Civil Service Commission's Denial of Appeal Upheld

Posted on November 4, 2009 by Donald Barbati

 

On November 4, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Michael Curtin, Battalion Fire Chief (PM3593G), Elizabeth, Docket No.: A-4861-07T2. In the case, Michael Curtin appealed from the decision of the former Merit System Board (“Board”), now the New Jersey Civil Service Commission (“Commission”), denying his appeal of the scoring of his promotional examination as well as the Commission’s decision again denying the appeal following remand for consideration of supplemental information.

Curtin is employed by the Elizabeth Fire Department with the rank of captain. He took the Department of Personnel’s examination for the position of battalion fire chief, and received an overall score of 89.270. He was ranked third on the eligible list. He appealed the scoring of the oral portions of the examination to the Board. In a five-page decision dated October 11, 2007, the Board denied the appeal.

Curtis appealed to the Appellate Division. On April 14, 2009, in response to Curtin’s motion to supplement the record, the Appellate Division remanded the matter temporarily to the Commission, which had replaced the Board as of June 30, 2008, for consideration of the arguments raised in Curtin’s motion. Following its review of Curtin’s additional arguments and documents, the Commission issued its remand decision on August 20, 2009, again denying the appeal. As a result, the Court permitted Curtin to supplement his brief on appeal.

The Appellate Division noted that the burden is on a petitioner, not the Commission, when challenging the administration and scoring of examination. Moreover, when reviewing examinations, the Commission shall decide any appeal on the written record or such other proceeding as the Board deems appropriate. Finally, the Court indicated that courts should defer to an agency’s grading of a civil service examination except in the most exceptional of circumstances that disclose a clear abuse of discretion.

Applying these principles, the Court was satisfied that the Commission’s decision on the remand was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The Commission duly re-evaluated the Board’s original decision in light of Curtin’s additional arguments and explained its reasons for disagreeing with his position. Moreover, the Court noted that it was not its role to second-guess the Commission with respect to the scoring of civil service examination and this case does not present “the most exceptional of circumstances that disclose a clear abuse of discretion” warranting such interference.

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Promotional Examination Results Remanded in Light of USERRA

Posted on October 12, 2009 by Donald Barbati

 

On October 5, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of John Fasanella, Docket No.: A-4455-07T1. In the case, John Fasanella, a sheriff’s officer in Mercer County, appealed a decision of the Merit System Board (“Board”) upholding adverse administrative determinations regarding a promotional examination for lieutenant.

The promotional examination for lieutenant was announced with a closing date of December 21, 2004. Fasanella was one of the nine individuals who applied for and were admitted to that examination. The examination was conducted in written form on June 9, 2005, however, Fasanella, who was on active military duty from May 12, 2004 to June 25, 2006, was unavailable to take the examination on the date it was given.

The June 9, 2005 examination resulted in a four-name eligibles list, promulgated on September 29, 2005, with an expiration date of September 28, 2008. The first-ranked person on that list, a non-veteran, was appointed effective December 1, 2005.

On July 24, 2006, shortly after Fasanella’s return from active military duty, the Department of Military and Veterans Affairs granted his application for veteran’s status. He made several requests of the Department of Personnel (“DOP”) to schedule his make-up examination for the lieutenant position. His examination occurred in June 2007. A memorandum from DOP, dated September 10, 2007, noted an “employment list change” with Fasanella ranked first on the list with veteran’s status. An October 15, 2007 memorandum from the Sheriff’s Office to Fasanella advised that the ranking had been modified as “for future certifications only.” Fasanella promptly filed his internal appeal from the latter determination.     

Subsequently, DOP notified Fasanella that his veteran’s status designation had been incorrect and that the eligibles list had been corrected to reflect his rank on the then-existing list as “A1 non-veteran.” Fasanella appealed that decision.

In considering the issues raised in the two appeals, the Board rejected Fasanella’s contention that he was entitled to the lieutenant appointment because he was, ultimately, first on the eligibles list and had veteran’s status. The Board determined that Fasanella did not qualify for veteran’s status at the time the list was certified. The Board also decided that the latitude conferred on the appointing authority by operation of the “rule of three” validated the appointment of the person who had been designated, notwithstanding that he was second on the list after Fasanella’s name had been added.  This appeal ensued.

