, indicating that under the State’s security policy anyone with access to the NCIC system had to have a background check and fingerprints taken. He also stated that he understood Cocuzza to mean that he should not ask anyone for their fingerprints, which he did not do. He did concede that he did criminal checks on five employees, including Cocuzza.

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In the case of In the Matter of Mark Moncho, Mark Moncho, a Sergeant First Class, appealed a final decision of the Division of State Police finding him in violation of Article VI, Section 2a of the Division’s regulations (performance of duties) and imposing a ten day suspension.

Moncho was assigned to the State Police Construction Inspection Unit. The Construction Unit is a component of the Traffic Bureau and operates as a partnership between the New Jersey State Police and the New Jersey Department of Transportation. In this capacity, Moncho was responsible for overseeing five sergeants who, in turn, supervised subordinate troopers. His responsibilities included: (1) reviewing the patrol charts and weekly reports of the sergeants and the subordinates; (2) time-keeping; and (3) day-to-day supervision of the Construction Unit.

Ultimately, the Division of State Police charged Moncho with violating a series of rules and regulations involving billing and overtime. Moncho pled not guilty to the charges and, on June 28, 2004, the Division transmitted the matter to the Office of Administrative Law. After conducting numerous hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded: (1) Moncho violated none of the specifications underlying disciplinary charges; and (2) nevertheless, Moncho was guilty of the performance of duties disciplinary charge based solely upon the amount of overtime he had earned. On August 2, 2007, the Division of State Police issued a final decision upholding the ALJ’s decision in its entirety. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Moncho argued that when the ALJ found that the Division had not met its burden of proof as to the specifications in the charges, the ALJ dismissed all bases of liability of which Moncho had notice. Moreover, Moncho argued the Division’s decision to discipline him absent a showing that he engaged in fraud, misleading conduct, or the violation of a policy is arbitrary and capricious.

In its decision, the Appellate Division agreed with Moncho’s contentions. The Court concluded that the record did not support the Division’s decision and this was further compelled by the ALJ’s incongruous findings. In effect, the ALJ created a new basis on which to justify disciplinary action after hearing and rejecting the official charges and specifications lodged against Moncho. The Court further noted that at no time was Moncho ever notified that the accrual of overtime, in and of itself, could subject him to disciplinary action. Accordingly, the Court determined the final decision of the Division to be arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and thereby vacated the penalty imposed. 

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In the case of In the Matter of Carpenito, Sergeant Vincent Capenito appealed a final agency decision dismissing him from the Division of State Police. The Appellate Division sustained Carpenito’s dismissal and rejected his contention that the policy of progressive discipline required a less severe sanction.

On March 24, 2006, Carpenito was charged with five disciplinary infractions of the rules and regulations of the Division of State Police. The case was eventually transferred to the Office of Administrative Law as contested matter. A seven day hearing was conducted by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), who issued an initial decision finding Carpenito guilty of the charges against him and recommending his termination of employment. Thereafter, Colonel Joseph Fuentes, Superintendent of the State Police, adopted the findings of the ALJ and dismissed Carpenito from the Division. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Carpenito argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the findings that he engaged in conduct that warranted discipline; and (2) the sanction of dismissal was inconsistent with the general policy of progressive discipline. The Court, in rejecting Carpenito’s arguments, found that the Superintendent’s determination that Carpenito left his post while on duty and lied to investigators was based on Carpenito’s own admissions and, therefore, Carpenito’s contention that he was denied his right to cross-examine his wife because of her invocation of her Fifth Amendment right was of no consequence. 

Moreover, the Court found the Superintendent was entirely justified in terminating Carpenito’s employment due to the seriousness of the misconduct. The Court held that the Superintendent properly: (1) recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished record and; (2) considered Carpenito’s prior disciplinary history and numerous occasions of alleged domestic disputes. As a result, the Court determined the application of progressive discipline was not appropriate in light of Carpenito’s egregious conduct.

This case illustrates an instance of where a general policy of progressive discipline will not be adhered to by a public employer. Should a disciplinary infraction be very serious in nature, a policy of progressive discipline can and will be abandoned so as to ensure a proper disciplinary response. This outcome should be noted by all public safety officers who intend to rely upon their employer’s policy of progressive discipline when contesting a disciplinary action. The seriousness of the misconduct, along with prior disciplinary history, may be used to circumvent a policy of progressive discipline and, therefore, may impose more serious consequences upon an officer than originally anticipated.  

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In State v. Thompson, A-2279-07T4, the Appellate Division held that a violation of the Conflicts of Interest Law and a code of conduct adopted pursuant thereto is not a sufficient basis for criminal prosecution for official misconduct.

In the case, the State appealed from an order dismissing 36 counts of a 42 count indictment. Thirty two counts charged six Treasury employees and two employees of OSI Collection Services, Inc., a vendor selected by the State, after competitive bidding, to collect tax deficiencies and delinquencies, with official misconduct. Four counts charged two of the State employees and the OSI employees with engaging in a pattern of official misconduct.

Twenty eight of the counts can be grouped into fourteen pairs. One count in each pair charged the State employee(s) and an OSI employee, as an accomplice, with the receipt of a benefit, including meals, entertainment, spa treatments and golf outings. The other count charged failure to report the receipt of the benefit to the appropriate ethics authority. In large part, the State relied on the Department’s Code of Ethics as the source of the duty allegedly breached.

Four counts also charged official misconduct when State employees failed to recuse themselves from the process involving an allegation of improper billing by OSI, the extension of OSI’s contract, selecting the committee that evaluated the bids, determined the winning bidder, and setting conditions on the bid that presumably gave OSI a competitive advantage in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2a.

The Appellate Division, in affirming the dismissal of the receiving and failure to report counts, held that reliance on a violation of the Conflicts of Interest Law alone does not set forth a basis to impose criminal sanctions under the official misconduct statute as the imposition of criminal sanctions does not follow from a simple conflict of interest. There must be some additional allegation of wrongdoing. 

Considering the case law regarding official misconduct, the Court concluded that the imposition of criminal sanctions does not follow from a simple conflict of interest. Culpability is not based on the receipt of a gift in the absence of some additional allegation of wrongdoing. The Conflicts of Interest Law does not set forth a basis for criminal liability under the official misconduct statute. Although it sets forth the ethical obligations of State employment, its terms are not self-executing and do not proscribe any conduct. 

The Court also noted that the Conflicts of Interest Law and Code of Ethics apply to all employees in the Department, providing general and generic rules. However, official misconduct requires an alleged failure to perform a duty specifically required of the defendant’s office. Moreover, the Conflicts of Interest Law does not provide sufficient notice that the unreasonable appearance of impropriety may lead to a defendant’s conviction of a crime.

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