 

On appeal, Fasanella argues that: (1) the eligible list resulting from the initial examination should have been conditional pending his return from the active military service; (2) his name should have been added to the eligibles list as first-ranked following the result of the make-up examination; and (3) he was entitled to veteran’s status in that listing.

The Appellate Division agreed with the Board that Fasanella was not entitled to veteran’s status on the eligibles list since when he qualified for the examination, Fasanella had not yet engaged in his active military service. However, the Court remanded this matter to the Board for a determination of Fasanella’s rights in light of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). On remand, the Board must determine what the promotions result would have been or should have been if the choice had been properly made from the superseding list on which Fasanella’s name appeared as first-ranked, without veteran’s status, subject to the rule of three.
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Suspension of Hudson County Corrections Officer Upheld

Posted on August 17, 2009 by Donald Barbati

 

On August 17, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Juan Melendez, Docket No.: A-4617-07T1. In the case, Juan Melendez, a Hudson County Corrections Officer, appealed from a final administrative determination of the Merit System Board (“Board”) imposing a fifteen-day suspension for neglect of duty and other sufficient cause warranting discipline.

The Board adopted the initial determination of an Administrative Law Judge on a remand following his first determination that the suspension should only be for three days following Hudson County’s suspension of thirty days. On appeal, Melendez argues that: (1) the decision of the Board upholding the charges is not supported by credible evidence in the record; (2) the penalty of a fifteen day suspension is at odds with the concept of progressive discipline and appellant’s prior disciplinary history; and (3) he is entitled to attorneys’ fees based on having prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues.

The testimony before the ALJ revealed that Sgt. Kevin Orlik reported, and testified, that Melendez was asleep at his post in a trailer annexed to the jail on March 19, 2006 when Orlik and other officers arrived to conduct a search of the cells. In his testimony, Orlik testified that when he entered the trailer he “saw Officer Melendez reclined back in a chair with a roll of toilet paper as a pillow or cushion behind his neck,” “his eyes were closed,” and he was “motionless” as he was observed “for approximately a minute to two minutes” until other officers entered the trailer and started to make noise. Melendez testified that he wasn’t sleeping and told that to Orlik when he directed Melendez “to write a report on why [he] was sleeping.” Melendez challenged Orlik’s credibility by noting that his written report omitted details embodied in his testimony.

There was also testimony about the practice of standing when a superior officer enters the room. Melendez did not do so on the night in questions, and testified that it wasn’t a “regular routine” and he generally did not do so. Although the failure to stand was not itself a basis for discipline, it was determined to be relevant to the issue of “attentiveness” at the time, as well as to the ALJ’s finding that the inattentive conduct was a “sufficient cause” for the three-day suspension he initially imposed.

On the remand, despite making credibility determinations against Orlik because of the failure to include certain details in his written report, the ALJ found neglect of duty and “other sufficient cause” for the discipline, and found that “the failure to stand and acknowledge Sgt. Orlik’s when he entered the trailer to constitute being inattentive.”

 

In its opinion, the Board agreed with Melendez that “his failure to stand was not a specific infraction or charge,” but concluded that it constituted “evidence that he was inattentive, which he was charged with,” and “[i]t was the appellant’s inattentiveness that constituted his neglect of duty as it could have resulted in harm to the inmates.”  

The Appellate Division affirmed the determination of the Board in its entirety. The Court agreed with Melendez that the failure to stand when Orlik entered the trailer was neither a basis for the disciplinary charges nor can be a basis by itself for disciplinary action. However, the Court noted that it could be considered by the Board to be part of the overall neglect of the circumstances by Melendez. His response to the entry of a superior officer was relevant to whether he was paying proper attention and was sufficiently attentive to his circumstances. While it may not be a specific violation for not standing when a superior officer entered the trailer, the Court did not disagree that the subject related to Melendez’s “inattentiveness,” and “[i]t was the appellant’s inattentiveness that constituted his neglect of duty as it could have resulted in harm to the inmates.” 

The Court also determined that the discipline imposed cannot be considered “shocking to one’s sense of fairness,” although the Court may have reached a different result. Lastly, the Court found that the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining that Melendez did not prevail on “substantially all of the primary issues,” and thereby denying him counsel fees. Some of the charges were sustained and a fifteen-day suspension was imposed on the Board’s review and, therefore, the Court agreed with the Board that Melendez was not entitled to fees despite the reduction of fifteen days of the suspension.
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Candidate Properly Bypassed Under Rule of Three

Posted on June 18, 2009 by Donald Barbati

 

On June 18, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Andre Ruiz, Firefighter (M2271E), City of Camden, Docket No.: A-2611-07T2. In the case, Andrte Ruiz appealed the Final Administrative Action of the Merit System Board (“Board”) issued on October 11, 2007, concluding that the City of Camden (“City”) properly bypassed Ruiz under the “Rule of Three.” Ruiz also appeals from the Board’s January 22, 2008 Final Administrative Action denying his petition for reconsideration.

On October 3, 2005, the Department of Personnel (“DOP”) issued Certification Number Ol052133 to the City respecting open-competitive lists M2013A and M2271E containing the names of 150 eligible candidates for the position of firefighter. Ruiz was on list M2271E. The City returned the certification in March 2006 proposing the removal of several names, including that of Ruiz, ranked thirty-sixth, on the ground that he failed to meet the City’s residency requirements. On April 3, 2006, the City appointed thirty-five eligible candidates to the position of firefighter while the propriety of the proposed removals was still pending before the DOP.

On January 18, 2007, the Board determined that the City had failed to establish that Ruiz and five other eligible candidates, including Ruiz’s brother who resided at the same address as Ruiz, did not reside in the City. As such, the Board ordered the City to either produce sufficient documentation to support removal of the six eligible candidates based on non-residency, appoint them, or produce adequate justification for bypassing them or removing them on other grounds within sixty (60) days. 

On March 14, 2007, the City responded to the Board’s January 18, 2007 decision by submitting additional documentation to the DOP seeking to establish that Ruiz and the five other eligible candidates did not meet the City’s residency requirements. Thereafter, on April 3, 2006, the City notified the DOP that it had used the Rule of Three to appoint thirty-five eligible candidates to the position of firefighter. Despite stating it employed the Rule of Three, the City represented that no eligible candidates had been bypassed and appointments had been made through eligible candidate No. 74. The City sought entry of an order that it had properly disposed of open-competitive lists M2013A and M2271E.

On March 20, 2007, the DOP issued a disposition-deficiency notice to the City, notifying it that the reasons it had submitted for removal of Ruiz and two other eligible candidates, including Ruiz’s brother, based upon non-residency were not acceptable. It permitted the City to bypass two of the three eligible candidates provided the City submitted a short, written positive statement explaining why other lower or equally ranked eligible candidates were appointed. However, it required that the City appoint one of the three eligible candidates.

 

In the meantime, open-competitive list M2271E was scheduled to expire on June 20, 2007, and the DOP Director of Selection Services requested that the expiration date be extended until new employment lists could be issued based on a new examination. The Board extended the expiration date and, pursuant to that extension, the City appointed Ruiz’s brother, the highest ranked of the three remaining candidates as a firefighter. 

Subsequently, on July 26, 2007, Ruiz filed a notice of appeal and petition for enforcement of the January 18, 2007, final agency action. He alleged that thirty-five eligible candidates had been appointed and that the City had failed to comply with the Board’s requirements for either adequate documentation of nonresidency or justification for removal or bypass. He further alleged that the City had appointed thirty-five firefighters, but had failed to appoint him.

On October 11, 2007, the Board issued its Final Administrative Action on Ruiz’s notice of appeal and petition for enforcement. The Board concluded that N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.4(c) and N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.8(b)(4) placed the burden of proof on Ruiz to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the City’s decision to bypass him was improper. The Board found that Ruiz had not even alleged “a specific improper reason underlying the appointing authority’s bypass of his name” and found that the City had fully complied with the Board’s January 18, 2007 decision. Accordingly, the Board found that the current disposition of the certification, including the bypass of Ruiz’s name, was in compliance with its prior decision and the Rule of Three. Thereafter, Ruiz filed a petition for reconsideration, which the Board ultimately found to be without merit. This appeal ensued.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision in determining that Ruiz failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the Board’s actions were arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. First, the Court found that all of the issues raised by Ruiz on appeal were not properly before the Court. Specifically, Ruiz’s time to appeal the January 18, 2007 Final Administrative Action expired ling before his July 26, 2007 notice of appeal and petition for enforcement. Second, the Court explained that any expectation that Ruiz had of mandatory appointment was defeated by the possibility of being bypassed that the Board specifically permitted on January 18, 2007, a final agency action from which Ruiz did not appeal. Further, as the Board observed, there is no evidence that Ruiz was not considered by the City when it selected the most qualified of the three remaining eligible candidates.
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Appeal of Removal for Failure to Complete PTC Course Dismissed

Posted on June 8, 2009 by Donald Barbati

 

On June 8, 2009, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Tanya Johnson, Docket No.: A-0482-07T2. In the case, Tanya Johnson appealed from a final decision of the Merit System Board (“Board”) terminating her employment as a parole officer recruit.

In her position as a recruit, Johnson was required to complete a Police Training Commission (“PTC”) course. She began the basic course on January 9, 2006. On March 24, 2006, she failed a test for unarmed defensive tactics. She was given remediation training, but on March 29, Johnson failed the test again and was dismissed from the PTC course.

On the same date, March 29, 2006, Johnson was served with a notice of dismissal from her position as a parole officer recruit. On March 31, 2006, she was served with a preliminary notice of disciplinary action for failure to comply with N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(11), which required her to successfully complete all of the instructional areas of the training cycle. She was removed effective April 4, 2006, and a departmental hearing was held on July 19, 2006. The charge was sustained.

Johnson appealed to the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Training Academy on April 20, 2006. The Training Academy, however, was not the proper venue for the appeal and Johnson’s counsel was advised that the appeal had been filed with the wrong party and had to be filed with the PTC. The appeal was not sent to the proper venue until almost a year after her dismissal, however.

Ultimately, the matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law (“OAL”) and, thereafter, the appointing authority moved to dismiss on the grounds that the appeal was not timely filed with the PTC. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) granted the motion and the matter was dismissed with prejudice. Johnson appealed to the Board and the Board affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal of the appeal. However, the Board dismissed the appeal without prejudice. This appeal ensued.

Since the dismissal of the appeal was without prejudice, the Appellate Division held the matter was not ripe for appeal because it did not know whether Johnson was ultimately successful in having the PTC accept her untimely appeal. Although Johnson argued that the Court should order a preliminary hearing on the merits, the Court determined it could not do so since Johnson has not complied with the procedural requirements for an administrative hearing. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice because is interlocutory.     

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Merit System Board Increase of Disciplinary Penalty Upheld

Posted on March 24, 2009 by Frank Crivelli

 On March 20, 2009, the Appellate Division decided In the Matter of Larry Martin, Docket No.: A-3271-07T3. In the case, Larry Martin, a police officer with the City of Jersey City, appealed from a disciplinary penalty imposed upon him by the Merit System Board.

Martin, who had been a member of the Jersey City Police Department for 22 years, failed to attend mandatory weapons qualification training for a new service weapon, a Glock .45 caliber handgun, on May 10, 2005. As a result, he was charged with “disobedience to a lawful order” and “absence without leave” in violation of the Police Department’s rules. After holding a hearing, Jersey City sustained the charges and imposed an eight-day loss of vacation days. Martin appealed to the Board.

The matter was referred to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) who conducted a hearing. The ALJ, in his decision, found that Martin had been given a direct order by his superior officer to attend the training session and failed to do so. The ALJ sustained the charges and the disciplinary penalty. Neither party filed exceptions and the matter went to the Merit System Board for a final decision.

After conducting its independent review of the record, the Merit System Board agreed the charges had been proven. However, the Board increased the penalty to a 120 day suspension based on Martin’s previous major disciplinary history. In reaching this conclusion, the Board considered the seriousness of the underlying incident, the concept of progressive discipline, and Martin’s prior record. This appeal ensued. 

On appeal, Martin contended that the Board’s decision to increase the penalty was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable and unsupported by the record. The Appellate Division disagreed and affirmed the Board’s determination. The Court found no basis to overturn the decision and noted that Martin had defied a direct order of his superior officer, on a very important issue, namely firearms training. The Court further noted that Martin had a prior history of four substantial disciplinary sanctions. Based on the nature of the underlying infraction, Martin’s past history of disciplinary sanctions, and the Board’s policy of progressive discipline, the Court did not find the increase in the penalty to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 

The case illustrates the principle that an agency can increase the penalty imposed upon a public safety officer in appealing a disciplinary determination. Many times, the increase will be upheld if the agency, such as the Civil Service Commission, adequately considered an officer’s disciplinary history, the nature of the underlying matter, and the policy of progressive discipline.

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Officer's Resignation Not Attributed to Duress, Upheld

Posted on January 21, 2009 by Frank Crivelli

 

In In the Matter of Thomas F. Fricano, Borough of Freehold, Docket No.: A-2280-07T3, the Appellate Division addressed Appellant Thomas Fricano’s appeal from final decisions of the Merit System Board (“Board”), dated September 27, 2007 and December 7, 2007, upholding his resignation in good standing from the Borough of Freehold Police Department.

By way of background, Fricano received a regular appointment as a police officer in Freehold on April 3, 2006. The appointment was subject to the successful completion of a one-year probationary working test period, commencing after completion of a police training course. On February 2, 2007, Fricano, in a written letter, resigned to pursue other opportunities in law enforcement. The appointing authority accepted the resignation, which was made effective February 22, 2007. 

The circumstances surrounding Fricano’s resignation are in dispute and at the core of the appeal. According to Fricano, on February 2, 2007, after having served ten months of his one-year probationary working term, he was summoned to the office of the Police Chief. Allegedly, the Chief ordered Fricano “to resign or be terminated immediately.” Denied his request for legal representation or to have a PBA representative present, Fricano drafted and submitted a letter of resignation under duress and coercion. Thereafter, on February 16, 2007, Fricano’s counsel wrote to the Chief requesting that he be able to rescind the resignation. The Borough attorney advised Fricano that he would not be reinstated, instead stating that “they could have fired him instead.” Subsequently, on March 13, 2007, Fricano was issued a preliminary notice of disciplinary action, charging him with numerous violations. On March 22, 2007, the appointing authority withdrew the charges and, thereafter, on March 28, 2007, issued Fricano a letter indicating that he did not satisfactorily complete his working test period and that he was being terminated effective April 3, 2007.

The Borough offers a different version. When called to his office, the Chief advised Fricano that his performance during the working test period had not been satisfactory, and, therefore, offered him the option to resign effective February 22 or face termination for failure to satisfactorily complete his working test period. This offer was made so that Fricano could avoid any stigma which might attach to an involuntary termination. Fricano decided to resign and submitted a resignation letter the same day. In the letter, Fricano explain that he resigned to pursue “a different choice in the Law Enforcement Career.” Although he did not work after February 2, he was paid through February 22, and his resignation was recorded effective February 22, 2007. After being subsequently informed of Fricano’s intention to challenge his resignation, the police department issued the preliminary notice of disciplinary action on March 13, 2007. On March 22, 2007, the police department withdrew the charges and, instead, as a cautionary measure, issued a letter to

 

Fricano informing him that he had not successfully completed his working test period. 

Thereafter, Fricano filed an administrative appeal challenging his resignation. In a September 27, 2007 decision, the Board upheld the resignation, finding insufficient evidence that Fricano’s resignation was the product of duress or coercion. This appeal followed.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s finding that Fricano voluntarily resigned his position. The Court determined there was sufficient credible evidence that Fricano was told he would be terminated because he had not satisfactorily performed during his working test period. Moreover, the Court found that Fricano voluntarily chose to accept the offered opportunity to resign to avoid any stigma attached to termination. According to the Court, Fricano’s deliberate choice of available alternatives cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be ascribed to duress.
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